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SYNOPSIS	 March 21st 198..
My concern is with what it is to be an artist. I believe
the matter can best be considered in terms of a theory
of agency since it is my contention that any claim that
a person might make to be an artist is a claim that he is
making about his agent-concerns.
I shall accordingly endeavour to establish certain
conditions under which we may posit the agency of an artist.
This is by no means to make a special case of artistic
agency for it will be my especial care to show that any
person who claims to be an artist is necessarily constrained
by the conditions of his situation as one human agent
amongst others. That which marks his agency as that of
an artist is the character of his concerns. An artist is
one whose reflective and practical activities are oriented
towards some making whose character is necessarily pictorial.
I shall show that the agency of an artist has a public
aspect, for an artwork is necessarily a public object.
This has implications for the artist which he may not
evade; furthermore the viewer is himself, as agent, obliged
to recognize the active nature of his response to artworks.
Artist and observer are in a communicative relation whose
locus of intelligibility is set by the pictorial constraints
of the work of art. An artwork is a pictorial form of
thought. I hold that since an artwork is a manifestation
of the reflective and practical concerns of the person who
made it there is good reason to take the agency of the artist
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A Note on the Form of Address.
I trust that nobody will register any offence at my
reference to the male throughout the text. It should in no
way be taken as an indication of any other purpose than that
of avoiding the tiresomeness of the impersonal, the
awkwardness of 'his/her', or the overtly political option
which would be expressed by reference to the female. Any such
platform would seem in the circumstances redundant. The
equality of the sexes is not the question.
A Note about the Illustrations
Wherever possible I have placed the illustrations
in such a way that they may be referred to without
turning the page. In all cases the plates are disposed
upon pages facing the text. I have been fortunate
throughout to have the use of
Ed Kinsey's drawings. It seemed to me important to
present his work as near as possible in the context of
the notebook in which he did them. I have therefore
tried to disturb the sequence of his cogitations as
little as possible. However, although the work done at
this stage is discussed in terms of its being consequent
upon the largely reflective activity of prospecting, I
have thought it valuable to use his drawings in such a
way as will be most informative of the process as a
whole.	 This is why some sketches are included in the
section on prospecting where perhaps it might otherwise
be objected they do not properly belong. Since the
development of Kinsey's prospect is clearly sequential I
have not given a descriptive account of these studies;
the progress is pictorially clear. I have also been
fortunate in having access to two of the paintings which
relate directly to certain of the studies. Monochrome
photographs of these works are presented in
juxtaposition to the preparatory drawings in the section
on painting.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
My concern is with what it is to be an artist. If a person
claims to be an artist it is my contention that such a claim is to
be understood in terms of that person's agent-concerns. Thus,
firstly I am not concerned with characterizing a condition of
being, but rather with establishing conditions under which we may
posit agency as that of an artist. There are two points essential
to my account of the condition upon which it is possible to posit
the agency of an artist. Firstly, Art is something we do. It
follows that I must reject the idea of an artist as one subject to
inspiration; inspiration is, in the present connection, a function
of action. Secondly a work of art is irreducibly pictorial,
however widely or particularly it may refer.
In attending to this matter I stand at the conflux of two
fields of interest for I come to the enquiry an interested party,
with all the problems and advantages attendant upon that
situation. As a painter, the territory is familiar and the
questions of concern are of concern to my work. It matters that I
try to come to terms with them; it is a case of really wanting to
know.
Furthermore the matter seems to me to have a significance
beyond itself, for the questions of concern for a painter are of
philosophical importance. In setting out upon an account of the
agency of an artist I hope to show, by examples of some
particularity, both the implications of any claim a person might
make for being an artist, and, also, that findings upon the
particular case are of some value to a wider account of human
agency.
It will be clear throughout the text that I have been a good
deal influenced by the work of John Macmurray, not however, for
what he has to say about art, as for his regard to the nature of
the self; the nature of a person. Concerning art, his view would
appear to be inimical to mine, since he is inclined to accede to a
concern with art as an "activity which is no activity"; 1 being,
as he would have it, primarily reflective. My view is that all
the activities involved in the making of works of art whether they
are overtly physical or predominantly reflective are orientated
ever towards a particular outcome. Whilst he and I would
therefore not concur on this point, I do believe his view on the
practical primacy of human agency is germane to my concerns and he
might, had he been alive yet, have been persuaded of my views as
relevant to his thinking. I believe they are. The relationship
of reflective and practical activities in making artworks has to
be regarded as integral in the activity; yet if it is possible to
speak of primacy of one mode of activity over another, then, since
the artist is necessarily engaged upon making things, pictorial
artefacts, it would be reasonable to regard the concerns an
artist has as primarily practical. I do not need to take a
specific stance of Macmurray's notion on art, and I shall not do
so, for it to be clear enough in the course of reading the text
that there is a case for regarding the activities of artists as
comprehensive and clear examples of human agency. My attention to
the activities associated with specific concerns that artists
explore will thus be in terms which invoke the tenor of his
thinking on agency, while offering an account of some relevance to
an expansion of ideas, which were ahead of their time and which I
believe are of a significance even now not widely appreciated.
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My concern will be to characterize the agency of the artist,
with whatever follows from it in terms of regard for the material
product of such agency: the object which is the work of art.
shall look to questions of agency from the standpoint both of the
artist, as agent, and from the standpoint of the observer as
agent, for human agency of whatever character, has a public
aspect.
The scope of my enquiries will be structured in terms of four
conditions under which we may posit the agency of the artist. In
each of four chapters a condition will be examined in the context
of different examples of things that artists do. This will serve
to relate my special concerns to a broader philosophical context
for in looking to the constraints of the examples I shall find
myself confronting problems familiar in philosophy, which in some
measure at least, will prove to be illuminating to my concerns.
These are the conditions:
I. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist
implies his concerns as pictorial. An artist creates pictorial
space.
II. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist
implies a communicative stance.
III. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist
implies an artefact, a product, characterized by a manifest
cohesion of reflective and practical endeavour. This product is a
pictorial form of thought.
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IV. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist
implies the product of his endeavour as a manifestation of his
agency as personal.
The implications of accepting each and all of the conditions
as outlined are in their several aspects interwoven and far-
reaching, as much in consideration of the agent standpoint of the
spectator as in exploring the agent standpoint of the artist.
Acceptance of the conditions requires that the activities of
painters, sculptors and so on, come under scrutiny from several
points of view. The constraints of making upon the reflective
activities of the artist cannot be set aside. Neither,
conversely, may the practical activity be regarded as excluding
reflective activities. From the standpoint of the spectator it
will become clear that he cannot disregard those agent-concerns of
the artist, since the very work present to his attention is their
manifestation. Conversely the artist must, whether he would or
no, accept that a communicative stance is a condition of his
agency as an artist. He cannot evade it. Involved in that
ineluctable obligation on the part of the artist is the equally
unavoidable recognition, on the part of the spectator, that what
is presented to his attention is a pictorial statement, having
about it the marks of the agency of the artist as personal. And
this is to say something important about the kind of entity an
artwork is. These points show that although each condition is
informative on particular aspects of artistic agency it would be
mistaken to try to regard any one of them as wholly independent.
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I shall be at pains to point up the integrated nature of these
aspects of agency in my thesis concerning the activities of
artists.
I should like to disclaim any intention to set out a general
theory of agency. The particularities of the case are such as to
make a general account difficult. Indeed it would seem
inadvisable, perhaps mistaken to try it. Having said that,
neither do I want to make a special case of the agency of artists
however particularly it is to be characterized. What can be shown
to be true about artistic agency does, I shall argue, have wider
application. It might well be that consideration of particular
examples can contribute to the general field of concern with
Agency; but parallels would not always be aptly sought. The
order of the text will follow in sequence as the conditions are
presented. Each chapter will be prefaced with an outline of its
substance. I shall be able to consider only a few of the vastly
many different things artists are concerned about. My
illustrations are drawn from a variety of sources. I am indebted
to Ed Kinsey for his generosity of spirit in submitting to the
barrage of questions day by day over many years on the nature of
his concerns as a Landscape painter. His work features
significantly as a consequence and I can only hope that I have
done him no injustice in my dealings. In attending to the
structure of a drawing exercise it seemed right and proper,
however, that I should do the thing myself. The drawings are
designed to show the progress of a pictorial idea as it relates to
observable objects and is undertaken in an attempt to cope with
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some of the difficulties of the task and, more importantly, to
expose the weaknesses in some notable theories about drawing.
This, from my point of view, is an account put forward a good deal
for the sake of my students, whose worries are usually worth
attending to.
CHAPTER I.
A CONCERN WITH PICTORIAL SPACE
I. Introduction.
In this first chapter I will attend to the first condition
under which we may posit the agency of the artist: in whatever
sphere of activity, the agency of the artist implies his concerns
as pictorial.
An artwork is a factitious object, irreducibly pictorial in
kind. I am unrepentant about giving new life to a word which in
its usual connotation is not very polite. Yet some apologetic is
in order. The derivation is unexceptionable (facere: to make,
0.E.D.) As "made for a special purpose, not genuine, not natural,
artificial", it seems apt that I use this word in connection with
artworks. They are indeed "not natural"; we do not find them, we
make them but they have their own peculiar nature as
manifestations of activities of certain kinds. While we speak of
artworks in terms of veracity we yet accept that they set out to
be "genuine", yet the constraints of truth conditions are not
applicable to their discussion. An artwork is quite certainly not
some kind of shadow of reality; that an artwork is indeed an
artifice is a necessity; yet that does not make it a sham (see
IV.3.2.2). It is in keeping with my concern for the nature of the
activity and for the irreducibly pictorial nature of works of art
that I now prove the worth of this term. In remarking works of
art as factitious objects I am aware of invoking deep fears, long
held, about the nature of agency involved in their making. I do
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not dispute the derogatory force associated with the use of this
term. The artist has ever been held in extraordinary awe and the
secular protestations of the present generation should not blind
us to a persistent superstition about the 'special powers'
vouchsafed by inspiration and invested in artistic 'genius'. Much
of the i Singspiel i that accompanies articles about artists,
gallery 'blurbs', films and art videos depends for its viability
upon an unquestioning acceptance of the artist as a special sort
of being. There are grave dangers in leaving such beliefs
intact. The dangers are themselves a perennial topic, as Thomas
Mann has so convincingly shown in his novel 'Doctor Faustus'.
My purpose is to consign that old Familiar, the Daemon of the
Creative act, to his own everlasting perdition. I shall in no
sense detract from the wonderment of creative activity; but I
shall show that the very marvel of the matter has its possibility
in agency of a wholly human sort. This is appropriate
circumstance for awe, for where there is no appeal to the notion
of Special Beings, there is - for there can be - no side step in
the communicative requirement. And that, truly, is a matter of
abiding and general concern to artists and philosophers alike.
That an object is factitious is, of course, no guarantee of
its being an artwork; it could be a poem, for example. To
produce a factitious object which is an artwork is to be concerned
with exploring constraints of pictorial space. In this chapter I
mean to consider the notion of space as it fundamentally occupies
the attention of the visual artist in his endeavours to settle the
direction, in reflective and practical terms, of his working
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concerns. It is a logical point and not a phenomenological
one, that we cannot concern ourselves with pictorial matters of
any sort whatever except upon the assumption of pictorial space.
Furthermore to posit concern with pictorial space as a condition
of the agency of the artist is to say something informative not
only about artworks and about artistic agency, but also it is to
implicate, in an active way, the agency of the spectator.
These notions, of pictorial space and the artwork as a
factitious entity, are entwined in the notion of artistic agency.
A factitious object is invented, created; an artefact which
depends for its being upon being made. It has thus some
observable form, which much that that implies with regard to its
existence in the world as an object amongst others. Yet an artwork
is, in ways characteristic of it as a factitious pictorial entity,
both material and imaginary. It is materially real enough but an
adequate account of pictorial space cannot be provided in
material object terms. Neither is the space of an artwork to be
found in the head; there is no 'ghostly snapshot'. We may say
this: a painting, sculpture, drawing and so on, is literally a
form of thought; imagery manifest. An artist may make use of
whatever starting place he pleases. The world serves his creative
turn. Such making has at times been compared with the works of
Nature. Consider Cezanne's Kantian remark, '1 want to make nature
and art the same. Art is a personal perception 	  which I ask
the understanding to organize into a painting." 2 As it were, "the
active mind ordering its objects, or representations", 3
 it matters
not what the subject of attention is nor what the influences or
impressions might be; the agency of the artist requires that the
thing made, in prospect and eventual form is a
factitious, pictorial entity. Merleau-Ponty illustrates it thus,
"...it can be said that a human is born at the instant when
something that was only virtually visible, inside the mother's
body, becomes at one and the same time visible for itself and for
us. The painter's vision is a continued birth." 4 There must
become some thing and the agency of the artist is critically
unfulfilled if he is not about the essential pictorial business of
effecting that becoming.
In order to recognize a concern with pictorial space as a
condition of artistic agency we must see that any artwork requires
that we unconditionally accept from the outset the constraints of
organized space as integral to the work and not separable from it
in any way. This has implications for the observer and it has
implications for any artist. A number of approaches will help us
to understand the importance of the matter.
Certainly the concept of pictorial space is of concern in the
spectator's approach to the visual arts, for the spectator's role
is primarily to be characterized in terms of a stance implied in
the compositional structure of the work of art. To illustrate the
direct importance of this matter I will take one example in order
to discover what happens when we are persuaded as spectators to
try to ignore the constraints which fix the pictorial integrity of
an artwork. This will then be related to other cases, which will
severally enable me to show the implications for the observer as
one who, as agent, actively seeks the intelligibility of artworks.
Then, to demonstrate the matter as of fundamental concern for
any artist I shall myself undertake a drawing exercise, such as
might be set a class of new art students. Some of the problems of
creating pictorial space will reveal themselves in so doing and
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the main substance of the chapter will be taken up with their
discussion. What should be remembered is that the value of this
drawing exercise, which is common enough in an art student's
education, is that it isolates and exposes problems which any
artist of whatever experience, must encounter not just in making
this sort of drawing, but on a more deeply complex level for a
great deal of his working life regardless of the reflective and
practical context. The activity undertaken in this exercise will
therefore be discussed in terms of the following considerations.
Beginning with a brief outline of some ways of thinking about and
of creating different sorts of 'pictorial space' I shall attend
to three matters of concern.
1. The feeling of apprehension experienced by the artist at the
moment of putting a mark on a clean canvas or sheet of paper. I
regard this difficulty as evidence on the part of the artist of
his awareness of his agent-concerns as being committed, in respect
of there being an artwork intended, and unavoidably uncertain as
to how exactly it will develop. Does the first mark on a canvas
begin the 'full concrete activity of painting'? What is the first
moment in making an artwork?
2. This raises the question whether I should have attempted to
discuss the artist's work in terms of his intentions. My decision
not to take on the business of explaining the agency of the artist
in terms of current Intention theory is explained in terms of my
whole thesis being testimony to the business of making artworks as
a deliberative endeavour. The agency of the artist implies that
endeavour as intentional. Admittedly that is worth
consideration in itself but I do not feel that any discussion of
intention at the present time could avoid a review of the very
considerable, and for my purposes largely peripheral, field
currently receiving fervid attention; and this would not be the
place for that. I shall therefore use the term as in ordinary
parlance. However, I shall give some consideration to the question
whether the activity involved in doing an objective drawing should
be characterized as a goal-directed activity.
3.	 I shall then consider the drawing insofar as it is about an
object, attending to a prevalent anxiety about the notion of
drawing accurately which usually takes the form of supposing that
there might be a right way to draw the object. Students worry
about this. Their difficulty I shall argue is a great deal due to
a mistaken belief that drawing can be characterized as primarily a
matter of learning to see.	 This Learning To See Theory (LTS)5
certainly regards the activity of drawing as oriented towards
improved knowledge of the perceived world. The idea is, broadly,
that if observation is accurate, a transcription is possible whose
success depends upon the extent to which a two-dimensional account
can create an illusion of a three-dimensional object. I do not
question the processes involved in such an undertaking as having
their part to play in certain sorts of drawing. However I cannot
consistently regard learning to see as the first and last concern
of the artist, even in making the sort of drawing in which
transcription is involved, since this would be to challenge the
irreducibly pictorial nature of the drawing itself. Depiction is
not to be regarded as evidence for some piece of seeing.
I shall rather summarily put to one side a certain well-known
assertion of Gombrich concerning the use of constraints and
schema, 6 since it is all too easy to show that he is
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ambiguous; there are, I suggest, quite enough difficulties to
deal with without attending too closely to possible extrapolations
upon an unclear case. I do not, of course, dispute that an artist
makes use of schema, and devises constructs of all kinds. The
problem is that Gombrich's argument is intended to upset the
learning-to-see theory of drawing but it founders in that it could
as well serve to support as to refute the notion of drawing he is
out to contest. I shall argue that the point of the drawing made
by the student is not to see how well the world matches his
making, any more than it is to find out how well he can see or how
well his construct describes the world. The student comes to
understand that the object he can see is just a starting place for
his prospect. That prospect, the creation of any kind of
pictorial space, obviously involves the use of contructs. But
there is no need to regard their undoubtedly necessary role as
standing in need of comparative criteria. Making, in my view has
very little to do with matching. 7 To suppose that it has is
precisely to limit the activity to skills of transcription. There
is no way forward along this path - it is best abandoned. To
point up the appropriate ways in which constructs may more or less
well be set to work I shall go on to look at some drawings by Van
Doesburg, Mondrian and Paul Klee. The first two artists may be
seen to be employing methods of drawing which they feel to be a
way of creating, out of the observable objects of study, pictorial
space of a new kind whose pictorial intelligibility is to be
characterized as a manifestation of the Theory of
Neo-Plasticism. We shall see, incidentally, the pedagogical error
of relating a pictorial matter too closely to its visual
beginnings. Neo-Plasticism provides good examples of the case to
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be grasped as a fundamentally pictorial issue.
I then turn to Paul Klee, in pursuit, (Pedagogical Notebooks,
The Thinking Eye, V.I), of "The Essential Nature of Objects", in
order to look at the conceptual issues of importance to him in his
search for the essential nature of an object.
1.2 Constraints of Pictorial Space as they concern
concern both Artist and Observer.
The artist as agent must concern himself with pictorial
space. Whatever the field of expression the product of reflective
and practical activity is an object fundamentally governed by the
constraints and compass of pictorial space (see 1.3.3 and 1.4.1).
The artwork has pictorial integrity. It has a surface. This
integrity of surface governs the way the viewer regards the
spatial relations of the work, in two or three-dimensional terms,
as it might be, as pertaining to the pictorial context of the work
and the manner by which it engages the attention of a viewer, in
its conceptual context. 9
 As may be seen in many Seventeenth
Century Dutch paintings, 9 what may be explored for a number of
reasons is a breakdown of the distinction between painted space
and actual space; the eye is readily advised. A sculpture, it
might be supposed, is incapable of the same kind of integrity, but
the supposition is wrong. The sculptor, no less than the painter,
is concerned with the constraints of pictorial space. However I
shall not deal specifically with a sculptor's problems since they
deserve a good deal more attention than I can presently give.
Pictorial space, for any artist, is a fact of life. It might
be called an aesthetic fact, to be sure, but as far as we may take
a person to be an artist we may take it that his agency is
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necessarily engaged upon its creation. Thus while the notions of
space he works with may be construed aesthetically, his working
concerns are rightly construed in the context of his agency.
The space of an artwork however expressed is a complex. The
elements which together make it a complex have a relation to each
other. The framework or format the artist decides to impose in
making a two-dimensional work,sets the context within which the
marks he has made have juxtaposition. The new student has to be
warned not to regard the format or frame as some unrelated, mere,
boundary. An example will help. I might ask: if I draw a square
and put a circle into it, how many shapes have I made? When this
question is put to students they do not always see that I have
made not two shapes only, but three: the square, the circle and
the complex unit in which the third is given in the shape of the
space the circle creates within the square. The nature of the
relation between these parts of the complex image is integral yet
without the context of the format - the square - they are not in
relation. For the contextual format to be other than it is is for
there to be a quite different image which exacts a different
response from its viewer. I shall explore further matters
pertaining to the factitious nature of pictorial space at greater
length in the section taken up with the exercise of an objective
drawing. Before I outline some of the notions involved in a
concern with pictorial space, it may help to illustrate the
importance of the matter, not only to the artist, but also to the
observer since, as Chapter II. will show, the concerns of the
observer are by no means remote in the agent-concerns of the
artist. Let us see what happens if we try for an example to make
three-dimensional something which is necessarily two-dimensional.
It may seem like a thing nobody would attempt, but a persuasive
attempt has been made to do just that. This raises a number of
issues, not least significant of which is the possibility that the
attempt might, under certain conditions be successful. Recently a
furniture design project explored the idea of making
'masterpieces' - or Furniture of the Painting. 10 Thus we might
possess, it might be supposed, a De Chirico chair, a Cezanne
table. Consider first the objections which are easiest to grasp.
Apart from the difficulties of sitting on the chair or putting a
glass on the table, with any degree of confidence, which is itself
very irritating, there is a deep contradiction in attempting to
put into volumetric terms on object whose pictorial sense -
distortion and all - rests in that object's being necessarily
two-dimensional (see I. 7.2). This example is useful in that it
very nicely makes my point about contextual nature of pictorial
space but it also raises a number of other interesting and related
points. It happens that, for one thing, we can only see that this
furniture is by way of being 'from the painting' by standing in
one place to look at it; seeing it as if we were seeing it in
two-dimensions. As regards the matter of thereby having a Cezanne
table or a de Chirico chair there are two ways of avoiding
absurdity. It is still possible to buy chairs and tables such as
those painted by the Masters. You might try and see what it would
be to paint their portraits in the manner of Cezanne or de
Chirico. It would be an instructive thing to do. Otherwise you
might simply buy yourself some cheap reproduction of the
paintings. That is really the only way that I know of possessing
a 'de Chirico Chair' or a 'Cezanne Table', other than actually
-16-
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owning the works or their furniture. However, the matter is not
quite despatched, for we may take the matter further:
As the illustrations opposite show, it has long been thought
possible to consider interior design in painting terms."
Indeed that seems to work well enough. Walking into a painting is
somehow conceivable. But why? It is not a trivial point to say
that one example works and the other just doesn't - though it may
seem rather absurd. The real point here is that pictorial space
sets very particular constraints. To 'turn' an essentially
two-dimensional object into a three-dimensional object is to
misunderstand the nature of the pictorial space in question. If a
painted interior is meant by the artist to work as a wrap-around
pictorial space, then why should it not work as such? Of course,
it does.
The question remains: what sort of thing would we be getting
in buying these pieces of furniture? We have seen that we should
not thereby have bought ourselves a de Chirico Chair or a Cezanne
Table; but we would be buying objects whose starting point had
been paintings. As such this would put the Chair-piece or
Table-piece, rather curiously, somewhat on a par with the
paintings. Just as the paintings refer to the external world of
chairs and tables, for the sake of the pictorial space of the
paintings, so the furniture-pieces refer to an external world,
whose objects are in this case paintings, for the sake of the
pictorial space of the furniture-pieces. These pieces may seem to
work for the spectator on the basis of allusion; for we get the
point only if we know that to which they allude. The allusion is
wrought on the basis of a three-dimensional transcription of
two-dimensional objects. To propose the other possibility, of
•3 .

the furniture-of-the-painting, is contradictory as we have already
seen.
To give another example of its being a mistake to regard
artworks as being too closely about reality, we might take the
work of a modern painter Georg Baselitz. 12 Recently he has used
inverted images. His paintings seem therefore to be about things
which are upside down. The spectator tries to turn upside down to
see them but finds that the images don't work right way up; they
only work as upside down images when seen from rightway up, which
is to see them as upside down. It seems right to say that
Baselitz's paintings create for us an image of upside-downness
which has its sense only in terms of seeing it as being upside
down. All sense is lost by up-ending the image, or the
spectator. The spatial inconsistencies have their point, which is
a point about reality: the presence, the attention of an
observer 13 . Baselitz I suspect makes us believe in some real
space in the world which need never to have existed. That it does
or does not, however, is important for this reason:reality is
visually puzzling. From the painter's standpoint this is a matter
which is pictorially intriguing and valuable. From any standpoint
concern with the particular structure of a given pictorial space
focuses such questions about reality whose meaning can only be
satisfactorily taken in pictorial terms. So, to return to the
furniture; admittedly it turns out never to have been anything
but a pretty and maddening caprice, an impossibility as
furniture. But we can at least say that what it does show us,
which is much more interesting than the initiators of the
enterprise may, or needed to, have foreseen, is the extent of our
response to the operation of the format upon the images selected
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for attention by the painter. That which he wants to do is
constrained from the outset in all its visual aspects of pictorial
space, which needfully includes the format he opts to deploy
(see III. 3.5.2). From the observer's point of view that is why
it is necessary to stand in one place to see that the furniture is
Of The Painting. We need to see it at the right angle. But that
is to see the painting; and that is why I have not bothered to
include any illustration. The 'furniture' can help us to
recognize something about the pictorial space of the paintings we
might have thought we already know. Furthermore we know from this
that unequivocally, "the viewer is compositionally as well as
functionally implied". 15 Further consideration of the spectator
as agent is the subject of Chapter II.
1.3. An Objective Drawing Exercise
When an art student is set an exercise of objective drawing
this is what happens: an object, or group of objects, is set out
on a surface so that the students in the class each have a clear
vantage point. The group is usually set up in order to emphasize
some particular pictorial problem. The students may be asked to
consider now they might deal pictorially with the effects upon the
object of a strong light source; the surface textures of the
objects of different substance, and so on. From the teaching
point of view we may regard the exercise as set up to help the
student to develop the ability to cope with certain kinds of
problem. %
 He will be asked, for example, to make careful
observations in a given medium of the objects before him and to
take account of related or associated phenomena; to bring to his
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observations an imaginative conception of the group of objects and
associated phenomena (see 1.7.4). He will, moreover, also be
expected to give evidence in the drawing of some apprehension of
formal attributes as conventionally associated in the visual arts
with objects as ordinarily perceived ('form', 'tone, 'line' etc).
What is of fundamental importance is that the student produces a
piece of work which shows his personal point of view concerning
the perceived objects, in a two-dimensional statement which is a
visual object in its own right.
1.3.1. A disclaimer concerning the terminology:
Objective drawing is the name given to an exercise. The
exercise is designed to develop the capability to make pictorial
matter of perceptible things. Thus a relation between the student
and the perceptible thing is given in the agent-concern of the
student. The concerns must be with the thing he is going to
make. The drawing is a factitious object. The term 'objective
drawing' should not be understood in this connection as indicative
of a particular philosophical stance with regard to the real. The
question, regarding the matter whether there might be some
objective reality, is at issue here only insofar as it has a
bearing upon the artwork. For the present it is my purpose to
describe an exercise, exploring the terminology only in that it
seems to extend our understanding of this aspect of the agency of
an artist: the making of pictorial space.
The student is encouraged to experiment. Thus he might pay
special attention to some qualities, some relationships, some part
of his imaginative prospect of the objects of study. He is
encouraged to take his account as far as he thinks justified
with reference to any of these aspects of attention. He is
encouraged to concern himself with the practicalities of
abstraction, thus furthering his own level of understanding about
abstraction. The drawing he completes will itself be an entity,
an artefact; its own internal relationships are crucially
important and the cohesiveness of approach achieved in his work is
considered a measure of the success of the exercise.
1.3.2 Success and Veracity.
It must be said that talk about success is recognized to be
problematic. The drawing teacher cannot set upper limits to
achievement; it follows that he cannot assess the ultimate
success of this exercise in terms of having 'correctly' solved
problems (see 1.6). There just are no set answers and since the
problems are in the main not such as to conform to the limits of
definition there really could not be right answers. Nevertheless
he may try to set minimal limits to achievement. There is no
doubt that occasionally a student's drawing fails to convince. A
number of factors are involved in doing the drawing: basic
handling abilities facilitate performance; what is expressed
takes its authority from more than one source and presenting
evidence of a variety of influences requires intelligent and
sensitive consideration and handling. It is as well to state that
there is such a thing as a bad drawing. But what do we look for
in a good drawing? What follows is by no means only the case in
respect of objective drawings, as such. We should recognize that
any artwork whatsoever may in its early stages involve a great
-21-

deal of drawing. Drawing should be regarded as the core study in
any concern with the making of works of art. For a while it was
relegated almost to oblivion in the Schools of Art, but happily
its importance is being recognized once more. It is, as I shall
show in Chapter III. 7.2.3. vital as a form of thinking in the
agency of the artist in any connection. A good drawing has
veracity; it is without prejudice to its non-propositional
status, a true account of something. This by no means limits the
drawing to the function of transcription for it may as a drawing
be true of a great many things, not all of which have perceptible
characteristics. That which marks such a drawing may show us
things we should be unable to discover about the object by looking
at the object itself. To take an example of a mundane sort, an
engineering illustration is able to show us, by means of a cutaway
view of a component, that which neither I nor the camera could
disclose. Interestingly such a drawing is far better at showing,
at putting the spectator into contact with, this component than a
photograph ever could be. 18
 Such a drawing shows us how something
is, but the way the drawing looks is not the way the object looks
to us (although we readily believe that this is just the way the
object looks to us). The veracity of that drawing is that it
convinces us about the way in which that object, in some necessary
aspect, is made and functions. 17
 If such a drawing should be
confusing to look at we cannot grasp what is being conveyed
regarding the object. Such a drawing would in this respect be
deficient. A thoroughly bad drawing of this kind fails completely
to be of use.
That the objectives are easier to state in the case of an
engineering illustration does not prejudice the argument for other
4,
5
cases, regarding the veracity of a drawing as being a mark of its
being a good drawing and the lack of it as a mark of a bad
drawing. I enclose a drawing which I would rate a thorough-going
bad piece of work. What makes me say so? For one thing, it is
anatomically sadly improbable and since, apparently, a literal,
naturalistic presentation is intended, then he might have taken
the trouble to work out the likely disposition of one set of
haunches with regard to another as they occupy the bench, or is it
a tree? The drawing is lazy, unconvincing. Not only that, I find
myself wanting to add comments of a less than respectful kind, in
balloons. Something about the ideas at work in the drawing is
risible and offensive. It is however, not that the man can't 
draw, for he is well enough reckoned on technical competence; it
is that 'The Three Graces' suffer the artist's customary derisory
treatment; all is reduced to coyness, stockbroker's blondes
discovered on the patio. Drawing itself is turned prostitute.
For a contrast let us confront a drawing by Egon Schiele.
Rebarbitive, not the least bit risible. The drawing is
convincing, painfully right. This is, as the other drawing is
not, a work in good faith, of shattering veracity. (see Chapter
II. 4.4 on testimony).
For the art student, as he sets out to make an objective
drawing of any object, what is asked of him is an honest approach
to his own concerns. There are no short cuts in drawing, and the
clarity and directness of Schiele is hard won. Nevertheless an
honest and searching enquiry is not the prerogative of the
emotionally riven: neither need it wait upon experience (see I.
3.4).
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1.3.3. Setting up the Exercise.
I have given an outline of the teaching objectives of the
exercise. I want now to undertake for myself the exercise as it
might be undertaken by any student, or for that matter any artist
as he follows up his various concerns. The point of the exercise
is to demonstrate a fundamental aspect of artistic agency which is
that an artwork is, as a pictorial statement, a manifestation of
the several concerns of one person. In this thesis as a whole I
shall be exploring the necessity of certain of these concerns to
the agency, as such, of any artist. This section deals expressly
with the manner in which an artist pursues an attention to the
perceptible object in terms of the sort of pictorial statement he
is wanting to make. Certain constraints attend his endeavours.
The perceptible attributes of the object before him; question of
pictorial space; the manner, in terms of medium and construct, in
which his statement is to be construed. These points have been
raised already (see 1.2). I mean now to take them further. It
would be impracticable for the present purpose to indicate the
number of drawings which might ordinarily be involved as
preliminaries to a study or set of studies so I will try to show
in my drawings how such a study might proceed by giving a partial
indication of the stages of its development and of only some of
the possible directions in which I might extend its progress.
Later, in Chapter III I do try to show more of the progress in the
different context of the pursuits of a landscape painter.
An Objective Drawing Exercise.
Apart from the fact that my drawing skills are less uncertain
than theirs, my task is comparable with that faced by my students,
for the problems I shall encounter as I work are problems we would
have in common working side by side. Although any medium may be
used provided it is suitable to a two-dimensional study, I shall
use pencil; this allows me to convey tonal differences
particularly well. Not using colour simplifies the exercise for
the purpose both of its description and ease of reproduction. As
we can see, some objectives are already set. They act as
constraints upon what I can do.
There are ten illustrations, including the photograph taken
of the object after I completed my drawings, which were done from
life. I did not work from photographs for the reason that to have
done so would be to have supposed it possible to save myself some
of the selection processes precisely necessary to the
understanding of an important part of the exercise. The
photograph is two-dimensional. I have, in drawing, to discover
what is involved in presenting a two-dimensional account of
three-dimensional objects. But we should not put the
two-dimensionality of the photograph on a par with the
two-dimensionality of the drawing. Drawing involves a process of
transcription which I need to be engaged in to some extent in this
exercise, although it is not the sum of my concerns. (This point
will be argued more fully in 1.7.3) Now the photograph does not
stand to the object as the drawing stands to the object. For one
thing a photograph is not a transcription but a partially recorded
visual image. Copying from a partial record of a
three-dimensional object is not going to meet the brief, even so
far as the skills of transcription are concerned. However, since
it would be impracticable to include the object in my thesis the
photograph is provided to give as clear a partial record of the
object as possible.
In a paper on the nature of photographic material Kendall
Walton makes a persuasive case for regarding the photograph as
transparent, "A photograph... is not just a means of producing
pictures. It is also an aid to vision."18
Now what I am not about, as will become quite clear, is the
business of seeing an object more clearly. My business is with
making factitious images; thus it would not be at all to my
purpose to work laboriously at a copy of a photograph. This
would, if Walton is correct, mean that, whatever else I was after,
it could not take me very far in my pictorial concerns. Even in
the event of my being concerned with transcription, drawing from
life and drawing from a photograph are fundamentally distinctive
as endeavours; Walton distinguishes "seeing through photographs
and seeing directly" as "different modes of perception." Even
given his case that in seeing a photograph of an ancestor we
"really do, literally, see our..ancestors..", 18 which might
perhaps be hard to accept, we must accept that perceptual contact
can be mediated in a variety of ways, including photographs. But
that what a photograph is doing, and a painting or drawing is not,
is effecting a way of "maintaining contact, perceptual contact,
with the world". Thus to work from a photograph of an object is
to be in pursuit of precisely that which the exercise is not
designed to produce: perceptual knowledge of the object.
Whatever Walton says about the nature of painterly realism, which
I might not wholeheartedly support, he does seem to me to say that
about photographic realism which allows me to say that the
photograph does not stand to the object as the drawing stands to
the object.
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1.3.4 The Exercise as undertaken by myself.
(For comment on the frames, see over.)

Frame 1.
A photograph of the object as perceived. There are two
sources of light; one from top left and the other Indirectly from
bottom right. The object is a soap box, quite richly decorative -




Once I turn my attention to what I might do I have to
consider the pieces of paper as a space, empty. Any mark I put
down has reference to the shape of the paper. I will give myself
a format, or frame. (Since the illustrations have been put in
groups, this stage is perhaps hard to envisage.)
Frame 2 indicates that I start with a blank sheet. The point is
that there is a need to establish a scale. I shall continue to
work within this format.
Frames 31 & 311.
Having set the format, or frame, a further question of scale
has to be decided. The scale of drawing relative to the frame
makes a surprising difference, compare 3i. & 31.1. Frame 311.
fills the space and is very significant; the remaining spaces are
also made significant (cf. p.16). This is perhaps because the
spaces which remain in frame 311.. have more obviously noticable
boundaries. In frame 31. the impression is of much greater space;
a much slighter Image.
3i. The image almost vanishes from view. If I wanted to
emphasize the vastness of its surrounding space and its own
insignificance as an object, this scale might suit me. However,
the space left by so small an image is rather formless, the object
too small to be visually interesting - it does not accord with my




Frames 41 & 411.
4i. I opt to keep to the scale of frame 31. Now I consider
it as an object in light. Note that as soon as I start to draw I
have to memorize, for the moment I start looking at my piece of
paper and drawing I have stopped, although momentarily, looking at
the box. I have to retain some image of the impression to record
anything. I also have to create; to relate line to line, tone to
tone. Also I must still concern myself with the perceived
object. I find a means of relating pencil tones which satisfies
these conditions. I am transcribing for the moment.
4ii. Now the 'remaining' space becomes very important. I am
still much concerned with the box I can see but what I do next has
reference not only to the space and light around the box but also
to the 'space' and 'light' in the frame. In this frame the object
dominates the space, tonal emphasis underlines this dominance.
The greater emphasis of features found in frame 4i, i.e. these
areas in shadow, can either be left alone, as no more than a
heavier working of frame 4i, or it can lead to further notions,
such as 'dominance'. A mood has already been created but it is
tentative. The question now is how do I deal with it? Cautiously
I consider the possibility of allowing the drawing to express a
deliberate mood. What kind of mood will rest upon what happens
next. Transcription is not now at the forefront of my concerns.




I decide to put in the graphics. The labels are decorative.
This adds both to an impression of perspective at the same time
creating a decorative emphasis to the whole, although to emphasize
the graphics requires a slight distortion of perspective, which I
am slightly doubtful about. However, the tone is decorative,
intricate. I am strongly tempted to leave it here, being much
taken with decorative objects. Yet the question of mood might be
further resolved, not in terms of surface design but in terms of
the structure of the object in particular conditions of light.
I decide to ignore the graphics and concentrate instead upon
frame 4ii. again, upon 'dominance'. Two possibilities emerge. I
could work on another kind of mood: say, the threatening aspect
of 'dominance' or I could instead look for formal relationships of
plane and line.
Being unhappy with the notion of dominance in this context
(it feels quite inappropriate) I become fascinated for the moment
with the second possibility; the relationship of forms.
Looking back at frame 4ii, it occurs to me that I might
within the terms of the exercise play a little game with the
shapes and tonal relationships. As a melody can be inverted so
might the juxtaposition of related images.
6i
Frames 61 & 611.
6i. Comparing this frame with frame 4ii., the 'inversion' is
clear enough. The emphasis of the images is now in counterchange;
the only purpose, so far as I can see, being to give me a clearer
indication of a certain relation between the place surfaces within
my drawing. The perspective is 'lost' and the earlier mood quite
• dissipated. Perhaps mood as such is no longer a feature. I am
not sure, however, that another is not being created. For the
moment I will go on reducing the images, concentrating not upon
mood, as such, but rather upon line and plane. A game is on and I
must see where it leads me.
6ii. By now I have reduced the image to a recognizable
minimum of line. It cannot be further reduced, or abstracted,
without its becoming exceedingly difficult to relate the drawing
to the box on the table. Now, I am allowed to take an account as
far as I judge it fit; I could therefore abandon any attempt to
refer further to the box on the table, so long as I could justify
doing so in the terms of the exercise.
The problem rests with me to consider my feelings about the
box on the table, the object of study; with its own
relationships. I have feelings about both objects. It seems to
me important to further a visual account which relates, as it
seems to me truly, insofar as it is ever possible, to the drawing
as a drawing and to the box (see the discussion of veracity.
1.3.2)
I have to assess the progress so far and to decide where
frame 6ii. has brought me. It seems that this frame establishes
the most purely formal account so far. In frame 6ii. I have done
something not done before; I have reduced the form in its space
to line, a minimally inclusive account of the pictorial form of
the object and the space it occupies. There could be, of course,
other 'minimal' accounts besides this one, and the questions
attending the issue of what it is to pare down the observable
content of a drawing to a minimum, the constraints of the case,
are indeed of considerable interest to me.
But I do not like the account at all; I think it is even a
little worrying as an image and since I am increasingly involved
in the drawing as an image I am forced into a dilemma, for despite
my concentration upon a predominantly formal construction it seems
to me that I am still concerned with mood - what I have in frame
6ii is a drawing which does express rather a disturbing mood. Now
the formal progression seems unavoidable yet wrong because it
denies certain important responses to the box I am studying; this
in turn adversely affects my regard for my reduction of form and
something else, not knowing at this stage quite what 'something
else' might be. What is lacking in the formal approach seems to
be a feeling of sympathy; some important relationship between the
drawn and the seen is not expressed by drawing in this manner, so
coldly, as it seems to me. This is pictorially rather
unsatisfactory.
I must retrace my steps to consider frame 5 once more. This
one I enjoyed. Enjoyment is always a little suspect, perhaps
because it can lead to indulgence and thereby to errors of
judgement. However, the rigorous attention to form cost me the
awareness of other key qualities so I will examine this earlier
frame and see if it might be seriously developed. It seems to me
that if I leave out the decorative graphics I have in this case
left out an awful lot; it seems that this intricate relationship
to the box-form is significant. Consider the undoubted fact that
it was the design on the box that sold me the soap - change that
and I might, nearly, as well buy Palmolive. What is now and
perhaps always was of concern is the persuasive charm of that
design. At the risk of being self-indulgent frame 5 will be the
subject of further development.

Frame 7i & 7ii.
7i. In frame 71, something of the form is retained by
running two graphic images together, the lettering and the
illustration (the 'flowers') and, in doing so, using the
semi-circular light patch on the right side of the box, (see
frames 4i & 4ii) I have turned one quality to account in the
service of another. That is to say, the formal qualities of the
earlier drawings are employed in combination with the graphic and
decorative aspects of frame 5. The illustration, however, is only
hinted at in frame 7i. I seem to have worked 'OEILLET' both as
word and image at the expense of other associations. It is a good
word to draw with.
7ii. This is better; the form of the box and the form given
by the light are taken care of by the semi-circular disposition of
lettering. I can afford to 'lose' the box at the bottom corner -
this still allows a suggestion of something contained, some
indication in the graphics of that which the box might be designed
to hold. What I want is to convey some notion of that unseen
object, for which the entire package is advertisment. If I miss
that element in my drawing, I have missed, if not everything, a
great deal. Whether I know beforehand the precise contents of the
box or not is as such perhaps really not important.
I should in any case know it was a box - certainly I would
want to know its contents - I do know that boxes can be opened.
The contents of the box, whether known or guessed at are after all
of some importance, in that they become a matter of curiosity,
itself a considerable force, capable of creative expression.
Consider poor Pandora. What troubles had been spared the world
had she but remembered pencil and paper.
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One thing that could be said about having made such a set of
drawings is that the outcome presents some kind of record of
multiple response. This set of what designers term 'rough visuals'
has involved my skills, and feelings. But above all it has
exercised the capacity to develop in pictorial terms a factitious
product of reflective activity. The connection between the
perceived object, the box, and the object I have made is complex.
My drawing refers to the box (see III. 3.2 re 'aspecting'). It
also had, whatever its reference to that object, its own pictorial
relationship of form. The object on the table has to be seen as
necessary to the object I have created yet it would be an error to
say it could be sufficient to inform the created thing. In a way
I could say that if anything was necessary to this outcome it was
the wish to make a drawing combined with the trained capacity to
respond to an object on the table in the way I have. That
capacity is not dependent upon the box, as the object of study
since any other object would or could stimulate a response -
indeed the exercise positively requires that such skills and
capabilities be developed and employed regardless of the choice of
object. "In the formative vision everything is equalized, i.e.
enters into relationships, because by their nature the artist's
experiences synthesize." 20
I have described the activity in this section of the
Chapter. The next section is concerned with further discussion of
some of the conceptual and practical problems raised by
consideration of the objectives of the exercise. The exercise of
objective drawing as undertaken in the example serves to
illustrate the fundamental importance to the artist, in whatever
area of creative concern, of the fact of pictorial space.
The possibility of this fact depends entirely on the reflective
and practical endeavours of the artist. Whatever his concerns
with stimuli, of whatever kind, he attends to them for the sake of
that which he must, "on pain of loss of self", 21 bring into
being. The agency of an artist is, necessarily, the engagement of
his personal concerns in the making of artworks; individual
objects of factitious, pictorial space. Otherwise his agency as
an artist is unfulfilled.
If we consider the matter of drawing a box in this way, we
can see that what is going on at all stages of the exercise
supports this. It is a peculiarity of the case that whatever the
stimulus or starting point the emergent statement of the agent is
conceptually un-resolved as a statement yet, simultanrously, it is
a factitious object. That is to say, each little study in the
series shows a progress; a partial resolution of ideas. In each
some feature of the preceding study is retained; some feature of
the next anticipated. Yet although there is imperfect resolution
of ideas each study is a pictorial fact; a manifestation of
reflective and practical activity at a point of development;
malleable yet, but with pictorial fixity. The last study is
intended to state as much as I am concerned to deal with in the
terms set by my choice of object and the ideas about drawing it
with which I have been engaged. Any number of alternative
accounts would of course be possible under someone else's hand;
make no claims to having given a definitive approach, even on my
own account. 22 What the example is intended to show is that this
kind of making is involved from the outset in the business of
figurative representation of a fairly straightforward
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sort, such as might be agreed to be true of objective drawing. I
would again stress that concern with pictorial space is involved
in the agency of an artist whatever the form of making in which he
is concerned.
1.4. Spatial concerns of a pictorial sort:
Some examples.
We need now to look at some considerations relevant to the
notion of pictorial space before going on to expand upon what is
involved in its making. I have characterized pictorial space as
factitious; a created space. Once involved in its making an
artist must attend to certain spatial concerns.
1.4.1 Real Space; the real space of the ground.
For example, in the drawing I chose to work within the format
of a rectangle measuring six cm. by seven cm. Related to that
format we must then attend to the real scale of the images set
within the rectangle. Thus in my format (see illustration frame
6i, 1.3.4) I might place two tonal areas, one being 1.5cm. at its
widest; the other, 2cm. at its widest. The relationships of
scale between any and all of the elements may be described in
terms of real space. Recollect the illustration of this point
made earlier (see 1.2).
1.4.2. Illusory Space.
The contrivance of real space which presents the images in
such a way as to suggest relations of scale which may deny the
relationships of real space in that they would appear to be other
than they actually are. The painter devises illusions of depth,
distance, height, and so on, so that, to the eye of the observer a
sky arches above a distant ruined castle in an Eighteenth Century
Romantic Landscape. In my drawing 5 (see 1.3.4) I am about
rather a similar business. It would be a mistake to think of
illusory space as a matter of concern only to a painter of boxes
or Romantic Landscape, or that he could possibly be disregarding,
as he creates his illusions, of the constraints of the real space
of his canvas. We should note, although I cannot illustrate the
point, that, in painting, real space also involves the dimension
given in the use of colour fields. Picasso's 'Seated Woman',
1927, would not only appear to be other than it is were it not for
a considerable expanse of cadmium red; it would be in a real
spatial sense, other than it is. Colour must here be considered,
surprising though it often seems to students, in the context of a
three-dimensional spectrum. Thus we are adding a third dimension
into the two-dimensional format although it is within the real
constraints of a two-dimensional format that the colour dimension
has its effect.
Still on the matter of illusory space, the latter drawings on
the objective study series, from 6i (1.3.3) right through to 7ii,
while clearly not concerned with pictorial verisimilitude are
certainly concerned with creating mood, atmosphere. In this
respect, I am about a similar business to the landscape painter
using chiascuro to set the tone of his painting. The spectator
knows from this the stance with which he should as onlooker
approach this prospect. You could say that part of what I intend
in the last drawing is to re-create in you the rarefied pictorial
pleasures of my having purchased a certain brand of soap. Such
pleasures are not, I would have said fully to be expressed in
drawing no. 5, but something more may be included by drawing as I
did, at 7i and 7ii. Furthermore, that 'something' is not like
sprinkling the drawing with perfume; it is to do with your seeing
my pictorial point. My pleasure is to be grasped as an image.
The factitious character of pictorial space is well, though
not only, illustrated by those works in which no reference to the
world of objects, no external meanings or symbols, attach to the
disposition of images on the canvas. I refer especially to the
works of abstract painters. Their meaning is to be found in the
context of their pictorial configuration. The format and the
elements within it are made one; a cohesive complex image in
which no element has independent meaning. The painters who
address themselves to the problems of abstraction give us the
clearest examples, but of course what is true of these formally
particular paintings regarding their pictorial cohesion, turns out
to be no less true of any painting whatever.
1.5. Nervous Apprehension as a Mark of Pictorial Commitment.
Since I hold the view that the agency of the artist is
deliberative in character, it is relevant to my present purposes
to consider the artist's feelings as he takes on the business of
making an artwork. A certain commitment on the possible product,
the artefact, can occasion feelings of unease. I want now,
therefore to ask a leading question:
What is the first moment in an artwork? Starting from the
example of objective drawing we will now consider a matter which
causes problems regardless of the particular pictorial context.
have put it that the making of pictorial space is a condition of
artistic agency. It follows that we cannot, if this condition is
unfulfilled, posit the agent as artist. It is in these
circumstances not surprising if as an artist confronts a clean
canvas, or piece of paper, he experiences a moment of nervous
apprehension. I suggest that this moment of difficulty is
commensurate with a commitment towards making an artwork; that it
goes so far as to involve some apprehension of the particularity
of the pictorial entity intended. Some part of the difficulty may
be due to the knowledge that this commitment lies in the agent's
power of decision. I am concerned to show the interdependency of
reflective and practical activity in the making of an artwork. An
artist has, in addressing himself to the making of an artwork to
settle the direction of his pictorial concerns at some point, and
the question arises as to what might be called the first moment at
which he does so: the 'first moment' in a work of art.
It has been put to me that on the face of it the first moment
is no different from any subsequent moment in which deliberative
action is required. I believe that a case can be made for there
being certain distinguishing features. The question I want to
consider is what it is that distinguishes the first moment, in
starting a drawing or painting, from subsequent moments in the
activity. This is a matter to which I shall return in Chapter
III. in connection with a discussion of the relation between the
reflective and practical aspects of the activity of painting. We
shall attend here to its relevance to a discussion of what it is
to become concerned with creating an entity of some particular
pictorial sort. Let us move from the drawing of the box and
consider the question by way of further examples. We might suppose
that one answer to the question is that the first moment,
so-called, involves marking a hitherto unmarked surface. This is
to change the visible space at once. It gains a pictorial fixity
directly. Subsequent marks take account of that mark but they
develop rather than initiate a progress (see 11.4.3). This might
seem to meet the question; we have indeed noted this sort of
progress in the objective drawing exercise. However, there are
problems. We have to consider whether we should ask if the first
mark occurs at the first moment, or whether the first mark
constitutes the first moment. A concern with pictorial space may
be an on-going preoccupation but at some point the artist has to
give his preoccupation form. Should we characterize the beginning
of a work in terms of its first visible evidence, or should we
perhaps think of the beginning as some moment of commitment to a
particular pictorial prospect? The question is really to do with
what it is to take up a particular stance with regard to the
nature of the prospective work. The feeling of unease which
attends this deliberative activity is, I shall argue, evidence of
the artist's recognition of a necessary condition of his agency,
his personal involvement in the creation of some pictorial entity.
First I want to consider the mark as constituting the
moment. To suggest that the first mark inevitably occurs at the
first moment may be wrong as some examples will show. Suppose the
first moment of a drawing involves me in contemplating drawing but
does not involve my making a mark at all; it may not involve
observable action for some time and may perhaps at this stage be
rather like a random receipt of impressions. An early stage of
this creative process could involve no more than a moment of
awareness, which might lead to the decisive act of drawing. Such
a progression might take seconds or years. I might tell someone
"It has taken me forty-five years to start this drawing".
But now let us suppose that the mark is the only mark and wholly
constitutes the drawing; this cannot be to say that the mark is
the moment unless we can show that marks which artists make have
no reflective or practical history. Since my case concerning the
artist as agent implies a concern with pictorial concerns as a
constant preoccupation, this will clearly not do. Let us consider
a different kind of case. Suppose I have equipped myself with
both paint and brush in order to repaint the dining room. If
instead of the first and fiftieth stroke being succeeded by others
in the appropriate way to the purpose of re-painting the dining
room, I go on after a moment's consideration to create instead a
miracle of trompe l'oeil or just a wild but decorative flourish,
then that mark, so innocently made leads not to a painted wall
merely, but to a wallpainting. Now it must be admitted that I
cannot say the first mark of such a work was made at the first
moment of settling the question of the character of this
particular pictorial space. In this example something rather
curious happens; the first moment of the wallpainting has
succeeded a mark put down upon another purpose. Something about
that mark occasions me to change what I was doing. The first
moment of the new activity follows in this case upon the last mark
of the original, other activity. Thus the first moment of a new
activity is subsequent upon that mark and requires it, but I
contend it is still separate. Yet it could be said that since the
mark occasions a new activity and is also not set aside but part
of the activity, it would appear that that mark does occur exactly
at the moment of change. The problem is to know how to deal with
the link which seems to be appearing between the end of one
activity and the beginning of another. Since the outcome of
the two activities is distinctively dissimiliar there is something
amiss with any review of the mark which does not distinguish
between its status as the last of one kind and the first of
another kind of activity. I have changed the entire nature of my
activity, for I began by painting the dining room and I shall
finish by having painted a mural. I have become concerned not
with the dining room space but with a pictorial space. (The
dining room may have in the end to be relocated).
There is, of course, a discontinuity which pertains rather to
the moment at which I realize what has happened than to the mark
itself. Since it would be absurd to entertain any notion of the
mark as changing itself, it might be better to think instead of
some of the difficulty attending the first moment of a drawing or
mural being associated with that moment of consideration, which
might involve some of the nervousness about the unknown aspects of
what might happen that accompanies the commencement of any
artwork. Although the wall in the dining room has long gone past
being in any sense a blank canvas by the time I have changed my
intentions, changing the circumstances of its treatment might be
tantamount, as an experience, to confronting the clean surface of
a new canvas. The first mark of the work is accompanied by
practical and reflective commitment. It is the first indication
of the sort of entity the artwork could conceivably become. It is
the coming together of the many factors which produce that mark;
a perhaps sudden awareness of the possibilities of the product of
unnoticed occurrences: this realization it is which, both after
that mark is put down but most especially before sets up a
peculiar nervous apprehension. It is only experienced in
conjunction with the active intent (see 11.4.1). To feel it is
to be at the beginning of the business of doing a painting or
drawing; to begin a painting or drawing is to feel it to some
extent, even if the feeling is not inevitably unpleasant.
D.H.Lawrence, "It is to me the most exciting moment - when you
have a blank canvas and a big brush full of wet colour, and you
plunge." 23 The possible withdrawal from the activity at any stage
makes no difference to this being so. To have reached this moment
of difficulty is to apprehend something unavoidable: the
malleable and sensitive nature of the process of making an artwork
and the fact that commitment is required to see it through. Thus
it would seem that there is some distinction between some first
moment and the first visible evidence of the painting. But what
distinguishes this moment from subsequent moments of decision in
the activity? The reflective considerations which precede the
practical activity of painting are no guarantee of a painting, but
we may yet say that an inadvertant mark can occasion such
considerations. It is also the case that nervous apprehension is
ordinarily experienced in diminishing proportion as the practical
activity advances. The conception of the artwork is least
well-formed, is at its most vulnerable at that first moment for I
do not know yet how good an idea it can become and cannot in the
least bit begin to find out until that mark is made.
This is still not enough to account for the difference
between the first and subsequent moments of apprehension in the
activity because, since I cannot know how good it is until the
work is finished, a measure of uncertainty remains until that
moment is reached, and sometimes beyond. What we can say is that
this earliest noticeable moment differs from others in being the
last before the engagement upon some practical pictorial
endeavour.
I will conclude this section with a disclaimer. In saying that
this moment is distinct from subsequent moments in the activity
and that this moment does not occur simultaneously with the first
mark of the painting I might appear to be positing some separation
between the idea and its practical outcome, such that the idea
might be one thing and its realization something else. What I do
not want to say is that my apprehensive feelings are due to fears
that the idea can never be matched by my efforts. Such a view
might set up 'the moment' as a kind of bridge between the
reflective and the practical and as the means needful to some
concrete realization of the idea. There is, as I shall show, in
Chapter III, in the introductory section, a good case to be made
for considering the stages involved in producing an artwork
distinctively, but this in no way allows us to suppose that ideas
stand distinctively before or above, or against their realization
at any point in the process. The notion of pictorial space is
artefactual in orientation. It seems to me vital to stress the
lively nature of the preliminary processes. We may say this:
ideas may not have to be fully expressed to be possible as ideas,
yet for them to be pictorial ideas requires that we regard the
possibility of their practical expression as of central
importance. The difficulty of that first moment, or if you will,
the last moment before some pictorially particular practical
activity begins, is due to nervousness regarding the consequential
nature of the decision to paint X, draw X and so on. It is this
which in the example of the dining room marks the end of the
decoration of the walls, merely, and the beginning of the
wall-painting. This is what is involved in the artist's
recognition of the kind of his agency and the weight of his
commitment to the making of pictorial space.
1.6. Is the Deliberative Activity of Making artworks a
Goal-directed Activity?
I shall not enter into a discussion of Intention Theory in
this enquiry. Although it is likely that useful observations
might be made about Intention by looking at what goes on in the
making of artworks, it would be to become involved in a range of
problems many of which, as such, are not my present concern.
Suffice it to say that my thesis is testimony to the activities
involved in the agent-concerns of the artist as deliberative and
thus, intentional in character. "If we wanted to say something
about art that we could be quite certain was true, we might opt
for the assertion that art is intentional. By this we would mean
that art is something we do, that works of art are things that
human beings make." 24
In a deliberative activity, such as making an objective
drawing, questions arise concerning the nature of that which is
desired either as an outcome of, or as a formative influence
upon the activity. The drawing teacher has certain
art-educational objectives which include that the student learns
to develop pictorial objectives. It is possible to think of such
desires, or wants, in terms of their being goals. We might regard
art-educational objectives in rather his way, though I doubt that
the drawing teacher would want to specify limitations as to ends.
The success of the exercise must always be hard to gauge
(see 1.3.2). There are numerous activities for which one may ask
reasons why 25 and be unable to give an answer of any great
clarity in terms of their being goal-directed or not. To be the
person doing an objective drawing rather than the drawing teacher
who wants him to do it is to be engaged upon just such a
problematic activity. An artist may have a number of goals in
doing what he does; alternatively he may have a single goal. But
thirdly, it is possible to paint pictures, or draw in a
deliberative way, and not to have specific goals. In an example
of the second kind, the activity is directed towards the
achievement of a clear end, for example, meeting an order: ten
line drawings, 10"x5" by April 5th, on a specified topic, say,
"Feral Cats". In the first kind I might engage in similar
activity just because I want to; that is to say, all kinds of
reasons attend my action, all manner of hopes and fears accompany
my progress yet no single or separate goal sets a direction upon
my activities. For example let us suppose that one afternoon I
decide to do some line drawings - I have a new pen and some good
paper and this is incentive enough; there is nobody waiting on
the results, and I have been set no specification; no deadline.
What are my goals as I draw? It might be said that there is an
overriding goal which is 'to do a good drawing'; or that the
determination to master the materials was a goal. Granted that my
drawing will only be as good as my hand-skills (and vision) allow,
it seems odd to speak of these aspects of the activity as 'goals',
because, really, if I embark on the business at all, then I could
hardly be hoping not to do a good drawing. It seems to be a part
of my engaging in the activity that I hope to enjoy what I am
doing, which would involve that I manage to do it well which would
be to say that insofar as 'doing it well' was part of the
prospective and on going activity it was integrally so, like
hoping to enjoy myself, and so not capable of being set apart as a
goal to attain to. I remarked 'vision' for it seems to me that in
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wanting to do it well there are other things, different
considerations to the mastery of technique and material with which
I am concerned as I work. Suppose, to return to "The Box", my
interest is for the moment mainly in discovering a relationship
between forms in diffused light, it might be a relationship of
tone rather than form or vice versa, and furthermore my interest
is not as we have seen, primarily with the object, qua object, but
overridingly with my drawing. If the limitations of skill and
material define my performance in some measure, and necessarily
so, then, wanting to do this rather than that with the materials
must equally constrain my performance. That what I want to do
both informs my activity and, equally, is informed by it shows the
goals, if such they can be called, to be as integral to the
business in hand as 'wanting to do a good drawing'. Wanting to do
a good drawing is a condition of wanting to draw. Within the
activity as described we can say we have a variety of goals but
not that they stand to the activity as ends stand to means,
because the interdependency of goals with the activity allows no
such relation.
Now although I might easily draw or paint without having any
goals at all, yet I would certainly claim to be drawing
deliberately. Now let me put forward an example to meet the third
case. Suppose I consciously know only that I mean to draw.
(Clearly I am not about to do 'An Objective Drawing'.) We can
take as given the known limitations of materials and skill.
start out with no idea at all how things will turn out but I do
know this: I am not cleaning a room, making a cake, or meeting a
deadline. My activity is consciously that of doing a drawing.
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I can simply allow the process to take over. All that will stop
me is that I either like it well enough not to want to go on; or I
like it far too little to continue with it; or there ceases to be
room on the page. While it is actually quite rare for me at any
rate to proceed wholly in this way, it is quite possible,
nevertheless; and usually one works at least for some of the time
in this way.
The point is that it is possible to speak of a deliberative
activity which drawing is, without having to regard the concerns
involved as if they were targets. Generally speaking it would be
mistaken to suppose that for an activity to be deliberative is for
it to be goal-directed.
1.7 Some Problems raised for the Student.
The business of drawing an object has been given its fair
share of attention but a good deal of it is mistakenly conceived.
Let me now turn to consider some problems raised for students as
they come to the exercise of making an Objective Drawing.
Students often get worried about not getting their drawings
right. Their unease isn't entirely due to concern over inadequate
hand-skills. It is likely that it is due to the fact that they
are thinking about drawing in a misguided way. In setting up this
exercise we ask that the student brings an imaginative conception
to bear upon the objects arranged for study. We need to show that
the importance of an imaginative conception is that it helps the
student to decide about the kind of drawing he will do. What
counts is the use to which he puts it, in terms of his drawing.
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1.7.1. The Error of regarding Learning to Draw as Learning to
See.
Along with the idea that there might be one way of 'getting
it right' go two quite naive but neverthless seriously mistaken
and related views of what it is to draw an object: that drawing
what you see is the same thing as drawing what is there; or that
it is possible, more, a requirement that you replicate what is
there. Both these views have their foundation in the idea that
learning drawing is primarily a process of learning to see. I
will look at this idea first. Against this I shall consider the
so-called opposition to it. The doctrine, put forward by
Gombrich, 26 and all too memorably collapsed into the statement
that "Making comes before matching", 27 is supposed to show that
the Learning to See theory is mistaken. However, while it will
become clear that learning to see is only part of the story, it is
part of the story nevertheless. As my own exercise demonstrates,
(see 1.3.4) the mistake is to regard it as the point of the
activity of drawing. The theory that drawing is Learning to See
has been concisely put by J.McPhee and R.Degge, "Drawing and
seeing are closely related. Learning to do the one is to learn to
do the other." 28 This is true in one sense; finding what I want
for my drawing obliges me to look very carefully at the object.
In drawing the box, for example, I certainly began to notice more
things about it and as I noted the phenomena I certainly
considered the possibility of modifying the drawing (see 11.4.2).
However, it would not be true to say that I slavishly obeyed my
eye. To the demands of the eye must be added the constant review
of its judgement. Seeing, in this matter, is for the sake of the
drawing. Drawing is not nowadays done for the sake of seeing.
Interestingly, we might regard Leonardo as having been more
particularly engaged upon the business of drawing in order to see,
his concern being primarily, not with drawing, but with the status
of knowledge. But I do not regard this as central in the
education of the modern art student in the exercise of objective
drawing. He learns to explore a pictorial prospect. His
discoveries about the object might be crucially important but we
should see their importance in terms of the drawing.
1.7.2 A Drawing is not an Inventory.
New students very often suppose, when asked to draw a model,
a landscape or group of objects, that they are being asked to
replicate 'What is there'; it is an easy move for the nervous or
reluctant to demur over this. "How can I get that lot down on
paper?" And put this way the problem in fact is sharply defined
for us. We can of course see, it is quite clear, that such an
attempt would be difficult if not downright absurd. However, it
is worth my actually showing how, for one thing, it might founder
in impracticability. If we should get so far as to agree that
"getting it on paper" meant, not using super-glue, but depicting
these objects in two-dimensional terms, we must see that depicting
"that which is there", in all its fulness of being, even if
achieved must be visually quite incoherent. Consider the example,
the soap box; I must record its top, its sides, its back and find
of course some way of depicting its (to my eye) hidden material
structure; I must remember to put in all the graphics, front, top,
sides and back - and underneath, I had forgotten that, not
forgetting I need
a way of depicting the chemical structure of the inks and
fixatives use in the graphics... and so on. Even to itemize the
components takes time, and is astonishingly boring; but bear in
mind that it is possible to do that and to be understood because I
could conceivably write a coherent inventory. Now if I am to draw
the box as it is, all that information has to be presented within
some pictorial compass of the box's dimensions. What I am obliged
to show is the actual disposition of its parts. If I could make
these bits in three dimensions I should have made a box (recollect
this point in connection with the Furniture of the Painting, see
1.2) but to present a two-dimensional account in the above manner
would even if posible, be completely incoherent. A drawing is not
an inventory.
1.7.3. Drawing as a Configuration.
So much for what the student is not asked to do; we can
reject the notion that depiction has only the properties of the
subject depicted. Having got so far is to have realized something
important about the activity of drawing from life. The
realization usually takes the form of a question, "What, then am I
putting down on paper?" Partly what has been put down are points,
lines and tonal distinctions which can only go up, down, across,
diagonally and in circles and which, related to each other, form a
pictorial unity. However it is not only the student who believes
that the marks on the paper also should refer to the object of
study in some way. But if a drawing is merely a configuration, in
what way does it relate to the perceived object? Without going
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into a discussion about perception, for it can legitimately be
assumed that he takes the object to exist and to be where he sees
it and for it not to be an hallucination, there are still problems
in being able to say what it is to make a drawing of, to
represent, an object which does not attempt to be a replication of
'what is there' even in two dimensional terms, but of which it is
true to say that the drawing will of course have reference to some
part of what is there. He has also to recognize that the point of
the drawing is not to produce an illusion for some spectator such
that he believes he is in some sense seeing the object. We might
compare the terms of the exercise with Wollheim's clear refutation
of Gombrich t s position that to see a drawing as a representation
is to enter into an illusion. Wollheim has this to say: "to enter
into an illusion depends by and large on a subversion of our
ordinary beliefs; whereas to look at something as a
representation seems not to necessitate either denial or erroneous
belief vis-a-vis reality. For 'the epistemic consequences and
presuppositions' are different" 29 Indeed they are, for they
necessarily start from a concept of pictorial irreducibility. It
is at this point that the student understands a technical matter
about transcription which is that from the outset he can be given
some, but cannot be given comprehensive information regarding the
existing object. He can furthermore, produce even less for he
understands that he is already having to be selective about what
he notices of the given information. His drawing refers to what
he has selectively observed of the object as it is presented to
him. Andrew Harrison, in his paper 'Stories and Pictures', 30
attests to the importance of recognizing that a picture can be
accurate in its own terms, " pictures can represent things as they
are by imposing on how we attend to them, selected patterns of
attention. What a picture represents in an object is necessarily 
an aspect of it; it matches 	 not the object as it can be seen
in various ways, but how it may be seen in particular". I would
add the not-inconsiderable rider that crucially, it refers to his
choice as well as to the group from which he makes his choice -
and that is a pictorial matter. He is drawing with reference to
some part of what he sees, therefore, and has by now apprehended
the crucial distinction not only between what he sees and what is
there, but furthermore, between both of these considerations and
his pictorial prospect. Technically he develops the ability to
transcribe what is known to be three-dimensional in two
dimensions. He does learn to 'beat the eye' in order to establish
coherent reference to that which we also see. He 'reduces' a
still-life group to a relationship of actually flat areas of tonal
variation and this is coherent insofar as he can persuade another
person both to recognize the appearance of the still life group in
the appearance of the drawing and to apprehend the surface of the
picture for its configurative interest. Configuration and
representation go together in pictorial business. Accuracy does
count for something. Observation can easily be faulty. However,
the drawing is informative not just about the way the object is,
but to the way in which it is being considered. Learning to see
has a part in the art student's education, but it is what he is
doing it for that counts. He learns to look for matter germane to
his pictorial concerns. That is the sort of learning to see he is
involved with (see 1.3.3).
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1.7.4 Configuration and Constructs.
Let us turn our attention to the Gombrich argument now to see
how it could help the puzzled student. Learning to see (LTS) has
been disputed by Gombrich on the grounds that the ability to draw
something presupposes the ability to produce a visual
configuration; that this capability involves the use of schema.
Thus a student drawing a box comes to the task equipped with
either an inherited schema or else able to invent one. This
enables him to draw the box. Gombrich's position is maintained by
J.Koh, 31 who says that L.T.S. operates as if drawing was
producing the kind of transcription involved in making replicas.
The question Koh asks is "How is Jones to transcribe his
sense-data of the three-dimensional world into a totally different
mode which results from some dark marks being made on paper?"
According to Gombrich the "injunction to 'copy appearances'" is
really meaningless unless the artist is first given something
which is to be made like something else. Indeed it is a problem
for Jones if that is what he thinks he is being asked to do. But
mere transcription need not be what is being asked for in telling
Jones to look at the object. If I tell Jones to look at the
object, to look at appearances, if I say to Jones, "Look for the
drawing in the object.", then of course he must attend with the
greatest concentration to what he sees but the point of looking so
attentively is in this case not to increase his knowledge of the
object as such, but to further his factitious intentions. Seeing
is for the sake of drawing. Drawing is not for the sake of
seeing. This prompts me to qualify and expand upon Harrison's
position, for it seems mistaken to regard even an objective
drawing as a "method of picturing", as "helping us to see the
world itself..in
different ways." However, it is important that the context of
this remark is pointed up for the target is Nelson Goodman's
34
notion of possible worlds. Were Harrison to start out from the
terms of that most elementary exercise of objective drawing, he
would then have the best possible line of attack. The factitious
nature of pictorial forms of whatever character must logically, as
such, count as material additions to the world and not as fictive
alternatives to it. It is the material sense of the pictorial
fact which exposes the very idea of possible worlds as a piece of
fabulous nonsense. This I venture to suggest is the substance of
Harrison's important objection: not being gods, we cannot conjur
extra terrestrial rabbits: 34 Returning to the troubles of the art
student, of course I think that Jones may well be learning to see
but what he is learning to see is what he wants to make or conjur
of the object present to his attention. Does this mean he comes
to the task of objective drawing by way of construct? Well, this
is partly right but taken as the whole story, once again, wrong.
It is possible to give to a drawing of the object a visually
coherent account of the object's appearance; for examples of this
concern expressed par excellence we should refer to Dutch painting
of the Seventeenth Century. But it is a fundamental requirement
of the student engaged in this activity these days that he "brings
to his observation an imaginative conception of the object." (see
1.3). Here we may examine what some have supposed to be at work
in the business of making visual configurations. Perhaps I can
discover what it means to speak of bringing the imagination to
bear upon the business of drawing objects by referring back to my
own drawings, looking at what it was like to do this. In Frame 5
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I speak of creating "a decorative emphasis... rich, intricate in
tone... I am strongly tempted to leave it here, being much taken
with decorative objects." In Frame 7ii "What I want is to convey
some notion of that unseen object for what the entire package is
advertisement. If I miss that element in my drawing, I have
missed, if not everything, a great deal".
Although there is absurdity in the notion of trying to draw
only what is there, there is obvious point in submitting a
rigorously observed account of the object's appearance to an
imaginative projection. Such a projection may reflect a
particular mood which may relate equally as well to the feeling of
the artist towards the object he sees as to the uses to which he
may imagine the object might be put; this may relate to
particular aspects of impression: its decorative design (which,
as I point out in Frame 5 attracts me a good deal) and since I
have had the lid off, to get at the soap, the perfume still about
its interior. All manner of associations have bearing upon such
apprehension of the object. What is looked for is the authority
and persuasiveness with which the student reveals such imaginative
associations as pictorially telling. What must be stressed is
that the 'imaginative concept' of the object does not stand before
the mind's eye, waiting to be matched, but that the conception
grows with the activity, informing it and responsive to it; it is
a lively notion, never static, possibly incapable of completion.
(A proper consideration of that issue is the subject of another
section. See 111.3.1, 'Prospects'). We must also separate the
methodological construct given, from the imaginative concept of,
the object. The rigour of this exercise is in the diversity of
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the demands made upon the student. He is required to observe and
to isolate phenomena: perhaps to look only for line, or the
distortion of form in shadow; for reflections; for texture and so
on. The point is he is in other words required to transcribe for
the sake of picture-making. What he is not doing is devising some
sort of code, by whose means the perceived object is to be
understood via his drawing. For a strong impression of the matter
consider Mondrian," In nature the surface of things is beautiful,
but its imitation is lifeless. The objects give us everything,
but their depiction gives us nothing. Art was always too
concerned with imitation, despite the artist's good intentions".32
Plainly there are physical objects, and equally plainly as
objects they are no more to the student than any other group of
objects might be, but there are also for the student his
considerations, his associations with the object, the
consciousness of something not wholly accounted for by the set
group of material things on the table. The capacity to conceive
of a construct is not itself dependent on this group of things
rather than that. The student might put a bizarre construct upon
a given group. He might, for example, take as his theme 'The
Three Graces', a classical subject using one or more ordinary
young women as models or, perfectly seriously, one or more garden
gnomes. The point is merely that given a creative intention of
such and such kind, a wide variety of given physical, material
objects are available to serve as material to it. It is, for one
thing, precisely this as a trained capability the exercise of
Objective Drawing is designed to develop. Yet can we regard this
capability to set constructs in quite the way that Gombrich
suggests?
What can be said is that what the student is doing could be
characterized in the context of a theory of some sort. Roger
Scruton says that we can say that a drawing is "about its object"
as a "sentence is about its subject", and in so doing we
acknowledge that this is to posit the object as "referring beyond
itself, where the 'object' is in this case the drawing itself." 33
This is to add into a student's tasks some recognition of the need
to be able to apply theoretical constructs to a consideration of
his pictorial intentions. It seems on the face of it, quite
reasonable to regard the drawing as reflecting theoretical
influence. For one thing we might be reluctant to suppose that
the object we can see (the drawing) was totally divorced from
theoretical considerations upon which the student directed his
attention. We would want to say that such consideration counted
for something in the final account of the pictorial object as we
see it. But should this be taken to mean that pictorial concerns
are primarily oriented towards some 'fit' with the world by way of
theoretical constructs? If so then we should have to say that "we
have now not a picture that we look at, but a puzzle that (by
inference) we unravel". 34 The student is testing possibilities,
both of his own skill and of the feasibility of his notions of
what can be done with his ideas as they relate, not only to the
arranged group of objects, but more importantly, to his powers of
invention and abstraction. 35 For the moment I want to examine
this aspect of the activity; must we not say that it is at this
point true to say the student is centrally concerned with some
construct? Of course we must. For what he 'makes of the job'
depends upon more than a response to the plans of his instructor;
upon more than a response to the objects. His concern is
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creative; no such group of objects is more nor less to him than a
point of departure. His construct, or constructs, further his
concern.
1.7.5 A Lesson to be drawn from Consideration of Neoplasticism.
The dangers of accepting the Learning to See Theory of
drawing are clear. I want now to turn to a notable theory of art,
Neoplasticism, in which the uselessness of accepting Gombrich's
assertion is rather well shown. My intention is to show that the
artist's business with constructs is, first and last, pictorial.
Where his concerns become theory-oriented, there is a real danger
of pictorial stultification; where art is given over to ideology
the irreducibility of pictorial concerns may be compromised.
Neoplasticism must be regarded as a pictorial concept,
notwithstanding the welter of written material devoted to is
explication. There is no difficulty in accepting the case for the
construct. How could we deny it? It is certainly tempting to
interpret the concerns of the painters caught up in the movement
to the reductive position which we can quite easily regard as
being put forward by Gombrich. But we need not, indeed we must
not concede any such thing, since to do so is inimical to the case
for the nature of artworks as irreducibly factitious. There is a
good example of what happens when an artist puts pictorial
irreducibility in jeopardy. The formalism giving rise to
reification of the Pure White Cube or the Square serves all too
easily as a negative constraint on possibilities, because in
taking on the status of the 'ism' it becomes a political matter,
with ideological associations and constraints. In contrast,
creative; no such group of objects is more nor less to him than a
point of departure. His construct, or constructs, further his
concern.
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(a) Sketch based on Domburg church (b) Sketch based on (a)
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however, if, for example, we consider Mondrian we can see how he
is at all times perfectly clear about the absolute need to turn
the construct to pictorial account, since it is first and last a
pictorial affair. For Mondrian it is ever the interaction or
relation, colour, form, line and tone which he explores. "The
relation is the principle thing". 36 he declares. It is a
pictorial relation. The vocabulary of Neoplasticism is geometric
- a new kind of pictorial space. 37 What Mondrian seems able to
accomplish is a synthesis of theory and artefactual sense. He
sets out with an assertion, "Modern man must strive for pure
aesthetic creation, ridding his art of the individualistic detail
of natural form. All linear forms should be reduced to vertical
and horizontal." In the sketches of Domburg Church the sense of
the composition is exactly an expression of these polarities. He
achieves a synthesis of the observed with the pursuit of the
"Universalization of Nature" insofar as he achieves pictorial 
intelligibility. Very much less successful are the studies by Van
Doesburg (1925) which set out to show how such aesthetic
transfiguration takes place. The trouble is, it doesn't.
Retaining the photograph is enough to ensure that it cannot. And
it cannot for reasons of there being a contradiction in his
terms. While his aim is to illustrate neo-plasticism principles
Van Doesburg is putting the design, the drawing, in the context of
the appearance of a cow; so that it looks dangerously like a bad
case of L.T.S. This is clearly far from his intention. Salvation
is not to be had in seeking reference to the "absolute truths of
Neoplasticism". Let us pause to review them. 'Le Neoplasticism'





T. Van Doesburg, sequence showing an object .
-aesthetically transfigured according to Neo-plastic principles (from
Grundbegrofe der Neuen Gestaltenden Kunst, 1925
(b) Form preserved but relationships accentuated
(c) Form abolished
'Niewe beeldung', this is what Piet Mondrian wrote about the
movement in 1923 (ponderous and rather incantatory, this was
intended as an explanation of its views to the general public).
"Neoplasticism broke with form altogether by abstracting it and
reducing it to the pure elements of form. The closed curved line,
which did not express plastic relationship, was replaced by the
straight line in the duality of the constant perpendicular
position, which is the purest plastic expression of relationship.
From this it constructed its universal plastic means, the
rectangular colour-plane. Through the duality of position of the
straight, it expresses equilibrium (equivalence) or relative and
absolute. It opposes the colour-plane to the non-colour plane
(white, grey, black), so that through this duality, the opposites
can annihilate one another in the multiplicity of the
composition. The perpendicular position expresses the constant,
the rhythm of the composition expresses the relative."38
Returning to Van Doesburg's illustrative 'interpretation' we are
bound to say the Freesian wins, hooves down. Far more convincing
are his own later works, in which he is fully engaged in the
relationships in the picture plane. Once he addresses himself to
the pictorial forms with formal progressions across a plane
surface, we can at last see that in the repudiation of "Nature's
given forms" he is no longer attempting to "match" his picture to
the perceived world. He, at last, practises as back in 1923 he
merely preached, "The picture must be entirely constructed from
purely plastic elements, that is planes and colours. A pictorial
element has no other meaning than 'itself' and thus the picture
has no other meaning than 'itself'." 38
 We need neither agree with
nor dispute Van Doesburg's concepts of meaning in order to see
that
Gombrich's assertion is no help whatever. Making is not a matter
of matching whether it be nature or ideology. Since there is no
guidance from Gombrich as to there being any problem about the way
in which his maxim is to be read, we can only suppose that he has
not recognized the matter of real importance. It would appear that
he has failed to grasp the truth that if the painter's construct
serves primarily as a way of seeing the world in any of its
manifestations, the factitious pictorial point of his activity
recedes. His agency as an artist is critically unfulfilled.
Merely to point to the fact that artists use constructs is not
informative.
1.7.6 The Pictorial Character of Concepts of Form.
In this connection we should take account of the fact that
the student brings to his drawing of the object not only his
imaginative conception of it; he is also required to make some
note in terms of formal qualities. Note that such notions of form
as artists use have the status of agreed terminology. Thus when
referring to the line or tone of the object, in this case the box,
I do not mean that the box has, inherently, line or tone. Yet in
talking about the box as a subject of an artwork such terminology
provides an account of the pictorial concerns of line and tone.
How can we come to understand these terms without taking them to
refer to qualities posessed by objects? This question informs
Klee's notable theory of Form, which had so great an influence on
the teaching at the Bauhaus School of Design during the
nineteen-twenties. Quoting from Klee's Pedagogical Notebooks 40
we need to be careful not to misunderstand what it is that he is
concerned with in his pursuit of "essences". The editor of the
Notebooks, Jurg Spiller, writes, "In considering a work of art he
(Klee) asks whether it reflected the essence of the object or only
its outward, optical manifestation... 'The complex development
from seed to flower raises the question of how growth as a texture
of dynamic occurrences can be represented "in its Essence".' ".
Formal accounts of 'essences' require in his view, and
consistently enough, 'ideal' rather than 'material' solutions.
For such 'ideal' means he posits line, tone, value, colour. A
careful note covers an obvious objection, "..they are not free
from matter; if they were it would be impossible to 'write' with
them. When I write the word wine with ink, the ink does not play
the primary role but makes possible the permanent fixation of the
concept wine. Thus ink helps us to obtain permanent wine. The
work and the picture, that is, word-making and form-building, are
one and the same." What is Klee after here? We might compare his
drawings of the seed pod with the way in which we would regard
those made by a botanist for whom structure must be described in
line and tone; or equally well, a cut-away drawing of a machine
part, sections which cannot be reached by the camera being
constructed in conventional drawing systems. But Klee is, of
course, not doing this. He is taking the seed pod as a way of
exploring, not merely the observable phenomena, but the concept of
growth as a concept of pictorial importance. He regards this as
an essential concept both in that it is for him informative to a
pictorial understanding of this particular form, and, furthermore,
to the nature of drawing itself. Thus for Klee there exist
parallel concerns. The means by which he satisfactorily deals
with them have, on his own terms, to be "ideal". The "ideal"
9
means of accounting for such essences are the terms of the
discipline: tone, value, colour. The "ideal" provides a
construct for characterizing essential concepts. In a similar way
a cut-away section illustration provides an ideal means, a
construct, for describing the parts and function of the machine
part. Klee's point must be that (a) a pictorial account of the
seed pod is best characterized as an account of the concept of
growth: a necessary aspect of its being and in that sense, of the
essence; this is the concept that is central to Klee's concern
with that plant. (b) The concept of growth is formative to a
pictorial concern with drawing. It is clear that we have here a
parallel of concern to Klee between the growth of a plant and the
undoubtedly lively nature of the growth of a drawing. Regarding
the gestural nature of drawing in these terms is wholly consistent
with his thinking on the activity of drawing. "Movement is the
source of all growth. The work of art, then, results from
physical movement; it is a record of such movement, and is
perceived through movement, (of the eye muscles) ." 41 We should not
forget that Klee's Notebooks are explorations undertaken in
pursuit of the nature of the pictorial and were written in
connection with the programmes of study to be undertaken by art
students. In responding to the exhortatory tone of the notebooks,
notwithstanding their possible ambiguities, what I do not believe
should be read into Klee's "notes on essential qualities" is that
he necessarily invokes an acceptance of there being such qualities
inherently in objects (see III 4.2.1). This might give us pause;
apart from the philosophical difficulties attending such a
position it would also carry with it the, to my mind,
objectionable assumption that the drawing would be right if
it could replicate the Real object; wrong if it did not. This
would not only be an odd view for him to take of drawing; it
would also imply that other drawings must be wrong (see II 2.2).
But what is likely is that, actually, Klee is after what this
plant can yield as germane to the activity of drawing itself.
1.8. Conclusion: The Agent as Artist.
To conclude: in this Chapter I have tried to give an account
of a condition in the fulfillment of which we may posit the agency
of an artist.
A good deal of the account has been taken up by arguing from
the standpoint of the artist; since the artist is the subject of
the thesis, this may be quite unsurprising. However, that
artistic agency necessarily implies his concerns as pictorial is
of interest from the standpoint of the spectator. In particular
it is a point of shared significance that the dimensional
constraints opted for at some stage of the progress of the artwork
set the stance not only of the artist but also of the person who
looks at the work.
Firstly, 1 endeavoured to show that the integral nature of
the spatial contexts thus worked are disregarded at one's peril,
so to speak, of misconstruing a matter fundamental to any account
of the work's intelligility; that is, the pictorial form of the
artwork. The example which in quite valuable ways showed this to
be so is the Furniture-of the-Painting.
Secondly I chose to undertake an objective drawing exercise
myself, because for one thing although I have many times been
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required to do such exercises, I had not until now done it other
than to worrit a pictorial prospect of mine. This time I had both
to do that and to describe the operation. A good deal of this
thesis is being conducted in the manner of an explanatory
excursion into areas I have actually occupied for years; it has
often felt more like an exploration. This drawing exercise could
be regarded as something of a test of my own claims for the agency
of the artist. Since it is a central tenet of my thesis that
consideration of the properties of artwork involves consideration
of the agency of the artist, my doing a drawing seemed
unavoidable. I have for the most part had the much greater
pleasure of discussing the work of others. However, the exercise
should primarily be regarded as having furnished me with the means
of focussing attention upon the factitious nature of any artist's
concern with observable things; with any form of stimulus to his
attention.
Thirdly, the agency of the artist is such that to begin to
work is to become personally committed to it. That the activity
as described is ineluctably the pursuit of individuals, however
great the company so occupied, it is small wonder that some
nervousness should overtake the agent at the commencement of some
pictorial endeavour - I have heard of a man so distressed by
indecision and awareness of his commitment before a blank canvas,
that he took his own life. His state of mind may have been
unusual but it is not I believe presumptuous to suggest that he
recognized and could not bear the full measure, as an artist, of
his pictorial commitment as personal. A painter must paint, must
thereby communicate, on "pain of loss of self". It was his
tragedy that he could not begin and thus he could not as painter,
or person,
continue to be. To be sick is not necessarily to see things all
wrong; it is perhaps to be specially vulnerable to things
correctly seen. It is the fear of not-being, fear of a failure of
agency which besets even the most robust; the moment of
agent-commitment to a pictorial endeavour of which nobody can
relieve him. The start of an artwork is to be regarded in terms
of the agent's commitment to some pictorial particularity.
Fourthly, it is clear by now, I hope, that if an artist sets
out to make a work we should be getting him badly wrong in
supposing him not to be engaged in deliberative activities. Yet
it is also clear that talk of means and ends here is often
inappropriate; an inadequate way of looking at the deliberations
at work.
In doing a drawing of an object what counts in the end is the
drawing. Whatever may usefully be said about the way such a
drawing refers to an object it is to misconstrue the activity
either to posit drawing as learning to see or to regard doing a
drawing as an instrumental activity, as it would be if it were
primarily regarded thus, or equally, in being thought to be
oriented towards constructs; if by that it were thought as
exactly analogous to the activity of mapping. An artist's matter
is his work, the artefactual statement. The exercise is not
primarily designed to make a student more observant, neither is it
hoped to make of him first and foremost some special sort of
cartographer. It aims, of course, in many ways to develop these
and other skills; to put the student in pursuit of a personal
prospect, necessarily factitious; pictorial in kind. To miss
that point is to misconstrue the agency of an artist. The work of
Paul Klee unequivocally demonstrates that what is sought in
attending
to natural forms is not the appearances of things: drawing is not
merely the means to transcribe the visually perceived. It is for
the sake of pictorially essential concepts that he so addresses
himself to the concept of growth as an essential concept in
pictorial consideration of Nature. Understanding the growth
pattern of the Calyx of a Calla Lily is a matter of pictorial
significance, however the pictorial is characterized. The
particularity of pictorial space as a defining term of the first
condition of artistic agency is that insofar as we may posit
agency as that of an artist we acknowledge that it is concern with
creating pictorial space with sets the orientation of his concerns
with any matter.
Finally, this chapter shows only the conditional nature of a
concern with pictorial space, but also indicates in outline those
concerns with which I shall be dealing in the next three chapters.
The public aspect of artistic agency hinted at in writing of the
moment of apprehension attending the beginning of an artwork is
the subject of Chapter II; the need for an artefact will be
stressed in that chapter and, supposed in the notion of the
factitious object, will further be explored in Chapter III in
terms of a more detailed discussion of the agency of a painter, as
exemplified by considering the progress of a landscape painting.
Chapter IV will be devoted to a discussion of the personal nature
of the agency of an artist, implied in the commitment of some
factitious object. The extent that not to create, is, in terms of
the agency of the artist, not to be, is a central implication of
the last chapter. I regard each of the four conditions of
artistic agency (see p.4.) as having a bearing on the others.
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This first condition it is that characterizes the agency with
which I am concerned in some particularity. Recognition of the
communicative stance; the relation of reflective to practical
activity which further characterizes the agency with which I am
concerned; the personal nature of human agency - all these
conditions are of general significance. I do not regard the
artist as agent as a special case in these respects. To describe
the artist as agent is to regard each and all of these conditions
as necessary. To describe the agent as artist is to relate these
conditions in terms of his necessary concern with creating
pictorial space.
CHAPTER II.
THE PUBLIC ASPECT OF THE AGENCY OF AN ARTIST
"Do not regard a human being merely as a person
by himself; but also as he is vis-a-vis another"
person." 1
11.1 Introduction.
Before going on to explore the relation of reflective to
practical activity in the production of an artwork I want to
elaborate upon the point raised in the last chaper (see 1.8).
This is that drawing, which is a practical manifestation of
thought is, besides being a personal statement, capable of
exacting public response. When any artwork is put into an
exh.bition it becomes accessible or at least available to the
criticEL notice of other people. In Chapter IV I will deal more
fully with the personal character of the artist's statement. This
present chapter will be devoted to the public aspect of the
artist's agency.
This is the claim: the public nature of a work of art is an
ineluctable aspect of an artist's agency. Whether or not the
painter, for example, primarily intends it, the content of a
canvas is capable of exciting the response of an observer in some
measure of understanding, sympathy or revulsion towards or against
it. In other words concerns of the observer are susceptible of
engagement in concerns of the artist. Community of ideas is
unavoidably involved in the agency of the artist. This is a
complex situation. In order to explore it we will need to
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give heed to the following points:
I.	 It is a necessary condition of the agency of the artist that
it has a public aspect. It is not however a sufficient condition.
2. The communicative relation between an observer as agent and
the artist as agent is constrained by the content of the artwork.
There must be an artefact.
3. The artefact is the locus of the communicative relation.
For this to be an effective, or 'successful' relationship the
artwork must somehow draw and engage the attention of the
observer. The production of an artwork engages the artist in
reflective and practical activity. The integrity of his
performance depends not merely upon the level of technical mastery
achieved in it but also upon the quality of testimony manifested
by it. To neglect either aspect is to disvalue the deed. This is
of consequence in the sharing, or community, of ideas of a
pictorial nature: human agency, in respect of its unavoidably
public aspect, is internal to the artefact as painting. It is the
cohesion between these aspects of his agency, insofar as that
cohesion is observable, which engages the observer's attention.
The fact of a work's being possibly withheld from exhibition, or
destroyed by the artist does not prejudice my case; rather it
reinforces it. Destruction at least in part supposes the
unwelcome possibility of exhibition. Withholding works supposes,
among ther things, the eventual possibility of exhibition.
I need some way of approaching these points. The
communicative relation depends in this connection upon the extent
to which that which one agent produces, in the form of an artwork,
engages the attention of another agent. It is informative to
regard the situation in terms of an artwork's having, or not
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having authority. Indeed I believe it is a concept of critical
significance to my thesis. However, I recognize that since the
concept of authority has application in widely disparate areas of
concern I will need to justify employing it in connection with the
communicative relationship of artist and observer, through the
content of the artwork.
I shall show that, whatever the domain of usage, the
possibility of the concept of authority is grounded in the idea of
there being effective agency between persons. This makes it
possible to address situations which are dissimilar, situations in
which it yet makes sense to employ the notion of an authorititive
relation between people. I suggest that in whatever sphere of use
it is the noticable cohesion between thinking and doing which is
central to the ascription of authority to persons, actions and
conseqences of actions. In cases such as presently concern me,
the extent to which the ascription is apt provides the gauge of
the communicative relation as it is effective, between the artist
as agent and the observer as agent, through the content of the
work of art.
This is the critical matter for consideration. It supposes
an artwork must first attract attention if the conditions
necessary to the effective agency of the artist are to be
fulfilled. Second it is a minimum requirement of an artwork's
engaging and not merely attracting the attention that the
reflective and practical activities involved in its making are not
at odds with one another. Thus it is of the utmost significance
that the notion of authority at issue sets a two-fold requirement
upon the artist: technical mastery and testimony. He neglects
either to his peril. To illustrate this cohesion at work I shall
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be considering the conceptual concerns and visual preoccupations
of Henry Moore as explored by him in a book dedicated to W. H.
Auden, taking for an example one of a series of etchings called
'Elephant Skull, Male Torso'.
11.2 How the Agency of an Artist brings him into a Relation with
the Agency of an Observer.
The first point to consider is the complex nature of the
agency of the artist insofar as it recurrently involves a public
aspect.
A paradox attends the agency of the artist. This concerns
the public nature of the product with which he is involved and the
consequent relation with others in which he places himself. For
that which may be of no professed concern to him as he works, that
is the agent relation between himself and other people, is yet and
must be his concern in painting since the painting is a publicly
accessible object. Artworks are by nature public. Therefore the
public aspect of his work is an ineluctable part of his agency.
This is not a special case of artistic agency. It is to remind
the artist of matters of unavoidable concern for him. We may
consider the agency of the artist as having two aspects:
I. The artist as agent relates to the world (objects,
experience, nature and so on), for the sake of the artefact.
2. The artist relates as agent to other people through the
thing he does. The artefact is the vehicle of his agency.
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These two aspects are distinguished in the following way:
Regarding I. It is both a necessary and sufficient condition of
his agency that the artist relates to the world for the sake of
the artefact (see ChapterI.).
Regarding 2. Since although the public nature of the artefact
makes it a necessary condition of his agency that the relation
between himself and others is of concern to him, we must
acknowledge that such will not wholly constitute his concerns. We
cannot therfore posit such concern as sufficient condition of his
agency. For the artist to have committed himself to the
production of the artwork is to have committed himself however
unwitting, or unwilling, to the possibility of communication.
This is not to say that it is only artistic actions which have the
feature of being public and therefore, of effecting
communications. It is to say that it is a matter of central
importance to the visual artist.
11.2.1 Making use of the Concept of Authority in order to
characterise Aspects of the Communicative Relation
between the Artist as Agent and the Observer as Agent.
It is necessarily true that the publicly accessible artwork
puts the artist in a communicative relation with other people.
The necessity of the communicative relation is an unavoidable
consequence of his activities. It is by this means possible to
ascribe authority to his work.
The authority of an artwork depends for its ascription upon
the extent to which the artist engages the attention of others in
that which he has made. When I speak in this connection of
authority I posit a relationship dependent upon the effective
content of the artefact as a publicly accessible object. A note
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of caution is in order; whether or not an artwork is somehow
authoritative is ascertainable through the communicative
relation. The communicative relation by no means guarantees the
ascription of authority to an artwork. Merely attracting the eye,
is, as I shall show, not enough (see 11.5.2).
Before we look to the role of the artefact in this
communicative stance it would be a good thing to show that, in
appraisal of that stance, making use of the concept of authority
is not inappropriate. Much is written about authority in the
context of Law, Education, and Sovereignty and it may be that,
since scarcely anything has been done on the application of the
term in respect of the Arts, it will seem that my using it in this
way constitutes a rather strange borrowing.
What has my concern with the concept of authority to do with
those concerns far more discussed in connection with that notion?
On the face of it, very little. The bases of enquiry would seem
to be quite dissimilar. Questions of authority, as a concept
relevant to the spheres of education, politics and so on, very
often arise out of a wider concern with the way society works, or
with the idea of a society as such. The concept is thus invoked
within particular contexts of public action. Very often what is
at issue is some criterion for there being a right or correct
thing to be done. This poses questions regarding the right or
otherwise of an individual, or body, to do this or that, where
such doing has consequences for other people. In whichever way
the concept of authority is construed whether in terms of a
sociological notion of control 2
 or in terms of there being some
internal relation between 'authority' as a concept and a domain of
action; as a "force" in some "milieu of existence" 3
 as de Jouvenel
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describes it - there is little to suggest any immediate connection
between such areas of application and that in which it might be
apt to ascribe authority to works of art. Yet the term is used in
this way and it is only a puzzle to us if it is supposed that the
possibility of the concept of authority is grounded in some one
sphere of use. What is needed is to show that there is common
ground even where it looks least likely.
11.2.2 A metaphoric Borrowing denied.
First let me admit to the apparent oddness of the present
application. It would be very peculiar to ascribe authority to
artworks on the basis of being involved in a "team of action" in
which the artwork, mediating the position of the artist, and some
spectator were engaged in some task; it would be odd to regard
the artist as having the 'right' to command spectator attention.
It would be obscure to ascribe authority to artworks on the basis
of there being a right or correct way of painting (see 1.7.6). If
for a moment these peculiarities are admitted as difficulties for
me and it is supposed that the 'proper' field of application is
such as would accommodate such usage without any strain, then
perhaps it is fruitful to pursue the idea that for the term to
work in the field of the visual arts is for it to work as a
metaphoric borrowing. Let me consider this as a possibility. The
force of any metaphor is the extent to which the new application
of a term of otherwise established use heightens awareness both of
its abstruse connection and also of its origin. There has to be
some sphere of use in which it is in some important sense
-78-
'straight', that is, rightly correctly, or truly applied. In some
respects like a good fiction, it depends on good facts. 4 For an
example, suppose my sort of use depended for its metaphoric force
upon some right and proper domain of use. On what core of
referential meaning would it thus depend? In this particular
connection it would appear to have to rest upon there being a
close association between the ideas of influence and authority.
To conjoin these notions would be to put forward a limited notion
of authority. In terms of the visual arts it would be to
recognize the metaphoric borrowing as taking its sense and meaning
from just that connection being made. An example would be to say:
if Y ascribes authority to X, then Y is or has been influenced by
X. Thus if X is an authoritive painting then, if Y sees X, Y will
paint differently next time, have a fit, burn the gallery or so
on. Quite possibly, but in a later section to this chapter (see
11.3.1), I shall show that such a likelihood need not preclude the
possibility of there being some painting, X, which is not
Footnoto 4
Stories and Pictures.
Andrew Harrison's argument in summary. A good fiction is both
intelligible and plausible according to the pattern of factual and
fictional assumptions that form the frame of expectation in which
it is possible to follow any narrative. A good story deals not in
possibilities, but in such probability assumptions as a telling
requires. thus 'good facts' are necessary insofar as they create
the conditions needful to that requirement. What is presumed in
the telling of the tale is the attention of someone for whom it is
told.
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influential for Y, in any of the ways described, but which yet
seems to qualify for the ascription of authority for Y. In this
context that model will not work because it misconstrues the
notion of authority. Indeed there is a case for saying that
influence and authority are wrongly conjoined in more orthodox
applications. Y may acknowledge the authority of X without being
influenced to act in any way other than he, Y, intends.
Is it in any case right to suggest - as admitting to
metaphoric borrowing would presuppose - that there is indeed a
right and proper use for the concept of authority? If so must it
be confined to those areas already described? My answer must I
believe be No and Yes. I would say, No, application of the
concept is not confined to any particular field of use; there is
no special sphere of reference to which all other uses reduce.
Yet I would say, Yes, there is that about any kind of use which
presupposes some common ground of possibility. This is not to
accept my less common usage as a metaphoric borrowing, however -
it is indeed to contest it, for the ground of the possibility of
the concept of authority is not and cannot be an instance of its
use. We may properly attend to the question, can an artwork be
ascribed authority, by rejecting the notion of a metaphorical
borrowing and turn instead to the question which, in orthodox
usage perhaps need not be raised, but yet which, having been
raised here, allows me to make perfectly good clear use of the
concept of authority. This is the case as I believe it to be:
questions about the nature of society, whatever form such
questions might take, presuppose the agency of persons; human
beings in effective relation. 	 The self as agent is ineluctably
involved in a communicative stance. 5
 My concern for the artist,
as agent, acknowledges this to be necessarily the case. The
enquiry I am pursuing starts with that which is presupposed in
many discussions of the concept of authority. That which enables
Winch, Peters, de Jouvenel, Weber and many more to attend to the
pursuit of the ground of the concept of authority that notion of
persons in relation with which I am concerned in setting out those
conditions under which we may posit the agency of the artist,
positively requires me to make use of the concept of authority.
It is essentially communicative notion. My use of the term should
be regarded as a means of setting out the implications for the
artist of the public aspect of his agency. Two possible sources
of difficulty remain. The first is readily met and leads directly
to a discussion, already mooted, of the relationship of influence
to authoritativeness.
a. concerning the non-intentionally authoritative stance.
b. concerning the non-verbal authoritative stance.
11.2.3 The Possibility of the Non-intentionally Authoritative
Stance.
It might appear strange to remark as authoritative an object
whose production involves the agent concerned in a stance towards
others which is by nature an ineluctable matter. He may not, in
making the work of art, have a deliberate intention to be
authoritative in relation to other people. We can say that there
are certainly many situations, in which authority is an issue, in
which we do not ordinarily doubt that the object or person to whom
authority is ascribed is wittingly so involved. It is certainly
the case that the policeman at least hopes he 'knows his duty'.
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It is surely true that the politician concerns himself in a
witting exercise of authority. To take an example from the
performing arts, the actor certainly means to command the
attention of his audience. In this matter the actor shares common
ground with politicians and policemen. Even in circumstances in
which actors or politicians are less than fully aware of the range
of their authoritative influence they would feel that their
actions could only begin to be judged authoritative insofar as
they were confident of being, in fairly specific terms, in a
measure of influential communication with others. For a painter,
communication is a necessary matter, as we have seen and it is
possible for it to be an unwitting matter; a necessary part but
only a part of his concern to be effective. We need to show
whether we can ascribe authority under conditions in which
possibly no part of the agent's concern with his work is
intentionally motivated towards the exercise of authority.
The comparison of cases would seem to indicate that in some
situations of use there is indeed a direction to the way in which
the authoritative relation operates: instigator and, as Eeyore
might put it, 6 Instigorated, where instigation is no accident.
However, I have noted that even in the self-awareness of the
politician there are gaps in the extent of his realization of the
range of his effect. We can further say that there are cases of
authority being ascribed or recognized in which the intentions of
the one of whom such ascription is made do not include that of
exerting an authoritative influence. Consider the following
example. The woman who is an authority on sandstone may, probably
will, be deferred to in matters pertaining to the use and study of
sandstone. Yet her central concern may not be to be deferred to,
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even although she might well regard herself as capable of saying
as much if not more than most on the subject. Now we would say of
her that she is in virtue of her specialist knowledge probably
very frequently intending to be in some sort of communicative
relationship with others. In discussion, lectures and so on she
surely means to be understood, at the very least and taken notice
of, for the sake of her subject. If we want to separate the
authoritative aspect of her performance or reputation, in terms of
the communicative relation being an ineluctable aspect of her
agency, from the sort of situation in which the one closely
involves the other, then we must ask this question: does
intending to be in a communicative relation with others involve
intending to be authoritative? Another example will show that it
need not. My wanting to have lunch with X would as far as I am
concerned only unusually involve my wanting to exercise authority
over him. Of course if my wanting to have lunch with X has to do
with discussing a problem, Y, on which he has expert knowledge,
then I will regard him as some sort of authority on Y. But X
will, just like the sandstone specialist, be more concerned with
sorting out the problem on Y than with his own statu as an
authority on it. The possibility that he does fancy his statue as
an Authority need not affect the case, though it would not do much
for my lunch.
What then can be said about ascribing authority in these
cases? I believe that we can ascribe authority to X or sandstone
specialists or to works of art, indeed, wherever it makes sense to
speak of somebody engaging the attention of others. The degree
on absence of the intention so to impress is as such not very
important. What is important is that we recognize the active
nature of response in the relationship between agents in which the
concept of authority is invoked. There are two sides to this
matter; the importance to the observer as agent and the central
importance to the artist as agent.
11.3 The Active Nature of Response.
The function of the authoritative relation is that one agent
engages the agency of another. This obtains regardless of context
and extends, by implication, the effective range of the artist's
concerns. The response of the spectator to the authority of an
artwork is not merely passive. That in the more usual cases
ascription of authority is awarded in response to some
deliberative instigation would seem to indicate that in most cases
response is a needful aspect in the authoritative relation.
Cooperation 7 is necessary to its function and this goes somewhat
beyond more passive acquiescence. Even in cases of oppression
accession though apparently passive buys relief or is an attempt
to buy relief from unwelcome consequences and is to that rather
minimal extent the exercise of an option and is active rather than
passive. In the context of the authority of the State cooperation
is sougbt since it is recognized that without it the authority of
the State dwindles. Whether active participation is negative or
positive it takes place within some practically oriented
conceptual framework. In the ascription of authority to artworks
the spectator is a participant in visually manifest conceptual
frameworks. The authoritative relation is a two-way consequence
of the public aspect of a painter's agency. We need not know the
extent to which the communicative stance of an artist is
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deliberative. We can call a work authoritative without claiming
anything regarding the artist's intention to command authority.
The authority awarded to an artist rests upon the extent to which
he stays the attention of others through his works. When we speak
of such authority we posit a necessary relation between the agency
of an artist and the agency of the spectator through the content
of the artefact.
While it is not inevitable that a work command authority it
is a condition of the public nature of the artefact that there is
some level of communication between artist and spectator. It is
appropriate to consider the extent to which a work is effective as
communication. The extent of a work's effectiveness is aptly
considered in terms of its having authority. Though it is a
necessary but not sufficient condition of the agency of an artist
that if he commands authority it must be through the artefact, it
is both a necessary and sufficient condition of a work's being
deemed authoritative that there exists an effective relationship
between the artist and another agent whose thinking is actively
engaged. Response is active; it is a kind of giving. The
importance to the artist in this matter is crucial to his agency.
The painter may not intend the authority, the command that his
work turns out to have for other people, but he cannot evade the
possibility for his agency entails a public aspect. Stanley
Cavell would regard him as one "pulled out of the ranks by a
message, which he must, on pain of loss of self, communicate".8
While not wishing to dwell too much on the possible revelatory
characLer of a painter's concerns, for they may not always be of
that sort, there is point in regarding his personal agency as
bound up in work to the extent that "loss of self" is truly a
threat
should he produce nothing or in trying repeatedly fail. The point
put by Cavell and with which I concur is that communication is
positively part of artistic agency even where it is true that
"telling someone else" may be, as such, an unwitting matter for
the painter; for saying something, working something out, making
new, is the stuff of his agency. After all, we regard his
activities as intentional. The artefact is our best evidence of
his intentions and as such may wittingly or otherwise at least as
well command our attention as the best rhetoric of politicians.
11.3.1 The Relationship between Authority and Influence in the
Visual Arts.
The difference between the painter and the politician in this
connection is not in the constitutive public aspect of their
agency; both are necessarily affected by this phenomenon. The
difference is in the degree of deliberation with which each under
the condition of his agency concerns himself in exercising
influence over another. For the politician this is an essential
part of his trade; so the link between his authority and
influence is direct and should be regarded as a characterizing
condition of his agency. It is far less clearly defined in the
communicative stance of the visual artist. This is by no means to
suggest that the artist's work carries no influence; but the
notion is far more complex and diffuse. It would be misguided to
work too hard in pursuit of a connection which is of its nature
elusive.
Even the restricted connotations of an art-historical
approach to the Influence are problematic. To say that if X has
been influential then X
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also been authoritative does no more than beg the question and we
cannot fix terms for an answer. Certainly we are in difficulties
if we want to say that X is authoritative in that X is or has been
influential, since Influence has manifestations so diffuse as must
make a putative connection with the concept of authority
unavoidably tenuous.
An exception to this is Propagandist Art for which the
notions of Authority and Influence are interrelated (see 11.5.1).
11.3.2 Mastery and Testimony: a Challenge to an Orthodox Account.
If, in the public aspect of the agency of the artist it is a
function of the authoritative relation that agent concerns are at
some level sharable it must now be asked what is involved in their
being shared.
Authority as communicated by artworks differs from some other
fields of use insofar as it does not involve, in a central way,
the use of language: I now turn to a consideration of an
implication for the view regarding the use of language as the
ground of the concept of Authority. I shall argue that the danger
of acceding to this view lies in the inadequacy of the account it
is able to provide of the notion of Authority. This is a matter
of the utmost importance for an artist. It is also of general •
significance.
First, let me approach the periphery of the problem:
painterly terms are not the terms of written or spoken language.
When an artwork is regarded as having authority, that it is
discussed, is discussable, by no means implies that the authority
the work has is grounded in the fact that we use language to
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remark it. "A Mozart's thinking results in something playable,
not statable." 9 In Chapter III I shall devote more time to the
discussion of the intelligibility of pictorial ideas (see III
6.1); but for the present it needs only to be made clear that
when we refer to an artist as 'having something to say' we are
attempting to characterize verbally a form of testimony which is
not made through the instruments of language. We remark upon
content but it is not the content of the proposition. We count it
a statement, but one without the syntax or grammar of the word.
That the idea of 'content' or 'statement' is a linguistic idea
does not make the content of the painting linguistic; the
statement it presents is not linguistic at all. Perhaps it would
be less confusing if artists did not use the term 'statement' at
all. However, they do use it and without any linguistic
overtones.
Since the means used to make the painting and the ideas
presented manifest by these means are not verbal means, verbal
ideas, it is reasonable to reject the suggestion that any
authority the painting might have is reducible to some account of
the painter as an animal possessed of language 19 . It is true that
of course he is. But it is also true that that in itself stands
alongside rather than at the root of the present case. Besides
the painting there are numerous other communicative forms of
expres3ion which if they merit the ascription of authoritativeness
do so within particular terms which may not be such as centrally
involve the human capacity for using language. 11 An authoritative
performance on the tennis court, on the clarinet, the potter's
wheel, through dance forms, are but a few instances. That one
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person's performance is authoritative while another's is not so
obviously requires us Lo seek an explanation which cannot be
satisfied so narrowly. I said that the question of non-verbal
communication is but peripheral in the case at issue. What it
leads us towards however, is the heart of my thesis concerning the
public aspect of artistic agency.
In consideration of language and authority within a
sociological construct, it has been argued that the ground of the
possibility of the concept of Authority is that Man is possessed
of language. 12 A central aspect of this being so is that this
necessarily involves him in following rules; all systems of
authority it is claimed, can be regarded as involving the making,
recognition and following of rules. Rule-following is integral to
the use of language, as indeed to painting pictures from time to
time, but that this is so, does not, it seems to me, argue that
their use in language, or dance, tennis or painting constitutes
the ground of the concept of Authority. A better account can be
given, not sociologically in terms of Man as a being who
characteristically follows rules, and talks and writes, but of Man
as an agent, a person necessarily in communicative relation with
others. This involves him in the business of sharing greatly
diverse ideas by widely diverse means. The commonest requirements
of human agency indeed involve talking and writing to one another
and these entail the use of rules. Other forms of communication
no less entail their use. Rules are a function of technical
mastery, instruments of communication; at least that much is
rather obvious. What seems from a review of the field to be less
obvious is that there is something desparately unsatisfactory
about setting up a context in which technical mastery provides the
entire framework within which to account generally for effective
dealings between people and by means of which to explain the use
of the concept of Authority. The fact is, it is rather less than
half the story. If sharing is to play the role which we shall
want to give it, we must rearrange, perhaps change, our thinking
on the concept of Authority, such that mastery in the executive
part assumes its proper place. Sharing, after all, is a rather
niggardly affair if all it comes down to is a question of
regulation. Recollect the tensions on the floor at children's
parties.
What we need to recognize is just how thin an account this
must yield in any attempt to characterize any one of our widely
diverse dealings within an account of the agency of persons in
relation. The communicative relation is the key: a necessary
aspect of human agency.
The possibility of the concept of authority is thus grounded
not in any uses of the instruments of communication; certainly not
just in the characteristically human activity of following rules
as such; it rests upon the possibility of an acknowledgement on
the part of an agent of the veracity of a cohesive idea or system
of ideas put forward by another agent in a shared corporate domain
of action. To say as Peter Winch does, that "Authority is
essentially bound up with systems of ideas, and systems of ideas
essentially involve the possibility of discussion and criticism"
13 is, or should be, to recognize that the context in which
discussion and criticism have their importance is one which calls
upon testimony in some form for here is a context of effective
human agency. It is a conviction in the communicable relation of
thinking to doing in some domain of action which occasions the
ascription of Authority to a person, system or object whether in
the field of Politics, Education or the Arts.
Communicability begs some form. In attending to the context
of the communicative relationship between artists and spectators,
I turn now to the need for an artefact.
11.4. The Need for an Artefact.
It is clear that when it comes to talking about systems of
ideas, about artworks as having or not having cohesion between
thought and action, there must be some artefact of which we can
say this is or is not the case. This may seem very obvious but
for artists it has not always been an area entirely free of
difficulty. I want now to begin to state the problem by examining
interdependency of thought and action in the creative process.
Starting from the standpoint of the authoritative work having to
be a cohesive work we come up against certain problems.
First, if we hold that cohesion between thought and action is
manifestly a mark of its authority are we to exclude from the
field of application all artworks which are incomplete?
Secondly, are we to call authoritative only those works done
by artists who know their own minds?
Thirdly, can we say that a work which presents a unity must
be one and the same with the product of the artist who knows his
mind?
Finally - what can be said in respect of 'good faith'?
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11.4.1 Authority and the Incomplete Artwork.
I. In the area with which I am concerned I have already
stressed that the idea that develops requires, in order to do so,
the practical awareness of the agent. His consideration of
practical possibilities is basic to this kind of thinking (see
1.5). That perhaps nothing appears by way of a practical outcome
makes no difference to this being the case. But would such a
state of affairs provide us with an example of disunity; an
incomplete work of art? I want to say that this must be so unless
we are to include in the class of works of art all ideas relating
or contributing to their making. Of course it may be less
troublesome to suggest that it is possible to have a pretty
complete idea of a work without actually engaging in the processes
of producing an artefact. But this is not to say that if the
artist gets to the stuffs and surfaces his ideas will not be
modified, for I believe it must be, even in the case of the
clearest practical forethought. It is simply not possible without
engaging in the practical activity fully to develop such ideas as
he is concerned with. Yet in the practically based thinking there
is, as functional to the concept at work as is scaffolding to a
tower in the making, some informed anticipation concerning its
development; what might happen and, with experience, some hopeful
expectations, alongside a proper respect for the likelier
visitations of calamity. We might say that such fulsome
preconsideration is rare, but it is possible. We must
differentiate these pre-intimations of works of art from complete
works. Some artists might object that the difference is trivial,
since it depends on how you choose to classify a work of art;
some would argue in favour of all such thinking being quite
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as justifiably called works of art as any material expression
which gets called a work of art. I dispute this. No material
expression of whatever kind can be synonymous with the practically
oriented thought as described.
We are obliged to link the notion of authoritativeness to the
need for an artefact. Interest in the presence or absence of
authority in this regard serves, I think, to mark out an important
point. The concept of Authority is meaningful only in the context
of practical ideas shared, argued or disputed between persons.
The only means of establishing such a relationship between the
artist and anybody else, that is open to the artist, lies in the
thing he does. If we are to speak of a work's having authority,
since the artist's thinking is itself oriented to the practical
then both we as well as he must attend to the object of his
thought, the practical outcome. If that object is a performance
then we will find authority, or not find it, in the performance
itself as manifesting the thinking of the performer. We must be
constrained by attention to that which the artist makes. Stories
told by artists about their ideas may carry the authority of a
good story and convince us perhaps of the authority of the idea;
but outsiders to the process require access in more direct
fashion. The mediation of even the first-hand account is no
better than a story of an idea. What I want to say is that an
artist may have some clear thoughts about possible works of art
without producing an artefact but the reflective process does not
alone qualify as a work of art. If we are to speak of the
authority of a work of art we discover ourselves bound to restrict
our account to productions. This would seem to indicate that in
answer to the first question, in seeking to account for
authority in works of art we must confine our enquiries to
artefacts, in which category I would include Performance Art.
However, there is in that question a suggestion that if a work is
incomplete, half-finished, then it cannot count in this enquiry.
This is very far from the case. What counts as finished is very
doubtful and, in any case, a half-finished drawing is capable of
the utmost authority. That there need be some perceptible
artefact is the case; but its strengths or weaknesses do not
depend upon its degree of finish. They depend upon the extent to
which the work presents weakness or strength of idea whose quality
comes through for good or ill in the material expression. Such
unity is discoverable only within the context of the work itself.
11.4.2 Are we to call Authoritative only those Works made by
Artists who know their own Minds?
The question of what the painter thinks he wants to do,
central as it is to this discussion, indicates that we need to say
something about his awareness of such purposes, endeavours, tasks
and so on as inform his activity. I shall not be trying to show
that the artist has advance knowledge of an outcome but I will,
rather, be trying to show the importance to the artist in his
practical thinking, of settling the character so far as possible,
of his conceptual preoccupations. I shall deal later (see
Ch.III.6.) in some detail with the vexed question of what a
pictorial concept might be and the question of preoccupation will
be an important one. For the moment a note of explanation will
suffice regarding my use of this word. For an artist or anyone
else, being aware of preoccupations is not the same thing as is
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ordinarily meant in speaking of being preoccupied. In the
ordinary sense, of course, 'we have preoccupations', that is, we
return to the same concern time and again.. We say, "He was
preoccupied.", meaning he was intent upon something or other and
not easily distracted. For an artist the question must be
"Why?". Note that a psychological account of that question is not
the one he wants. What he does want is to know how, as an artist,
he is preoccupied thus. Consider an example: Henry Moore's
concern with "basic substance" as not the concern of a physicist
or a biologist or a chemist but as of a sculptor. Moore speaks of
his "preoccupation with making shapes in space on a flat sheet of
paper - pushing and destroying the surface to create the effect of
solidity, depth, and distance." What he intends in his work is
that his preoccupations with material similarities of substance
between very different structures and organisms is to be resolved
into a two-dimensional statement. In the example of Moore's
etchings, 'Elephant Skull', we can see his concerns as a sculptor
coming under graphic constraints. Regarding the connection
between the 'Elephant Skull' and the Auden illustrations, Moore
says this, "What excited me about the elephant's skull and made me
want to study it by drawing was the surprising contrasts of form
contained in it - some parts were very thick and strong, others
were paper thin - and its intricate and mysterious interior
structure, with perspectives and depths, like caves and caverns
and tunnels." 14 Moore's concern with substance must be worked out
by him in terms of the pictorial construct he puts upon those
recurrent concerns. An artist concerns himself with
considerations of general pictorial significance. Yet he deals
with the particular to do it, "an actual hand, or known shoulder,
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even a particular pelvis" shows us that the general concern is
served best if we can be brought to apprehend the individuality of
things. 15 However general the significance of the idea may turn
out to be, the statement he makes is necessarily particular. (I
shall return to this point; see IV.3.2)
Thus, though we ordinarily speak of being preoccupied as if
it were a state of mind, the artist must go further than this.
Accepting that his being so absorbed has the usual psychological
features, he is for example abstracted, difficult to talk to, lets
his food go cold and so on, he seeks reasons for being preoccupied
whose grounds rest in the character of his agency. He seeks to be
pictorially exercised; searches out matters for preoccupation,
rather than just finding himself in a preoccupied state.
Questions about consciousness are not at issue in speaking of an
artist knowing his mind. What is of concern is restricted to the
relaticnship between cohesive practical thought and some
recognition of a certain authority in the artwork. The question
is: dues the artist have to be aware of the extent of his
reflective activity for it to be possible for somebody else to
remark his work as authoritative?
Let us consider the example of Moore's etchings. What comes
through to me is his interest in the weight of the object; the
spectacular displacement of the space it occupies; the
disposition and texture of its plane surfaces. As a sculptor he
is by inclination for most of the time preoccupied with
considerations of mass, extension and the disposition of plane
surfaces with respect to each other and their surroundings. We
could say such a man knows his mind to the extent that he is not
in doubt about his matter. Later I will show that we need not
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suppose him to have, complete, any firm advance plans for content
for the etchings he makes. The illustration shows that these
etchings are indeed informative about bone. But also they present
to our attention general and quite widely evocative problems of
form. We find ourselves standing back from biological data of
structure and considering the manner in which this image occasions
thoughts of scale, change, balance; we enter into his
concentration upon things recollected of landscape; and, in the
illustration I have chosen, male torso, elephant skull and
landscape coalesce. It is my experience that concern for the
human figure is very much like concern for landscape, as later
discussion will show. (see ch 111.7.3). We quite easily
understand Moore making relationships of this sort. As
spectators, we also seek out and find significance at a personal
level. Preoccupation with landscape provides a sympathetic link
with Auden. "The fact that Auden was a Yorkshireman, as I am,
and that the Yorkshire Landscape has always been a very exciting
element in my life, made a strong link between us". 16 It is not
that in making these etchings Moore seeks to tell us how
elephants' skeletons or male torsos or landscapes look; we need
not ask how like to an elephant's skull can a drawing be.
Questions which make sense might be the following: What is the
formal disposition of X to Y? Why does a concern for landscape
find its way into a concern for bone? What kind of problems does
Moore discover and resolve about scale, balance, surfaces in
etching this skull? New students of drawing are often told "Don't
• look for the object in your drawing; look for drawings in the
object." Which in a rough and ready way is to say that what
matters in looking at the object is the sort of drawing you want
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to try and do. Until the student has some idea of his concerns he
cannot see how to regard the object; he has nowhere to start.
The art student is not concerned with learning to see. He learns
how to look (see 1.7.1), but not for likenesses.
Knowing "what he wants to do" does not involve him in
foreknowledge of how his drawing will eventually look. It does
not require a mental image of that by the light of which he might
eventually examine his drawing;	 nothing of the sort. It does
mean sorting out the tenor and direction of his preoccupations
(see Chapter 111.3.2) for a fuller development of this matter). I
would say regarding the relation between the artist's knowledge of
his concerns and the recognition by another of authority in his
work that if the artist is vague about his concerns; has no
preoccupation in particular, or is in other ways havering over his
concerns, then his work will not convey authority. If on the
other hand we feel a work does do this then one of the things we
shall feel to be evident is a line of thought, as with the Moore
etching, though we should be every bit as cautious of laying claim
to its complete comprehension as he himself would be.
So we need not posit the artist himself as fully aware of the
extent of his preoccupations. It may, for one thing, be that
public response plays some part in his practical thinking, to
which in all its uncertainty he addresses himself. For another
his thinking is practically oriented. His preoccupations relate
to material possibilities and are subject to constraints for their
development. There is a certain open ended interdependency at
work. How is this interdependency to be understood? I am not
suggesting for example that a sculptor's concern with form depends
upon his prior experience of plastic substance. Neither do I
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think his concern is possible in theoretical isolation for in
order for it to be a sculptural concern some account has obviously
to be given of substance. The problem is to find a means of
characterizing sculptural ideas of form which allows us to show
that a merely experiential account is mistaken while at the same
time we do not wish to divorce the notion of form from the
constraints of physical perception. Moore is preoccupied with the
particularity and with generality of touch, of the feel, physical
and emotional of the skull's structure; its form furthers his own
concern with form. Yet his concern does not wait upon the being
of this bone. Rather he seeks out such objects for the
furtherance of a concern he has with form. Interestingly, in the
first place the skull was given to him by Julian Huxley who from
long association knew Moore would find the skull a likely subject
for investigation of a kind other than that of the biologist.
Moore shows in this example just how to turn somebody else's
concerns to pictorial account; first the scientist engages his
attention, latterly the poet.
It could seem, despite disclaimers, that what is being
suggested is some intra-mental notion of form which may be matched
or satisfied by careful selection of material objects; that is to
say an idea in isolation. This is not the case, as will be shown
in Chapter III, any more than it is the case for Ed Kinsey as he
thinks about painting Landscape (see 111.3.2, alsoI11.4.2.1)
Neither do I suppose it is sufficient to refute this by pointing
to any defining terms of sculpture without recognizing the need to
know that those defining terms have a conceptual basis which
involves the interdependency of a particular sort of thought and
action. Thus Moore's preoccupation with landscape is, we might
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thereby suppose, conditional upon recurring notions of form; his
search for general statements of form is conditional upon his
attention to the objective presence of, in this case, an
elephant's skull or it might be a landscape. He pursues his ideas
in an educated frame of mind, in a state of preparedness; which
is not to say that he has advance or comprehensive knowledge of
his state of mind.
11.4.3 The Question whether the Cohesiveness of an Artwork is
capable of complete Comprehension by the Artist.
Does the observer have a positive role in filling out the
coherence an artwork presents?
I have suggested that in some cases a work may in some way
exceed the intention of its maker in its appreciation by another
person and that one possible account of this state of affairs may
rest in the incompleteness of the artist's knowledge or
understanding of what he wants or wanted to do in his work.
Intention is only being discussed in connection with the question
of the authoritative standing of works of art. I am still not
investigating the artist's intentions, as such, but rather what it
is that prompts someone to remark a work as authoritative. I have
claimed that there is a relation between making such attribution
and the recognition of an artist's preoccupations and concerns;
that such attributions rest upon there being cohesion between the
reflective and practical activities manifest in the work. It is
true that, in the making, content affects content and is affected
as it develops by its relative disposition to what has gone
before. That is, any mark upon the canvas makes a difference to
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the mark which will succeed it and is thus itself put down with
some regard for its predecessors (see Chapter 1.5 concerning The
First Moment.) But content is often enigmatic and may by allusion
exceed its immediate format. The extent of allusion may only be
guessed, though its direction, if it is not deliberately
ambiguous, may be noted. One of the marks of any work we are
pleased to term 'great' or 'good' and without prejudice to what
else that might be, is that we are compelled to search out its
content, for it may not be available all at once. The observer
seeks to understand the artist. Now does this indicate that the
artist has the key to all its complexities or is it possible that
his power is such that in making a statement he discloses unaware,
numerous implications not guessed in advance, but discoverable,
hinted at through graphic or sculptural form and, as it were
picked up and taken further by an observer?
The making of the work constantly informs and sometimes
startles even its maker. He cannot be said to apprehend at the
outset the full particularity of his concerns (see 111.8.4); even
his preoccupations, while needfully sought and explored are with
concerns by nature incapable of complete advance knowledge. Now
can we suppose him ever to be capable of anything like full
knowledge? It would not seem a likely thing for anyone to claim.
Neither would this be required for a view of cohesion of thought
and action. However if that cohesion is not contained entirely by
pictorial or scuptural content then are we to suppose it possible
that it takes an audience to fill out the artist's intention?
Perhaps the point is that the artwork positively implies the
spectator, and thus implies the active role of the spectator.
This we will now consider.
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There is obviously a case for supposing this to be so in
examples of Performance Art. The border line between the visual
and dramatic arts is deliberately diffuse in such works as that
not so long ago performed by Kerry Trengove digging his way out of
a London Gallery; 17 However ambiguous, it is fair to take it that
such work was 'art' perhaps not merely by virtue of its venue,
announcement and orchestration for art critics, without whom some
may reckon his activity might have been awarded another sort of
title like vandalism or potholing, plumbing or archaeology. That
is perhaps a peripheral matter to my present point though not
irrelevant to observations I shall make in Chapter IV, but for the
moment I will leave over the contentious aspect of the case and
take the status of the event as an artwork as given. Whatever
objections we might sustain it has to be admitted that Trengove is
at least concerned to demonstrate the inseparability of the act of
sharing in the idea to the execution of the material deed. The
real point raised here is, must it be only 'drama' in order to
require the spectator, as I believe this work does? It would be
absurd to shut the spectator out of the theatre; but is there any
less absurdity in excluding him from the gallery and, if not, then
can we not see that there might be rather more orthodox works of
art which no less require the responsive agency of other people
for the scope of the artist's concerns and preoccupations to be
extended? The authoritative work does more than sit back
quiescent in its frame. It somewhat coerces the attention,
compels the spectator to take a view, by quite formal,
compositional or gestural means revealing its content through his
eyes. Although we have noted the fact that many painters are not
wittingly concerned with public response to their work it would
seem very strange if it could possibly be supposed that paintings
were deliberately conceived as private. Painting is a kind of
conversing. Recently it has become difficult to 'converse' with
artists but it is important that the attempt is made; it matters
to the artist unless he is to subject himself to conceptual
isolation, which would effectively be to truncate his agency in a
critical aspect, that his public is apprised of the colour of his
preoccupations. It will be a sad day that his public ceases to
care whether he does so or not. The viewer is still implied,
though the terms of implication are far from secure. But we would
be rash to suppose these terms ever to have been fixed; static.
Thus, in answer to my third question, "can we say that a work
which is cohesive must be one and the same with the product of the
artist who knows his mind?", it seems that we must heed the
preoccupations of the artist even if they are hard to find; we
must recognize that a painting may, while being a manifestation
of such preoccupations, exceed the expectations of its maker in
the richness of its content. It is difficult to exclude from
consideration of the agency involved in the making of artworks the
participation of the man-in-the-gallery. While that work us one
with the product of an artist's preoccupations, the same work is
capable of exceeding the comprehension of the artist in its making
and in its public impact. In such sense we may view the work of
art, without detraction to its entity, as a catalyst and its
authority as dependent upon the extent to which it exacts and
engages response. It is that with which I shall next be
concerned. (see also 111.3.1).
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11.4.4 A Question of Good Faith.
Consider now the painting whose technical merits are not
deficient and which, we are bound to say, is commanding
considerable attention but yet is, I should fervently wish to say,
a work whose testimony is disingenuous or even despicable?
Earlier I remarked a sorry want of veracity in the drawing by
Russell Flint (see 1.3.3) and maintain that whatever charge might
be preferred in terms of its being a sloppy piece of drawing what
matters most is that his sentiments are questionable. The
suspicion is that eroticism is being debased for some purpose.
There is just the feeling that it might be in line with the
easiest of appeals; the trigger to the old familiar mechanism.
The same techniques characteristically advertise our daily goods,
the target being the point of sale. If this drawing offends it is
in its intention to exploit to commercial purpose that it does
so. An artist is in a special position of power since the graphic
image is curiously both direct and evocative in its appeal. A
truly erotic work is the hardest of all to execute in good faith.
This is a matter of concern not only for any artist but also
for anyone who pauses before the work. The requirement of good
faith is no less rigorously laid upon the spectator. He is
necessarily implicated in the erotic content of the work. Yet his
particular and personal response to the pleasures, pain and
excitement of the content is - however demanded - open to his
misuse. My concern is this; that response of the spectator to
the erotic painting provides a most compelling model for the
inclusive character of the self as it implies the presence and
response of another. This is a relationship in which that truth
is clearly, manifestly given. Yet any temptation to regard
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pictorial content in instrumental terms is as mistaken in this
genre of painting thought as it is an any; it is at worst to
reduce it to the level of pornography. And that is shamefully to
abuse the relation, one's own self and the artist whose work it
is. Agency is itself perverted thus. The problem is to attain to
some level of objectification since the artist has himself been
under the same obligation - painting an erotic picture is not a
piece of sexual behaviour on the artist's part. This by no means
reduces the emotions involved to Mr. Casaubon's "shallow rill" of
feeling. 18 On the contrary a lack of response is a failure for it
marks, in Kant's works, "a want of feeling". The full measure of
a Nude by Matthew Smith is, in some important sense for me as a
spectator, the analogous measure of myself - and that need not be
because I am myself a woman. But I cannot remain detached!
Pornography can only direct me towards some getting; it is
necessarily instrumental. But Eroticism is a term of art which
presupposes reciprocity, over all things a spirit of generosity.
The communicating authority of an erotic work of art is in this
connection yet an irreducibly pictorial matter. That is the
difficulty for both the painter and the spectator. In Chaper III
I shall pursue the discussion of the need for an objective stance
as exemplified in landscape painting and will reveal an important
connection between the present issue and the concerns of a
landscape painter, already mooted in my allusion to Kant and in my
abiding concern with the nature of the self.
Concerning authority, if there is in a work some technical
deficiency, some ineptitude then to be sure we feel a sense of
uncertainty about that work, but the worrying thing about the
disingenuous picture or sculpture is that the unwary, no doubt
well-meaning spectator
might never notice a thing - he can be hoodwinked into accepting
all kinds of squalid rubbish. There is a lot of trouble in store
for the so-called innocent eye. Technical mastery on its own may
be spurious but it may easily also be pernicious. What is
important is that we take care in ascribing authority to artworks
not to rate expertise at the expense of testimony, and no less
important, that we exact of any artist a standard of workmanship
worthy of his testimony.
11.5 Engaging the Attention. The Standpoint of the Spectator.
An artwork is capable of attracting, in some cases even
coercing the attention of the spectator. Yet, as I have pointed
out, it is the case that under certain circumstances such a work
may, notwithstanding its apparent claim upon the attention, not be
worthy of the ascription of authority. Concentration of some of
the ways in which this is borne out will be the substance of the
rest of this chapter.
Firstly, I will show that there is no difficulty in accepting
the ascription of authority in the recognition of an artwork as
powerful, where its power may come in the guise of distinctively
dissimilar attributes.
11.5.1 The Relationship between Power and Authority in the
Present Connection.
It is my contention that we should be prepared to ascribe
authority where we would not necessarily acknowledge a work as
powerful, whatever form power might take, although there are
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cases in which it is both authoritative and powerful. The extent
to which the eye is drawn to a work is evidence of the extent to
which the work presents itself as a pictorial presence. It is the
case that we should not want to separate off the standing of a
work from its power to attract attention. Of course it is not in
all cases true that the power to attract and engage attention lies
in the brute power of the work, per se. There are works with
which the artist clearly sets out to exercise power; to direct
the attention, to force opinion in particular ways. Propagandist
Art provides us with such instances. Consider the attacks of the
Futurists upon the architecture of the past; 19 or Dada upon
conventions of the Salon: 20 a case of the Art that was Anti-Art.
Effective power is required in this case for the successful
communication of the Message. The irony of their situation is,
historically, that rejection of Authority did not release the
Dadaists from their own need to be authoritative; they relied
very heavily upon being just that, although they themselves saw
the irony of their situation: the problems of the construction of
a manifesto based on the principles of annihilation! We have to
see their impact in terms of a firm connection between their being
powerful enough and thus being influential enough. We may regard
influence and authority in this instance as interrelated, and a
connection between the two as central to the success of the
campaign.
	 (This is without prejudice to the case put forward in
11.3.1 against influence and authority being conjoined in the
ascription of authority.) Here are now two examples in which, in
differing ways, the connection between authority and power seems
to be doubtful.
-107-
A. Consider the student's painting which has some good bits,
some powerful good bits; we can see what he's after, but yet, it
is not really what we would call authoritative, although it might
• be his dearest wish that we should. Let us say something is
missing in the way the picture works as a whole. In fact it
doesn't work as a whole; technicalities let it down. So it lacks
the cohesion of mastery and testimony necessary to any work's
communicative success. It is thus not able to be authoritative,
although it is, we would still be able to say, quite powerful. In
such a case mastery is deficient, but the painting is a work in
good faith and this, as such, would command the greatest
encouragement from any teacher worth his contract.
B. Consider now the artwork those content does not immediately
convey authority but which catches the attention such that on
longer inspection and sustained effort, on the part of the
observer, it takes on an authoritative aspect. Admittedly
something prompts the observer to persevere: yet it seems
inappropriate to think about such a work in terms of its making an
impact in the powerful way that work by, say, Matthew Smith makes
an impact. Is it still quite correct to describe such a work in
terms of its being powerful? Intriguing it may be, and elusive.
In such a case even though my feeling is that we would be better
to speak of its authoritativeness in terms such as these, we
cannot dismiss the matter, for an idea may take time in its
apprehension; it may eventually have no less powerful a hold in
the imagination than that which came by way of a shock to the eye.
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11.5.2 Attracting the Attention and engaging it.
The Standpoint of the Spectator.
An artwork is capable of enagaging the attention of the
spectator. The agency of the artist implies that this is so. How
far is the ascription of authority to works of art a matter of the
artwork's attracting attention to itself? It is in order to
characterize more closely the communicative stance between the
spectator and the agent concerns of the artist, as manifest in the
configurations of the artwork, that I want now to look to the
matter of what it is for an artwork to engage the pictorial
attention of a spectator (see 11.2.1). There are, of course, many
kinds of communicative stance. In some instances attracting, even
compelling attention to the work is a primary concern of the
artist. We have noted that in such cases a work may by this
criterion be ascribed its authority. However that an artwork is
'powerful' may not have to do with whether it is the intention of
the artist to exercise power as such. This just may be an epithet
which seems right; the colour, the manner, the subject matter may
be powerful in expression. In such a case we find ourselves as
spectators powerfully affected. Again authority may accordingly
be ascribed, yet we should not wish to regard as a criterion of
authoritativeness in such cases the successful exercise of power
over attention, whereas in the instance of propaganda we certainly
would. The question whether an artwork is powerful and so, by that
means, authoritative may be regarded as one amongst others coming
within a wider concern to discover the way the communicative
stance is achieved. Whether the exercise of power, for example,
is intended or simply concomitantly accomplished, what must be
asked is what is involved in the artwork's engaging the attention
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to the extent that such questions as concern the particular
character of the communicative stance are possible. The matter of
concern here is to ask what it is for artworks to engage the
pictorial attention of the spectator such that the ascription of
authority to artworks is possible.
There are two related areas of concern to consider. In the
first, these three questions arise from the point of view of the
spectator.
For the ascription of authority to be possible must it be the
case that the artwork so invested is such as attracts attention to
itself?
Would a work be authoritative in that it had the features
needful to attract spectator-attention to itself?
Would a work which did not attract attention all-at-once but
rather in gradual fashion over a perhaps protracted period be such
as would qualify for the ascription of authority?
These are the questions which arise concerning the
relationship between the effective capability an artwork might
have to attract the attention of the spectator and the ascription
of authority to artworks. The questions reveal in assumption:
the ascription of authority, being possible only in the domain of
shared ideas, has to begin somewhere; an artwork has to be
noticed before its ideas can possibly be shared, or be deemed
authoritative. The exhibition provides a venue, but in an
exhibition one work can all too easily go unnoticed for one reason
or another, while another is very much more noticeable. What is
it about a work which attracts notice, which gives the spectator
pause? That broadly is the first order problem. The second order
question concerns the characterization of this aspect of
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communicative stance set up by the artwork's availability to the
attention of a spectator.
Since the notion of authority is possible only in the
context of a communicative stance, is it not reasonable, in the
case of ascribing authority to artworks, to posit some relation,
or at least, association between such ascription and the
noticeable features of the work? Can it not, for example, be said
that the fact of the attention of a spectator being engaged by a
painting by Matthew Smith must be very much to do with the visual
impact of the painting upon the attention of the spectator and
that this is dependent upon there being a measure of cohesiveness
in the concerns of Matthew Smith as manifest in his painting?
Must it be allowed that attracting the attention is on a par with
engaging the pictorial concerns of the spectator in respect of
there being some communicative stance in which the notion of
authority has meaning?
I have claimed that for an artwork to have authority is for
it to manifest cohesion of reflective and practical activity in
its observable features. Where such pictorial thinking is vague
or inconsistent, cohesion will be noticeably lacking. Working in
good faith involves some clarity of thought. The ascription of
authority to artworks requires some community of ideas between the
spectator and the artist.
Let me now turn to a consideration of the first order
problem.
11.5.2.1 Concerning the Ability or otherwise of an Artwork
to attract Attention to itself.
It may be said that for an artwork to make its own running,
so to speak, does not limit the ways and means by which it does
so. It must be true that for an artwork never to engage the
attention of another for whatever reason is to deny the
communicative stance necessary to the possibility of the
ascription of authority. This is to fail to satisfy the condition
of his agency. The spectator has to begin somewhere. Otherwise
his agent-concerns cannot be engaged.
11.5.2.2 The Question whether a work should be deemed
authoritative in that it had such features as might
attract attention to itself.
It may be said that we should want to distinguish the
contingency of some spurious command over spectator attention from
the engagement of his pictorial concerns in a shared communicative
stance. For the latter is grounds for the ascription of
authority; the former is questionable. Taking first the former
case it is clear enough that features of many kinds may attract
attention. An otherwise inconsistent, dull, vaguely considered
painting may draw the eye by means of there being a splash of
fluorescent paint on the canvas; or a tear in it; other than
these features, the work would command not the least attention to
itself. Another instance may be the accidental mark or blemish
which cnly serves to draw attention to itself, either in being
more interesting than the canvas it has marked, or in being a pity
for having spoilt the painting. We should note that
attract mg the eye is possible by many means. Holding the eye,
sustaining attention and calling it back, perhaps many times,
requires more of the artist than that he has the trick of
conjuring the eye of the observer into a momentary stare. That
the eye is caught is not in itself an indication of a
communicative relation between agents. Yet the cohesive work,
which may or equally may not be wrought in assertive, bold or
colourful terms, has the power both to stay and hold the attention
of the spectator.
11.5.2.3 The possibility of Gradual recognition.
I now come to the question as to whether the authoritative
work is one whose attributes, in respect of which it is this
characterized, are such as must be immediately apparent to a
spectator or whether they may be acquainted to his attention in
gradual fashion, effecting what one might call a shift in the
spectator's initial view of the work. There is no good reason to
suppose that pictorial content - just because it occurs in all its
complexity on the same plane and is simultantiously present to the
attention - must simultaneously engage the attention. There are
paintings whose impact is of that sort, but there are many whose
content is ambiguous; those whose matter may be available,
accessible, not all at once but over time; where education or
experience may deepen the spectator's understanding. A painting
barely understood may richly reward the spectator of persistence
who is prepared to keep on coming back. Such a work as is felt to
be worth coming back should not be precluded from the possibility
of its being authoritative. It could be said to be authoritative
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precisely in the function of holding the interest of a spectator
over time and under conditions of some ambiguity.
11.5.3 Engaging a spectator's Attention by a Diversity of Means.
I now come to the second order question of concern in this
connection. What is the relationship between the noticeable
features of an artwork and the ascription of authority to the
artwork? That an artwork has both the power to attract and to
hold the attention of a spectator prompts us to enquire whether it
is after all just a matter of power; of hitting the retina hard
enough to hurt? But this has been shown not to be the case. What
is more difficult to discover is what it is, in less strident
works, that attracts attention. While the cohesiveness of the
work may be said effectively to hold the attention can it be the
case that it is this which initially exerts power, or fascination
or whatever over the passing glance of the spectator?
Some examples will show that there is a case for making a
distinction between the spectator's attention having been arrested
and its being held.
It is fair to say that some of Matthew Smith's paintings
mount a sort of assault on the retina; His works certainly can be
described as compelling the attention. Initially this may either
be through his use of rather seamy colour, or because he puts it
on in a very gestural manner; or because he seems to do
outrageous things with rather formal subject matter. But at the
very first glance which, say, is drawn to a particularly lurid
gash - like rotten fruit - the spectator takes in other features.







cohesiveness of his pictorial business. The audacious treatment
of traditional material; the choice of colours and the gestural
way of putting them down; these are not at odds. They are at
one. One feature may make the spectator turn and look. But as he
looks he sees one feature is an integral aspect of another and it
is that which might be said to keep him looking. Here let us say
is a work which both commands the eye and, having pictorial
cohesion, stays it, engaging the sustained attention of the
observer. A work which can do both may justly be ascribed
authority. The work which cannot sustain the attention of the
spectator for longer than it takes him to realize that his
initial reaction to the work is going to be the sum of his concern
with it, has nothing amounting to authority. It merely has the
trick of conjuring, or catching at the eye; diverting the
attention. These are the attributes of novelty, by definition
soon assimilated, soon exhausted. However, I do not believe that
I should want to say that a painting or drawing with capacity for
holding the attention must necessarily attract it in the very way
that a painting by Matthew Smith attracts it.
For it is true that a work may have no brightness about it,
no outstanding image, no element of shock and yet it may quite
easily engage the regard. Quiet gestures being as capable of
engaging the attention as are those of more flamboyance. In music
this might be accomplished as a device of cadence, or a shift in
key. In the visual arts it is perhaps a matter of a work's being
transparent to some common experience, or it is the occasion of
something the spectator himself is brought to know. In this
connection I might remark the pictorial economy of Rembrandt's
etching of Saskia; spare but comprehensive, of a tenderness
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whose kind we understand; cannot disregard. There are thus not
very remarkably, more ways than one of engaging and holding
spectator attention. They have in common that, in whatever mode
that attention is caught, whether through the physical impact of
colour or by virtue of there being an established emotional common
ground between painter and spectator the focus of spectator
attention is the artwork; in this case the etching. The
pictorial cohesion at work in the reflective and practical
concerns of the artist are manifest in the work, and primarily
they are pictorial concerns. There need be no unease over this
being so, for a spectator must come in some spirit of trust to an
artwork. Manipulation of the emotions is always a fear but the
device need not be suspected where the painter's primary concern
has pictorial veracity. Being true to oneself is, for a painter,
to be concerned with this above all else.
The visual impact of an artwork upon a spectator therefore
cannot be dissociated from his initial attention to it.
Furthermore it is by its pictorial cohesion that it stands or
falls in engaging the concerns of the spectator in a shared
communicative pictorial stance. The ascription of authority to an
artwork is some measure of the extent to which a communicative
relationship is achieved.
Lastly, it must be asked, in what way, considered now from
the standpoint of the artist, it is the case that merely getting
the attention is not on a par with holding the attention, that is
engaging it in some shared system of ideas, in the context of the
ascription of authority.
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11.6 Engaging the Attention. The Standpoint of the Artist as
unavoidably Pictorial.
The notion of authority is possible only in the context of
communicative relationships between agents. The engagement of
spectator attention in pictorial concerns would seem apt context
for the application of the concept of authority. However, merely
for something to have attracted the spectator's attention does
not guarantee his being brought into communicative relationship as
agent. An accidental happening can attract the eye. As such, the
attention being caught is no guarantee of the communicative stance
needful to provide the grounds of the possibility of the notion of
authority. A gesture made by the artist, as agent, if it is an
accidental gesture, is on a par with any other accidental event
insofar as it stands outside the context of the pictorial
communicative stance; as is the case if he trips on the gallery
rug and splatters his work with icecream for example. But what
about an attention-seeking gesture which comes within the
communicative context in that the spectatpr's attention may
successfully be drawn to something another agent does? Should
that scmething be significantly connected with an artwork than the
character of communicative relation which is established is
pictorial. This would contribute towards a longer stay of
spectator attention. However if it seems not, as a gesture, to
have any interest beyond that which is generated in itself then it
may or may not be the case that the communicative stance is
pictorial. Where it is not to be so characterized then the
context in which it is communicative between agents is arbitrary
with respect to the context of the artwork - just as arbitrary as
an accidental splash of paint or splatter of icecream. A gesture
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of this kind is spurious and does not sustain the attention of the
spectator, nor does it lead the spectator beyond itself. Where
the gesture is intended to be pictorially significant yet is
itself arbitrary with respect to the artwork, for the sake of
which the gesture is made, then we may expect no more of the
spectator than that he looks at the gesture and when tired of
looking at that, looks no further. If a picture is a
compositional disaster, salvation almost certainly does not lie
that way (see 111.8.4).
11.7. Conclusion.
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the public
aspect of artistic agency, to show something of its complexity and
to study its operation. I have sought to show that the agency of
the artist unavoidably involves a communicative stance. The artist
as agent is inelectably engaged in a communicative relation with
other agents. This relation between an artist and his public is
effective, or ineffectual in terms of the attention of the public
being drawn towards a consideration of the ideas put forward by
some other person whose ideas are, in the case of that person
being a painter, manifest in the configurations on the canvas.
The extent to which the attention of an observer is engaged by the
work of art, as a system of visual ideas may most usefully be
discussed in terms of an authoritative relation.
I noted that two features which to some extent appear to mark
out the application of the notion of authority in this connection
from other fields of use are in fact quite common; the complexity
of the agency of the artist, which led us to ask whether authority
could be ascribed where the intention to command it is even in
part not clear, is in some degree a complexity shared by other
areas of usage. Secondly, the non-verbal nature of the artistic
agency which marks it out as an area of communication in which the
notion of authority is employed, is to be found in other areas
also.
What this application has in common with other areas of use
is that the communicative relations, in the context of which the
authoritative relation obtains, is a necessary aspect of the
agent-concerns of persons engaged in effective relationship to one
another. A work, person, performance or plan may be regarded as
having authority insofar as it is possible, and plausible to point
to there being a noticeable cohesion of ideas and actions. That
in the majority of cases the situation giving rise to the
application of the term is most usually a task does not prejudice
my case. We look to the good faith of the case, whatever it is,
and to the practicability or expertise of its mechanics.
As an example to consider I have spent some time looking at
the relationship of some of the professed ideas and preoccupations
of one man, Henry Moore, to a particular piece of work. In
'Elephant Skull' there is evidence of the operations of making as
manifestations of one person's agency as an artist.
What may be said on the basis of these observations?
Firstly, there has to be some artefact; some observable,
remarkable form of expression before the notion of authority can
come into use. The story of the idea of a work of art is not the
work of art and is scant guide to any possible authoritative
impact of the unmade work. We look for artefactual evidence of
reflective and practical action.
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Secondly, it is a condition of artistic agency that it entails a
public aspect. Unless some communicative relation is effected
between artist and observer one essential aspect of the agency of
the artist is unsatisfied. This is not to deny the possible
satisfaction of the conditions of his agency; but the authority
ascribed to an artwork is one mark of the extent to which that
work instigates communication.Engaging the attention is the first
requirement. Entering into the agent-concerns of the artist is in
considerable part a positive act on the part of the agent
observer, but if he fails to notice the work he can hardly begin
the attempt. Thirdly, this shows us a parallel in general
consideration of the case. Whether we are speaking of the
authority of artworks or politicians we are bound by the terms of
its grounds to suppose the possibility of some community of ideas
in the domain of human dealings. 21 Where community of ideas
fails or does not begin we may say that in such cases agency
itself is partially unsatisfied; incomplete. "Any self, any
agent, is an existent being - a person. The idea of an isolated
agent is self-contradictory. Any agent is necessarily in relation
to the other. Apart from this essential relation he does not
exist. But, further, the other in this constitutive relation must
itself be personal. Persons, therefore, are constituted by their
mutual relation to one another. 'I' exist only as one element in
the complex 'you and I'." 22
Fourthly, just in case the concept of authority should still be
thought out of place in the art gallery, I would say that it is
perhaps time the concept of authority enjoyed a re-appraisal in
general; liberation from those narrow associations which it
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retains with the cane and the court-room. If the artist is on
"pain or loss of self" compelled to recognize the public aspect of
his agency, it is far from mistaken to discuss the fruits of his
labours in terms of the extent to which they engage the attention
of others; therein is properly a matter of authoritative dealing.
CHAPTER III PICTORIAL CONCEPTS
In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies a
product, characterized by a manifest cohesion of reflective and
practical endeavour. This product is a pictorial form of thought.
111.1 Introduction.
In the foregoing chapter considerable emphasis was laid upon
the cohesion of thinking and doing as it is shown in works of
art. That this cohesion is apparent is, it was claimed, a mark
of the communicative standing of an artwork, since it is this
which effectively engages the attention of the observer or
spectator. In this section I shall consider the progress of the
reflective activity of painting. I will be concerned with the
characterization of the thinking involved in that activity.
Standing back to reflect is part of an artist's work; it is
as much a part of the business of painting as the mixing of
pigments and the overtly practical activity of applying them to
the canvas. Even in widely different forms of painting, forms as
diverse as action-painting and portraiture, setting up standing
stones, or throwing down sticks, relection attends the practical
deed. From the standpoint of the artist as agent it is important
that out of concern for the thing he wants to do he furthers his
understanding about the way in which he thinks, (see 1.5). In the
circumstances of painting it is not possible to sustain any
opposition of thinking and making.
However, whilst clearly not wishing to sort the activity of
painting pictures into rigidly separable phases it is yet possible
to remark a progress in the development of ideas whose expression
is necessarily pictorial. The progress involves approaches to the
work which range from the predominantly reflective pursuit of a
prospective painting to the predominantly practical business of
painting itself.
The area of concern is large. I mean to conduct my enquiry
around a consideration of aspects of the thinking that attend the
progress of landscape painting. In exploring the progress of this
painterly idea I shall be able with some clarity to fix the
character of agency at issue, thereby expanding upon the terms of
the first chapter concerning pictorial irreducibility. By the
same means I shall be able to make good my case for the self, the
artist, as agent and to despatch the notion of the artist, as a
special sort of being. By implication, pursuit of the nature of
the Self is inadequately satisfied in terms of Being. It is only
by looking to the field of action that we can approach the notion
of the Self.
My reason for choosing Landscape Painting to illustrate my
case is that it enables me to set out in some clarity certain
implications of producing works of art of all kinds. Although
what I shall have to say will in no way be presumed exclusive to
landscape painting, it will become clear that Landscape art
embodies the points at issue in very particular fashion. I will
examine the progress of a pictorial prospect of landscape,
therefore, in the light of the following observations.
I. "Prospect" is itself a term of landscape. Nowadays we perhaps
more readily make use of the notion of a view than of a prospect,
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but to use either is to acknowledge a debt to Art. It is part of
the artist's task to take a creative stance; to objectify some
focus upon a comprehensive world. The fundamental possibility of
this detachment is given in the conditions under which we may
posit the agent as artist.
In the making of any work of art, the intention to make it is
constrained by the fact that the world "comprehends", is inclusive
of the artist's corporeal presence. The Wordsworthian "Prospect
in the mind", from which I shall substantially develop my
argument, sets out the factitious nature of his response. It is
not the chief concern of the artist to set a glass against
reality, whatever that might be. He intends rather to add
something to it, new made, irreducibly of its own kind.
Clearly, I shall not claim Landscape Art as a special domain
of objectification. But I shall make use of the notion of
Prospect with due deference to its connotations in Romantic Poetry
and Painting since their fundamental similarity in this connection
lies in the recognition of the nature of the business of making
works, not of Nature, but of Art. In this context, the context of
Landscape - there is scope, perhaps as in none better, to explore
the nature of the Self implied by positing the artist as agent.
2. The painter needs to regard himself in a relationship with
the world of which he is part and with the factitious pictorial
entity which informs his pictorial intent. This 3-term relation
is a central condition of his agency as an artist.
3. An artist's ideas are dependent upon practical expression for
their development. It is possible to distinguish phases in the
progress which involve both reflective and practical activity.
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An artist needs a means of settling the question of his reflective
stance. He cannot do this simply by beginning to put paint on
canvas, nor yet can he re-discover it out of purely reflective
consideration. This looks remarkably like a threat of circularity
for him which he must resolve or dismiss - or be unable to
continue at all.
4. The reflective work of the artist cannot be adequately
accounted for in an account of the artist's capacities or
dispositions. The innovatory character of his concerns must
always exceed these.
5. In looking to the constraints of the three-term relation upon
the artist, it is mistaken to pursue questions concerning the
nature of the self-that-he-is in the context of an organic model.
It is primarily doing, and not being, which informs an account of
the self.
6. The fullest development of a painter's concerns is reached in
the culmination of the work.
As indicated in Chapter II a great deal of this has
implications for the notion of the intelligibility of works of
art, for to refer to an art work in terms of its ideas is to
acknowledge the reflective aspect of a practical endeavour.
Further, it is to free the notion of intelligibility from the
constraints of language. 1 What is needed is some way of looking
at the development of ideas which does not necessitate the
isolation of reflective, predominantly mental, activities from
practical and predominantly physical activities - and which
permits of pictorial intelligibility. A related issue is the
possibility of postulating pictorial concepts. However, I am
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only concerned to ask what a pictorial concept might be in terms
of being able to say something of what it is to develop such
concepts: it is central to my case that such ideas as are
developed are pictorially manifest. With this in mind I shall
look at the development of a pictorial prospect and the problems
involved, in the context of an orthodox - if by now a little
old-fashioned - theory of concept development put by H.H. Price.2
Price states very clearly the sort of position a standard
empirical account leads to, or can lead to.
Concerning the nature of thinking involved in painting I will
continue my enquiries by looking to the question of what is
involved in the earliest stages of an idea's development. I shall
challenge the account put by Maurice Merleau-Ponty regarding the
progress of a concept as necessitating two related stages of
development: reflective thinking - which leads to objective
knowledge being dependent upon the pre-reflective awareness of a
sentient being towards his physical environment.3
This I shall explore in the hope of furthering my account of
the agency of the artist within a framework of some characterizing
force. It will be of note to point up the comparison of the case
regarding the nature of the Self put by John Macmurray.
My objective is to characterize artistic agency and to do so
by considering the concerns of the landscape painter. I shall
show tbat the reflective and practical, sensible, aspects of his
concern can neither be excised from the creative endeavour nor
wholly separated in it. The central concern of this chapter must
be to show that it is in the context of the personal deliberative
agency of the artist that we must attend to the relationship of
reflective to practical activity. The reflective stance adopted
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by a painter towards his endeavours is part of his work; it has
therefore to be regarded not as a withdrawal from work but as
itself part of his way of working on his picture.
Regarding the mechanics of the process; the mental stance
adopted by an artist towards his endeavour is marked by
distinctive phases although temporally they may overlap and
confuse. These phases of a painter's undertaking are part of the
process of developing painterly ideas.
In Chapter I, I spent time over an objective drawing. This
had purposes which may seem in many respects to overlap with the
example of the Landscape Painting. But it is clear that whereas
an objective drawing excercise serves in many respects to raise
problems of a general sort for any artist, it is in important ways
a task in isolation, whose point is to indicate the comprehensive
scope of artistic agency. A painter's role in making what he does
is inevitably constituted by his thought as developed in his
painting. The example of painting landscape, perhaps better than
any other, serves to show something of the business of being an
artist. In this chapter I shall be at pains to show that the
painter can only develop the sense of himself in terms of his task
- his manifest ways of thinking, in drawing, painting or whatever
form his pictorial concerns may take. So this chapter will not
only show a process at work; it will also show a progress. In
that connection I shall be able to say something informative, not
only of the business of making, but also of the artwork as an
object, and in this endeavour and its outcome, something of the
Self the artist is. Since it is my belief that the best way of
approaching is by taking as standpoint the agency of the artist it
is hoped that the working conerns of one
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person will serve to confirm that standpoint as of use to artists
and philosophers alike. The substance of this chapter will be an
exploration of these working concerns set forth in the context of
the six observations outlined above.
111.2 The Pursuits of a Landscape Painter.
111.2.1 A Painter's Need to characterize his concerns.
Consider the case of Ed Kinsey. Landscape Painter.
I shall begin by giving some account of features of his
concern which, while of particular interest to him may help us to
understand generally what an artist means when he speaks of having
an idea for a painting.
Kinsey is an easel painter. He uses traditional materials:
oil paint and canvas.
He concentrates upon forms encountered in nature but deals
with his material in a semi-abstract manner. He is not primarily
concerned with topographical paintings.
Ho is not a plein air painter. That is, he does not feel
that a landscape painting must be undertaken in conditions of
immediacy. Even though he sometimes uses drawings made on
location, it would be reasonable to regard his painterly concern
with places as mediate.
Given Kinsey's mediate approach to landscape painting we may
appreciate that there could be some difficulty for him in
identifying the locus of his attention. He uses landscape forms
in his painting; particular places provide him with material.
What is his matter, since it is not primarily the portrayal of any
particular place? He is concerned to discover what his prospect
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might be, which I shall show, is the first order problem. The
second order problem for him and for us is how he should address
himself to his matter, his prospect. How he should characterize
his concerns in a manner which is primarily painterly, however
extensively he need plunder the diversity of language, memory, and
emotion in its expression. He does not seek the intelligibility
of language. Language can indeed be an impediment to him as he
seeks to characterize his concerns, just as a visual medium can be
an impediment to a linguistic creation. It is at this early stage
that the artist may find himself, by virtue of his concerns,
standing somewhat athwart his own endeavours. The difficulty
resides in reconciling the account he intends, which will be
pictorial and material, not in his head, not verbal, with his
attempts to come to terms with his own personal complex response
to the landscape. In short, he has to undertake the task of
objectification. The problem of characterizing concerns is a
feature of landscape painting of whatever tradition. A painting
has many phases of development. No matter how many reversals,
slurs and overlaps occur between the phases, we need to regard
them distinctly. Kinsey has himself outlined a progress to the
processes involved for him in painting landscape which I here
include:
"The Process.
a.	 Identification of a feature or type of landscape which one
immediately recognizes as sympathetic to one's need to create.
This identification generally occurs after a period of involvement
through direct observation, memory, imagination, and photographs.
This period of time can be either short or protracted.
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"An incubation period seems necessary, when the 'mental
stance' becomes an all-consuming preoccupation. The visual
appearance of these landscape features are not enough in their own
right. I am not interested in displaying my ability to observe
and record. The image must match up with my need to express
personal qualities. When these two things coincide (the visual
image/feature and my inner expression/feelings) the production of
artwork is a logical progression. The hindrance of this
progression results in great personal frusLration." (see 111.8.2).
"b. Having established a 'mental stance' there follows a
great deal of drawing. This drawing relates to the compositional
problems of organizing the 'visual language' e.g. shape, line,
form etc. The drawing is very rarely done from observation of the
landscape. It is generally produced in retrospect, isolated
physically from the location by time and space. In addition to
the formal organization of the visual composition the attempt to
introduce the wider personal emotional content of the picture
becomes a consideration. This is the matching up of image and
emotions that I spoke of as being paramount to my beginning to
work. It becomes more than just a 'mental stance' but seeks a
physical, visual evidence or existence. Producing this 'evidence'
is a complex matter; many factors contribute, such as memory,
imagination, training, accident/chance, photographs.
"c. The production of many drawings (which in many ways are
complete in their own right) serve to stimulate the natural desire
to produce a more finished or resolved statement. Other
considerations now become the preoccupation. Choice of media,
scale, technique and the organization of my physical working
environment. The translation into colour from what appear to be
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black/white drawings (but which in fact have always been
conceived in colour) is very important. Generally colour is used
intuitively and not governed by any set rules. The activity of
painting is totally absorbing and the production of a painting can
occupy either a matter of hours or weeks (see also 111.5.3).
During this physical activity the 'mental stance' recedes only to
re-emerge when one once more begins to question the 'finished'
visual statement. At this stage one becomes aware that other
unidentifiable aspects have crept into the work. It is this
'unknown' element that enables you to proclaim that the work is
'finished' or 'successful', (at least for the moment)." (see
111.8.4 re serendipity).
There is some dificulty for Kinsey in developing his 'mental
stance'. He speaks of great personal frustration experienced at
any hindrance to progression. These hindrances threaten the
development of the work at particular points and are of critical
concern, as will be made clear in distinguishing the conceptual
field of the painter. Clearly, although the quotation suggests
that what greatly frustrates is being prevented from painting when
once the "coincidence of visual imagery and feeling" is
established, as for instance might be the case at having to
fulfill other duties just at the point of being ready to paint, I
do not think that this is the only sort of frustration for him,
(but it can be ruinously interruptive nevertheless). The
"incubation period" he speaks of can quite easily be
unproductive. (see also 111.8.2).
It is with this bleak possibility in mind that I approach the
matter of recognizing the importance of the 'mental' or reflective
stance of the painter, for unless he settles the matter to his
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personal satisfaction he would, he would claim, be unable to get
any further with a work of any importance. This surely must be
the worst kind of frustration for one whose concerns require
practical expression.
111.2.2 In Outline: an Approach to Kinsey's Concerns.
During the earliest stages of the activity I shall regard him
as taking up a reflective stance. He feels it is important that
he has some kind of prospect in mind. This prospect embraces his
feelings towards the world and himself in an intention to paint a
picture. It is not and cannot be an inflexible plan of action;
it is by nature malleable and incomplete. I have called this
reflective stance 'prospecting'.4
Secondly Kinsey engages in activities which will take him
from the business of prospecting towards the full material
activity of painting. He makes drawings and notes. In so doing
he is attempting to make his malleable prospect intelligible. The
intelligibility of a painter's ideas is necessarily pictorial.
Between the mental stance of prospecting and the act of painting
Kinsey endeavours to develop his pictorial concerns. This -is a
predominently reflective activity yet he is committed to the
practical business of drawing. Where a painting is intended this
is a transitional stage of the process. Less malleable, more
determi nate than the prospect it yet must be to an extent
malleable, indeterminate. In such cases as occasionally arise,
where the matter is fully worked out at the drawing stage, there
is no point in going on to make a painting. We may say that the
transition may be completed equally possibly either later or
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sooner. However, this does not deny that some transitional stage
is necessary to the fullest development of pictorial concerns.
For convenience I shall assume a case in which a painting
continues to have point.
The drawings and notes Kinsey makes are a means by which he
gives form to his ideas and impressions. The visual relationships
of line, tone and scale are explored in this endeavour. The
prospect so flexibly envisaged becomes intelligible in terms of
its eventual expression. The ideas literally take shape. Drawing
is a form of cogitation.
Yet what is there to distinguish this stage of the process
from the full practical activity of painting? Something
fundamentally distinguishes these activities which in some ways
are similar in that they both involve making observable marks by a
material means, given that in our example such drawings are not
made as a preliminary marking-up or plotting out of what will go
where on the canvas. (that is a matter of planning and somewhat
different. The transfer of a scale drawing, for example, succeeds
and is usually dependent upon some preparatory sort of drawing and
note-taking). What distinguishes this activity from that of
painting is that as an activity it is predominantly reflective,
while painting is a predominantly physical or practical activity.
This does not mean that either excludes the other. In some
measure painting is a reflective activity; in some measure
drawing is a physical activity. But drawing of the cogitating
sort is a transitional activity, whose function is to take forward
the prospect, insofar as it is possible by such means, towards the
moment at which the mainly reflective aspect of the work is set
aside, if temporarily, for the "full, concrete activity" 5 of
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painting. It is my contention that in the activity of painting
pictorial ideas are developed to their fullest determinacy. It is
a paradox that their greatest determinacy as ideas is apparently
achieved at the setting aside of predominantly reflective
activity.
Having set out the matters for consideration let me return
now to look more closely at, first, what it is to settle the
nature of a pictorial prospect.
111.3 The Mental Stance of Landscape Painter: Prospects.
111.3.1 The Need for a Mental Stance.
In painting a landscape there is at its commencement a deal
of difficulty and significance in recongnizing what Wordsworth has
called a "prospect in the mind". 6
 The term covers most aptly the
earliest distinguishable phase of the making of the work. The
hunches, the preoccupations of a painter lack focus until he has
settled what I might refer to as their 'colour'. (see 11.4.2).
The prospect he seeks directs his recurring interests towards a
context of conceptual and practical development. What exercises a
painter in accounting for the direction of his attention, his
mental stance, has to do with wanting, requiriny the establishment
of its kind from the outset. Notwithstanding the philosophical
reservations surrounding the notion of a prospect "in the mind",
the term will yet be worth the trouble of its defence.
First, however, something might be said about the enthusiasm
a painter feels for his subject. Constable has remarked upon the
pleasures: "Paley observed of himself that 'The happiest hours of
a sufficiently happy life were passed by the side of a stream.',
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and I am greatly mistaken if every landscape painter will not
acknowledge that his most serene hours have been spent in the open
air with his palette in his hand".7
Constable's content rests upon the unity of his endeavours. It
is, as Bacon remarked "a great happiness when men's professions
and their inclinations accord". 8 Constable knew his prospect.
Happy man. Painting 'plein air', in great and disparate
traditions from Constable to the Impressionists, the Newlyn
painters and the Fauvists, constitutes an attempt to capture the
prospect in the most direct manner. This is but one way of
furthering a concern with Landscape and we shall see that it is
not without problems regarding the reflective aspect of landscape
painting. At the present time concern for landscape exercises the
painter and sculptor in broadly two directions: the descendants of
the plein air school concern themselves with Nature as Material.
A recent exhibition with just that title showed painters and
sculptors working with collections of natural objects, ash twigs,
even such events as a walk in the country (Nature as Material,
Arts Council travelling exhibition, 1980). The idea informing
these works being that the presence of the artist, interruptive,
material, acting upon and acted upon by an immediate landscape is
the ultimate expression of the plein air tradition. However there
are still easel painters working mediately in their studios. For
them the problems of prospect might seem to be more complicated,
but they are not problems which the plein airist avoids. It would
be a mistake to suppose that an immediate approach is any less
mindful or reflective an endeavour than that involved in more
traditional ways of working. For any artist concerned with
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occupies a major part of his attention. How might Kinsey set
about the business of settling the nature of his prospect?
Consider his observations. Kinsey is currently working on a
series of landscape with notes of another landscape than that
which surrounds him. Most of his notes refer to the countryside
of South Wales, but as some of these illustrations show (viii -
xiv) some of his studies are based upon a visit to Canada.
However he himself acknowledges that Wales seems to dominate his
paintings, in some way, whatever the distance. "No matter how
bright or hot the light is, I should still be painting black
pictures." However, while recognizing the influence of a place
upon his work his pictures are not topographical. Pictures of
places are not his concern at all. Rather, it is that his
feelings for that landscape and his interests as a painter are
mutually, importantly happy. This particular landscape prevails
as a good place for him to consider as he sorts out his concern
with Landscape. Just being in it is not enough. Indeed he might
want not want to spend too much time in the places which move him
to paint pictures (see 111.7.3). Sorting out his concern is the
matter to which I shall now turn.
111.3.2 ".. something to pursue"
Wordsworth's "prospect in the mind" presents a useful analogy
to Kinsey's "idea for a painting". Both present the reflective
pursuits of artists, whether painters or poets, concerned with
directing their efforts towards some sort of making new. That the
kind of the artefactual product shapes the sort of reflective
activity that occurs does no damage to the usefulness of the
analogy. The painter and poet are alike engaged in working a
balance of reflective and practical activity. This worked balance
has issue in particular expressive forms. At its earliest stage,
there is little to show publicly what goes on. However distinct
as forms poems and paintings are, consideration of Wordsworth's
conception of a "prospect" and Kinsey's "idea" bring us to
problems of close similarity. I shall look, for example, to the
relation between sensible observation and imagination. There is
matter to be made of the tension that comes of putting them into
juxtaposition.
Part of the usefulness of the notion of the prospect lies in
its flexible and inclusive character. Although constrained by the
paradigm of the agency of the artist it is not determined by it.
The mental prospect is oriented towards something of a different
nature. The comprehensive scope of the prospect - which covers the
painter's stance towards himself, his environment, his faculties
and skills, cannot at this stage be fully intelligible. For what
is not yet made cannot yet be seen.
For Wordsworth, concern with the poetic prospect is itself a
poetic topic. He speaks of that prospect as "something in
myself", barely defined yet drawing on
"faculties still growing, feeling still
That whatsoever point they gain, they yet
Have something to pursue."9
That "something" can only be pursued through the creative agency
of the poet, and it is precisely in that pursuit that the
Wordsworthian 'Self' has its possibility. As he goes on to point
out, in walking "with nature" Wordsworth retains his "first
creative sensibility". He speaks of a "plastic power", an
"auxilliar light" from his mind, 10 subscribing to the power of
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Nature as he observes and experiences it, he regards his
observations as active rather than passive: The world
'comprehends' him - his poetic task is not to construe the world
but to add something to it. (see III 7.2.3.)
"..the bodily eye
Amidst my strongest workings evermore
Was searching out the lines of difference
As they lie hid in all external forms
an eye
Which..
Could find no surface where its power might sleep,
Which spake perpetual logic to my soul,
And by an unrelenting agency
Did bind my feelings ever as in a chain." 11
This is, in all save the chosen form of expression, the
experience of the landscape painter. When Ed Kinsey talks about
having an idea for a painting he undergoes much that he would
recognize in these lines. As he observes and responds to the
landscape he is imaginatively "searching out" his material. His
agency as a painter makes his "idea" a painterly rather than a
poetic one.
The prospect, or idea for a painting, being a constitutive
part of the mental activity which is constitutive of the creative
agency of the artist, is, as I have claimed comprehensive in its
scope. The "prospect in the mind" of Wordsworth, and, or may, I
believe equally be said of Kinsey, binds together sensible
observation and imaginative excursion. It is the prospect,
oriented towards material expression, which invests the
imagination and the findings of sensible observation with
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meaning. For Wordsworth, as for Kinsey, Imagination leads on
sensible observation and, just as surely, is itself tempered by
the findings of observation.
If the prospect or idea for a painting were concerned merely
with picturing we should have to posit an asymmetrical relation
between the picture and that which is pictured; this inevitably
would narrow the scope of the prospect. As Andrew Harrison has
pointed out, if a picture is to "show how things are", then, in
pursuit of a good transcription, "pictures tend normally to be
simpler than what they represent and cannot be more complicated -
cannot add, can always subtract." 12 This is a useful way of
looking at the transcriptive aspect of making an objective
drawing, discussed in Chapter 1.3.4. This, if it were all (which
is by no means Harrison's contention) would be a restrictive
account of what Kinsey and Wordsworth are up to; it would be to
set their best efforts down as ever less rich than that to which
they must attend. This would be to speak of what Harrison calls
'aspecting'. Prospecting involves aspecting but does not, for it
cannot reduce to it. While a certain degree of accuracy of
picturing is important to the artist in any concern with
representation, it is not his whole concern (see 1.7.1) but must
serve him in his wider interests. Where those wider interests
combine, in prospect, attention both to the real and to the
imaginary, the terms of the relation are not fixedly
asymmetrical. That is to say, the painter is not subtracting all
the time. Prospect binds imagination and observation into a
dependency of flexible and sensitive bias. In this respect, the
realities of sensible observation do temper the wilder flights of
fancy. For a negative comment upon this constraint consider, for
-139-
example, the disappointed expectations of the poet as a tourist
confronted with Mont Blanc:
"the soulless image on the eye
That had usurped upon a living thought
That never more could be."13
Yet consider also this, where Wordsworth later attests to the
central importance of the Imagination:
"..the Power so called
Through sad incompetence of human speech..
	
to my conscious soul I now can say -
'I recognize thy glory: in such strength
Of usurpation, when the light of sense
Goes out, but with a flash that has revealed
The invisible world doth greatness make abode,
There harbours;..."
The artist's business is as much with something "evermore about to
be" as it is with "the light of sense". 14 Both count - it is the
artist's work to make matter of the relations betwixt sense and
imagination.
Interestingly Wordsworth apparently recognizes the centrality
of this imaginative aspect of "prospecting" from a point of
physical distance. On native soil he speaks incessantly of Nature
as his mentor, his emotional and creative counsellor. The role of
the "Power", or of "Imagination" in that process is most clear to
him when he is away from familiar surroundings. Now this is a
recognizable feature of Kinsey's experience, indeed he actually
seeks out his distance, both temporal and spatial, from the
stimulus of the sensibly observed in order to consider a
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"prospect". Since he is a painter this must further his own
"invisible world" or, as he might prefer to say, his mental stance
towards the act of material painterly expression, its factitious
and visible product. (see 11.4.2)
Both the poet's and the painter's prospect can be regarded as
including both sensible observations and imaginative
possibilities. We can also say that it is directed towards a
material expression which is publicly accessible. The ensuing
material expression within landscape painting and poetry requires
much of the prospect in the mind. When a painter speaks of having
an idea for a painting it may be some time before he gets to his
sketch book, let alone the canvas. In the case of Kinsey his idea
for a painting tends to be quite a while in mind and will sooner
or later require a, perhaps prolonged period of drawing to develop
visual intelligibility. As the poet develops his prospect the
field of its scope reduces though it never disappears. (A work of
art cannot be fully determined. "The painting doesn't exhaust its
content." 15 Its role in the response of other people ensures a
continuing mutability and the prospect is thus capable of
transference from artist to reader or spectator - (see section on
Authority 11.4.3). The form of its expression contains and
enriches those flights of fancy and sensible observations conjured
by the artist in prospect. In syntactical and semantic devising
the poet makes his prospect intelligible. Similarly, in drawing,
a painter will develop his prospect which is for him the means by
which he takes his idea for a painting forward into statement;
pictorial statement. His manner of thinking as a painter tends
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towards some pictorial entity. Having a prospect is part of the
process of painting which cannot be neglected, since recognition
of that prospect takes the painter towards some personal material
expression. Prospecting is, even within the constraints imposed
by observation and the intention to paint, necessarily malleable
by nature; allowing innumerable shifts in emphasis to the point
at which drawings and studies are started (see 1.7.4).
We need different ways of characterizing response to a
landscape and having a prospect of Landscape. Prospecting has to
be regarded as part of the daily life of the painter or poet. The
, imaginative constructions which by training and creative interest
inform his prospect or idea for a painting are needful to his
further use since they provide material from which he can develop
ways of addressing himself to his matter. The business of
developing patterns of salience is part of a painter's concern. A
good deal of his early training has to do with recognizing this to
be the case. Exploratory drawings, working drawings and studies
are, in this sense, classificatory in intention. The growth of
the pictorial idea depends upon both these transitional
activities, which Wordsworth has made it his business, as a poet,
to characterize and describe. Characterization of a mental stance
is something which the painter, cannot, just by beginning his
painting accomplish. Development takes time.
It is worth restating the relationship between the
activities which so centrally concern a painter at this stage.
The landscape painter engages in phases of reflective activity,
which are distinguishable from each other but related in that each
has a bearing upon the progress of the other and both are
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oriented towards the practical business of painting. Both may be
said to be predominently reflective or mental activities but they
differ in that the earlier phase need involve no practical
expression whatever, while the later phase necessitates drawings
and note-taking. Prospecting, the earliest part of the process,
anticipates this second phase of activity.
These terms, "prospect," "intelligible object", are not
interchangeable. Yet they are related in that within the context
of producing a landscape painting they are constitutive of the
mental stance taken up by the painter and as such are constitutive
of his practical endeavour. They effectively constitute the form
of the landscape painter's thought. Working in a principled manner
involves a process of sorting, deliberating on a special kind of
directed classification. For example, at this stage, a possible
direction to Kinsey's concerns could, perhaps, be as follows.
Since he paints away from Wales and does so, not because he
happens to live elsewhere, but because he need not, for the sake
of his painting live or work on site, it would not be unreasonable
to suppose that his attention was held by the notion of its being
possible to paint so as to present generalizable truths about
landscape. In that case we might have to say that Kinsey was in
pursuit of The Landscape. However, I am constrained by the
particular and thus recalcitrant temper of a live example to
accept that Kinsey is not in pursuit of a Universal statement
regarding landscape, since he says he is not. For he sees that
option as one he must reject on the grounds that it is not
possible to achieve one ideal picture: a Right and True Account.
Veracity in this case is not constrained by truth conditions.
Yet he does entertain recurring concerns and while
they have little to do with places they have quite a lot to do
with place as a pictorial preoccupation (see also 1.7.6, 11.4.2 &
III. 4.2.1). Whatever his 'prospect' or 'idea' for a painting may
be, it is not sought in terms of an Ideal Landscape.
111.3.3	 The Three-term Relation: 	 Painter, Environment,
Pictorial Idea.
"The inseparability of maker, picture and what is
pictured." 16
Concerning a sense of Place we may say this: since Kinsey
does for most of the time carry a workbook in his pocket we can at
least suppose that his paintings have something to do with such
sketches and notes as he makes, since they are in some part
occasioned by his having been in specific and locatable places.
Yet these notes do not serve to replenish an imperfect
recollection. They may possibly be done on location, but often
they are not. Painting 'plein air' would not obviate the need for
his workbook. His notes and sketches may be considered as
exploratory material: a means of settling the character of the
"prospect in the mind". In such cases we should see the taking of
notes as important in the establishment of a three-term relation
of person to Place where the person is a painter. The third term
of the relation is the painting (see also 111.7.2.). Where a
painter professes a complete lack of interest in topographical
pictures we must ask what he is after that requires both that he
takes his notebook around in his pocket, draws sometimes at a
distance, sometimes on the spot and that he abjures pictures of
places in the paintings he undertakes. From this point of view
the moment has been reached at which the matter of characterizing
the painter's thinking is more than germane to his work; it
might, if neglected, prevent him in his ideas.
From my point of view Kinsey's position with regard to the
importance of what he might for the moment term the prospect is
generally significant. As a painter I am myself familiar with the
problem; it is not simply of anecdotal interest; it is vital to
an account of the artist as agent. What counts for the painter
is that his regard for matters pertaining to landscape painting is
an integral part of his work. That regard, or mental stance is
fundamental to action, for if it is subtracted from the activity
he is left without a basis for the deliberation or reasoning
needful to his activities.
An artist's agency stands through this relation between
himself as painter, the world of external events and conditions,
and the picture he , paints; this three-term relation is a
consequence of agent-deliberation. To posit the artist as agent
is to posit his deliberation with respect to external conditions
for the sake of that which he wants to make. We may see how it is
of consequence that he at least recognizes the problematic nature
of what might be called his mental stance; it matters to him in
proportion as it matters that the painting he does manifests his
thinking. It is of the first importance that his thinking is
successful. An unsuccessful painting is a real possibility for it
is not at all certain that a painting will manifest clear
thinking. Now it can seem as if, where this happens, there is
some gap between the idea and its expression. Recollect T.S.
Eliot and Prufrock's lamentation: "That is not what I meant at
all. That is not it at all". 17 I shall shortly return to
Pruf rock but for Kinsey, we must recognize that implied in his
knowing at least enough of what he means to avert disaster is the
fact that poor painting is poor thouyht. This might help to
explain why he is so exercised. Should his stance be equivocal
with regard to his concerns, or should he fail to recognize the
existence of problems of the kind outlined, then such
equivocation, or shortsightedness must, he would correctly
maintain, show in the content of his work. He does need to sort
out his ideas. The three-term relation implies the need for a
locus, or loci, of creative attention.
111.4.	 Finding the Locus of Attention.
With regard to the landscape painter's pursuit of some locus
of attention there are certain considerations he must ponder.
Firstly, he must adopt a stance of some sort towards the data at
his disposal. To examine this requirement I will put forward as
an example a wish to celebrate landscape. How would this accord
with his concerns as an artist? Many features of the observable
landscape may give him cause for joy and wonder but how does he
address himself to such features? Arising out of this it must be
asked just how he is to establish a locus of attention whose terms
are fundamentally pictorial. Is there a threat of circularity in
his position?
III.4.1. Celebration.
First the notion of 'celebration' needs some explanation. In
the Romantic tradition the relationship of man to nature is
frequently expressed by painters and poets in celebratory vein.
Consider the remarks of a latter-day would-be Romantic landscape
painter.
H.H. Price in a lecture given at Reading University in 1950,
'Painting and the Theory of Knowledge', has this to say about his
own adventure into landscape painting. "I had (a) motive of..an
emotional kind which made me want to take up painting..., it was
just this - that I happen to like Nature and always have. The
great Nature poets, Lucretius, Virgil, Wordsworth - are the poets
who move me most. How well I can sympathize with the
Nature-worshippers of old. I want also to be allowed to admire
Nature as a spectacle ... far surpassing all the works of Man."18
This is an understandable point of view - and a rather moving one
- yet it is as a current basis for pictorial celebration in some
ways bothersome. A love of Nature may inspire a desire to write
or paint. That seems unexceptionable as a starting point, but it
is perhaps worth a doubt or two, also since I believe it is an
approach which is attended by error concerning the nature of the
activity. Let me show this by first distinguishing, for example
the celebratory stance of Wordsworth and Keats. The English
Romantics of the Eighteenth Century and the Nineteenth Century
frequently use Landscape not so much in celebration of Nature, as
such, but rather as a starting point in pursuit of the role of the
individual. There are of course very considerable differences as
to regard for that role between Romantic poets. Wordsworth's
personification of Nature embodies a supernaturalism - the poet is
taught by Nature to recognize the Divine in himself and in
things. Some lines from 'The Simplon Pass', Book vi of 'The
Prelude', illustrate the point.
"The unfettered clouds and region of the Heavens,
Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light -
Were all like workings of one mind, the features
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree;
Characters of the great Apocolypse,
The types and symbols of Eternity,
Of first, and last, and midst, and without end." 19
But we would distinguish the earlier from the later
Romantics; In the works of the late Romantics, Keats and Shelley,
there is growing emphasis on human rather than supernatural power.
The patterns of sensation employed by Wordsworth "tumult and
peace, the darkness and the light" evoke an "experience" in which
people "respond with awe to something which dwarfs them. In
Keats, however, what dwarfs them is ultimately another human
being. ”20 Keats takes on the issue that perturbed the earlier
poets, the possibilities of human action. The Ben Nevis Sonnet
("Read me a lesson, muse and speak it loud") extends Keats'
scepticism towards a supernatural level of being H .. the sonnet
interprets the mist which surrounds the mountain as an emblem of
man's incapacity to attain reliable knowledge of hell, heaven,
himself, or anything else". It is a matter of underpinning a
prospect, a poetic prospect, with a pertinent structure of ideas.
The need is timeless, but that which is pertinent must change.
We are obliged to admit that in the Twentieth Century the
relationship of Man to Nature has further altered. A celebratory
stance about Nature if such is possible, would be different again
for we might be moved to admire Nature as "Far surpassing all the
works of Man" but should not forget that an atomic explosion can
yield, at least, and best, a year of fiery sunsets. Current
scientific capabilities rob the artist of some valuable
uncertainties; thus the analogy so profitable to Keats' purpose,
having diminished applicability, would serve the modern poet to
rather less point:
"I look into the chasms, and a shroud of
Vapours doth hide them; just as much I wist
Mankind do know of Hell." 21
Hell is no longer that kind of problem; we can produce it at
will, from particular knowledge. I am in no position to take
Price to task in his sympathies. Neither should I want to. What
seems doubtful is the possible, artistic, measure of his "sympathy
with Nature-worshippers" and Nature poets. It would be easy to
read too much into the notion, but Price could be read as if he
had overlooked a possible difficulty about the artist's need to
establish appropriate sympathies. If this is indeed the case,
then it is probably due to a common enough misunderstanding about
the nature of the activity of Landscape painting. What counts is
not so much the landscape or Nature, but Landscape Paintings, or
Nature Poetry or even Nature Rituals. It is the recognition of
this that informs the deliberate denial by Kinsey of a concern to
produce topographical paintings. Emulating landscape is not his
concern. Insofar as making pictures of places involved merely
doing that, he would want to avoid it. Price cannot emulate his
landscape, but he could yet take up a stance with regard to the
landscape, or Nature, and turn it to pictorial account, centrally
that. We do not need to establish exact sympathies to make a case
for there being an important continuity in the notion of the
poetic or painterly prospect as such. The relationship between
the artist and Nature is always to be regarded as oriented towards
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his making something, his factitious prospect. We may need to ask
'Is the painter still concerned with some sort of celebration of
Nature? How can we view this in 19857' Having regard to the
calculable and the incalculable changes Man brings about in
Nature, the painter as agent perhaps does need to reconsider,
though with the deepest apprehension, what it is to be "all one"
with Nature. The Twentieth Century landscape artist may be
unhappy about celebrating "eternity" - but he may well lament his
condition in its passing. He needs for his prospect to develop as
an idea, to begin from a viable position. He obviously cannot be
in Wordsworth's position. Yet he needs, as Wordsworth needed, a
pertinent structure to his ideas. The point is that a celebratory
or any other sort of stance can be taken up only in the context of
a prospective entity which is necessarily other than his starting
point, that is, in the factitious work of his own making. -(That
indeed is itself a truly celebratory matter.)
The relationship of Man to Nature, deperately precarious and
subject to our will, as it is, lends poignancy to the reading of
Wordsworth and Keats. But it is out of place simply to mourn a
change in situation over a hundred and eighty odd years. The
question is the viability, the factitious plausibility of
pictorial, or poetic stance. It always was. It is readily shown
in this connection that personification of Nature is matter for
Wordsworth, but for Keats is untenable; identification with
Nature, as a Twentieth Century device, or vehicle of composition,
seems now a different matter altogether; deeply problematic. If
now, regretfully, the artist recognizes himself in "the features
of the one face" he must adopt a different stance. The agency of
the artist ties him into concerns for the conditions in which he
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finds himself. That is a function of the three-term relation. So
nowadays there is surely no easy place left for the celebrations
of an itinerant limner. Perhaps, no, of course, we can with
Professor Price, celebrate "the way nature works". Yet if the
Romantic tradition is to survive the threat of nostalgic decline
then what neither he nor any one of us can honestly do is
celebrate "the eternal hills". The Twentieth Century artist is
put to it to establish a fresh basis of objective distance. But
that is an old problem. Recognizing it as a concommitant feature
of concern with pictorial or poetic making is the problem which
lies at its foundations. (see also 111.7.2.) At the end of this
chapter I shall show that a Twentieth Century celebratory stance
is indeed a posibility (111.7.3).
111.4.2 A Problem of Circularity.
In the last section I showed the necessity to the artist,
whether painter or poet, of establishing a basis for objective
distance. In this section I mean to take things further in order
to expose the threat of circularity which apparently besets the
artist as he seeks to further his creative purpose. I shall begin
by showing that, accepting the need for objective distance, there
yet remains a question as to what that need amount to. We may
regard this matter as of two-fold importance. I shall accordingly
approach it first in terms of the artist's response to the
observable world. Under this heading I shall discuss Kinsey's
sketches and use of Enclosed Forms; the use of symbols in
painting; and the function of memory in mediate cognition.
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Secondly, I shall concern myself with the conceptual status of the
need for objective distance. This will be centered around a
discussion of Price's Theory of Representation and Thinking and
will explore the Analogy from Language; the question of
intelligible objects as it relates to painting landscape; and the
notion of conceptual manifestation.
I intend to show that the supposed problem of circularity
turns out to be an empty threat. Furthermore I shall argue that
wrong thinking about the nature of concept development leads to an
impasse whether the field of action is painting or philosophy.
Part of the problem arising out of the artist's need to
establish objective distance seems to be that of characterizing a
particular kind of knowledge of the world, pictorial knowledge.
This is a puzzle about the nature of the need to achieve objective
distance, whatever that might be. It is a necessary aspect of
painterly thought and, of course, of poetic thought. Regarding
the pictorial I have suggested, in Chapter II, a curiously close
comparison to be drawn between the communicative relations that
obtain between an artwork and a spectator both in the context of
the Erotic and in the apparently dissimilar genre of Landscape
painting. I shall, later in the chapter, show that there is a
point of logical significance to be made of relating these
pictorial concerns. (111.7.3) So far as the reference to Chapter
II is concerned the following may be said of the putative
parallel: The requirement of good faith, which may seem at first
to obtain quite particularly in connection with the erotic turns
out to be just as surely connected in with the business of looking
at and responding to Landscape art. A painter's prospect does not
stand to the spectator's attention as an instrument of sensible
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stimulation except insofar as it irreducibly relates him, as
agent, in the pictorial content of the painting; but this is a
question of good faith and not one of logic. It is, logically
speaking, all too easy to disvalue and abuse the true nature of
that relation. An objective stance is a positive requirement and
by no means is this a denial of response as personal; as
emotionally important.
It is clear that the difficulty of achieving objective
distance attends many aspects of the landscape painter's work.
Just as he is obliged to question his possible personal detachment
from nature, so he has also to question the standpoint from which
he idertifies his matter, (by which I mean the content and
substance of his painting). It is not that the objective
presence, existence, of external events and conditions is in
question; but there is, as I have already suggested, a problem:
if a painter is worried about the way he thinks about landscape
painting he is also worried about how he can think about landscape
or nature. The conceptual difficulty he appears to be faced with
is that he cannot begin, as a painter, to consider what to use of
nature or landscape without some basis for doing so. He is,
after all, part of it and is no more detached in this concern than
he is in Figure painting, erotic or otherwise. It is not like
looking at the box on the table.
It is worth pausing to attend to the structural distinction
often given in the discussion of Landscape and Figure painting.
It is a common observation that, compositionally, a landscape is
characteristically concave whereas a Figure painting, or for that
matter an objective study, is characteristically convex. I find
the distinction hard to sustain on these terms. Consider the two
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etchings opposite. The Landscape might superficially be
despatched as a concave composition - it is as it were, a
cycloramic bowl whose rim is constituted by the edge of the
picture plane. But if this is to work at all, it requires an
opposition internal to its structure. That is to say, its very
concavity implies and is implied in its convexities. The cloud
forms the foreground of rocks and the figures themselves are not
concave, yet their placing is the key to focal distance. The
tension is unavoidable; the spatial rhythm of 'coming and going'
is crucial in any concern with pictorial space.
Now consider the torso. What cannot now be said of the
concavities, the tensions of plane movement, which may so readily
be remarked of the Landscape? It is not convincing to say that
the general orientation of the composition is convex,
notwithstanding the point made above - for there might easily be a
figure drawing or painting whose orientation has a prevailing
concavity. Why not? Equally a still life may be of one
compositional 'direction' or another. What of a still life in an
interior?
The point of abiding significance is that the comprehensive
nature and scope of a pictorial prospect is not confined to the
business of painting landscape. I have remarked the obligation of
good faith. Alongside that must be the fundamental apprehension
of the objective demands internal to the concept of pictorial
space. This is the stance of objectification of such importance
in the working concerns of any artist. This it is for which the
exercise of objective drawing is preparation. An objective
drawing of a box may serve equally as preparation for landscape'or
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figure painting. It is therefore not to the purpose to
distinguish Landscape from the Figure - or either of these from an
objective drawing - in terms of directed plane. They may,
however, be distinguished as forms of painterly thought - In this,
it is clear that whereas for present purposes Landscape and Figure
painting may be significantly comparable the exercise of objective
drawing is in a different category of conceptual attention in that
the exercise is designed to set questions about the task of
objectification. On a pedagogical point, sometimes it is a help to
new students painting Landscape for there to be a window through
which to look at it and better still, a viewfinder stuck to the
glass. This is a way of effecting the transition from doing an
objective drawing exercise to establishing an objective stance
towards this comprehensive world.
Let me now consider some of the ways which a painter might
respond to his observation of the observable landscape: the
artist may as he opens his notebook opt to draw attention to
certain observable features; for example, possibly relatively
enduring features are what he wants, such as those presented by
geological strata. Alternatively he may consider quite transient
features like the shadows of clouds across high places; he might
choose to take a nostalgic stance, in the Nineteenth Century
mdnner - whatever he does it does not affect the status of his
problem, whichever he selects for attention, for he has to regard
any such features in terms of his pictorial concern. His question
to himself is what use are these features and how is he to decide
that he wants them? It is clear that sorting out the supposed
circularity of this situation constitutes the major part of his
problem (see 111.6.1).
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The difficulty is to establish the terms of his concern,
within which he distinguishes observable features of the
landscape. In philosophical areas of concern about having
concepts, current thinking would regard language as central in
pursuit of this question. For the artist this is a dubious
option. We can try saying that for a painter any sort of
condition for a 'mental stance' is set by the prospective activity
of painting. But the point is that this does not as it stands
help him very much for he cannot get that far, without settling
the character of his concerns with the prospect. "In the making
of art a concept enters into, and plays a crucial role in, the
determination of what is made, indeed an activity cannot be
engaged in, except inadvertently, unless the agent posesses the
concept of that activity". 22 But for Kinsey the prospect
embraces the objective landscape, the field of imagination and the
Landscape painting itself, and is essential, materially, in the
conceptual cohesion of thought and action in the finished work.
Yet he cannot resolve his problem purely out of the activity of
prospecting - neither can he yet paint, for he is significantly
unsure of himself. It needs to be mentioned that the prospect
whilst having some of the attributes of a mental image, differs in
that it is to be characterized in practical terms, as integral to
the activity of painting. How he is to remove the threat of
circularity is the question I now intend to treat.
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111.4.2.1. Response to the Observable World.
The example of Kinsey's use of the Enclosed
Form: Another possible Locus of Attention.
For the moment we may usefully approach the matter of the
painter's mental stance by way of his response to observable
objects of his attention. First we can ask by what means he
identifies what he wants. Perhaps he begins by considering, then
making notes, and discovers he wishes to make frequent allusions
to features of prevailing similarity. We already accept that we
are considering a painter who is not concerned with
representational verisimilitude and must look for another reason
for his drawings of reference. Kinsey has claimed not to be
concerned with some ideal, or universal, Landscape, but we might
usefully pause over what it is about such a concern that would
make it something he actually must reject in terms of the point
outlined in 111.3:2. Suppose for a moment that he is viewing
these features primarily as instances of some objective reality.
But what would he settle for? If he tries to identify such
entities what will they be? Let us suppose for example that a
landscape painter again and again makes use of a particular
feature : "X7 an enclosed form. Suppose that one way or another
he keeps on considering and seeking enclosed forms like this one.
The illustrations opposite show that for Kinsey this is a
prevailing image. We might make the mistake of saying that he is
doing this in an attempt to get as close as possible to an
essential feature of any landscape. But if such a feature were
essential as a feature of the landscape it could not be restricted
to any particular place. Rather it would have to be that any and
all particular places provided instances of the same
feature. In any and all natural landscape this artist might be
concerned with enclosed forms. This might be true of Kinsey; his
work could be regarded in that way, so it might seem. Yet if such
were the case would this feature not be accessible to us all?
Whilst Kinsey might in such a state of affairs, persuade us all to
consider landscape in new ways, we might object to being told
that, since such features were universal, any painter setting out
to paint landscape must sooner or later stumble upon the objective
reality of such Enclosed Forms, (see above). The fact that he
does seem to be concerned with this feature whether in Deep River
or Pembrokeshire does not prejudice the case that Kinsey does not
wish to sustain any pursuit of the Ideal on such terms. He
rightly sees that option as one he must reject on the grounds that
it is neither possible nor desirable to think in this way about
his work, for his concerns are expressly not with natural
landscapes as such. They are, however with his painting, as such,
such as it might become. Any concern with 'essentials' would have
to take its place as a pictorial issue. So he does entertain
recurring concerns and while they may have little to do with
places, they have quite a lot to do with place, as a pictorial
preoccupation. (see also 1.7.6, 11.4.2 & II 4.2.1). In terms of
his agency this would not be a case of regarding the natural
landscape in terms of these features being inherent to it. The
pursuit of some pictorial Essence would in no sense jeopardize
pictorial irreducibility, (cf. Paul Klee 1.7.6, also 11.4.2).
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111.4.2.2 The Use of Symbols: Kinsey's problem in a
Philosophical Context.
What exercises any landscape painter is the way he might
think to pictorial purpose. How may we regard this as his object?
The activity of prospecting is one in which an artist in some
way considers his preoccupations. We need now to characterize
this activity and in order to do so will have to look both at the
endeavour itself and at its product. It is in consideration of
the work of art that we ask questions about its content and the
relation of content to conceptual inception. Looking to
philosophical terminology this might be expressed in terms of
symbolic cognition. What is usually meant by this is that by
means of symbols cognition of the absent is possible.23
How does this sit with an account of the activity at issue?
A painter might make use of symbols. But there would be no
parallel system of meaning; no reference to language for
example. "Blue" does not stand for "p". Let us consider this
further. For the philosopher concerned with language and thinking
the problem is to understand how it is that merely by operating
with symbols one can be in cognitive contact with absent objects
or events. Being aware of anything beyond the symbols themselves
is the puzzle. For the painter, however, even being in the
presence of the 'objects or events' of landscape does nothing to
reduce the puzzlement, for he is about a business which exceeds
the constraints of transcription. Further, the problem may be
compounded in the very 'symbolism' in use, and in the view held by
many regarding their autonomy. Some would reject the use of
symbols altogether. "Symbols are my bate noire. They are supposed
to represent reality, but in truth they don't represent anything.
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If one looks at a thing with the intention of trying to discover
what it means, one ends no longer seeing the thing itself, but
thinking of the question that had been raised." 24 (Rene
Magritte). This is a cry from the heart; a plea against
instrumentalism. (see IV.5 for further discussion, also 111.3.2,
penultimate paragraph). It seems that our parallel must break
down for the philosopher seeks to understand the relation between
the symbols of language and objects and events (in absence). The
painter is sometimes accused of abandoning the analogous pursuit,
but in either case nothing is solved for we still need to know
what governs the 'symbols' used by painters. If the painter is
not concerned with verisimilitude; does not, and indeed cannot,
seek to show direct parallels between brushstrokes and the visible
objects and events of landscape, then his problem looks to be
somewhat distinct from that of a philosopher of H.H. Price's
persuasion, at least.
Yet he does refer his picture does owe something to the
observable world. In order to explore this apparent distinction I
want now to stay with Price a little longer. For it may be
instructive to pursue the question of what it is can be said to
possess an artist of the colour of his preoccupations in the
context of Price's dispositional account of concept cognition and
development. I will look first at his work on the function of
memory and will then concern myself with what he has to say about
thinking and representation. My interest is two-fold: one, to
question the role of revisionary procedures in the development of
an emergent idea; two, to show that, because of the irreducibly
pictorial nature of the artist's ideas, we have, perhaps
paradoxically, the clearest case possible for showing the
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redundancy of the search for 'hidden' concepts: of well-known
relevance to the discussion of language, but far less
well-documented in the case of the visual arts. My intention is
to show that if we look at what is going on in the painter's
working procedures we shall discover common ground on the matter
of the conceptual status of ideas of pictorial and verbal sort.
How much does memory have to do with an artist's purpose?
Does he carry around in his head the perfect recollection of
observational reference? Does he carry around a picture (in his
head) all ready for him to transfer to canvas? What happens to
his idea when the picture is painted?
III 4.2.3. Memory.
In his discussion of the development of concepts Price argues
for the active function of memory. He is out to contest the
notion of intelligible objects considered as subsistent
propositions. His example is of interest to the present enquiry:
a concept, he claims can be in mind without being present to the
mind. "The concept in the mind of the craftsman manifest itself in
what he does without being present to his mind as an object of
inspection." 25 This is a significant case for me to consider,
since it shows up with particular force the dilemma in which Price
finds himself. He wants to be rid of intra-mental objects of
inspection; seeks to show that concepts are manifest in practice
yet retains the notion of the concept "in mind".
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How then, may Price's argument be assessed in the present
connection? His case is that the active function of memory
obviates the need for intra-mental objects of inspection. How
does this not meet the needs of the case? This is his position:
in conceptual cognition, he claims, the memory serves not just as
a repository for symbols of past experience; it enables us to
conceive that for which we have no symbols, by means of other
concepts which we have in mind and for which we do have symbols.
It is a working faculty. As far as the craftsman example is
concerned it is possible to think of the trained man turning his
hand to objects he has never made before on the basis of his
• recollecting, his knowing how to cut and fix three kinds of
joint. Certainly I would concede a painter would be put to it in
addressing himself to his pictorial prospect if he had never
practiced pictorial handskills. But would that in itself provide
the grounds for him to settle the question of some locus of
attention? No. This does not really help the artist to solve his
problem for while he would share Price's objection to the notion
of pictorial concepts as objects of inspection and would certainly
and in a far more thoroughgoing fashion, say that such concepts as
he has do manifest themselves in what he does, yet there remains a
persistent and critical gap. For a painter, somewhat as the
philosopher seeking the "general sense of a complex passage", 26
seeks the general sense of his creative intention regarding his
prospective landscape painting. The concern to conceive of a
pictorial idea seems to ask something different. Regarding the
functions of memory two things are amiss: firstly, it needs to be
understood that looking for a pictorial locus of attention is not
a case of re-apprehending, not yet, insofar as it is as yet not
available to the regard, it is capable of apprehension. It can as
yet only be intimated. It is not, for example, like another case
Price puts forward in which we might say that if a man possesses
the concept of Dog he has acquired the capacity of re-apprehending
Doghood. 27 If we now take the matter at one remove and ask not
about the cognition of concepts but about their development can
the dispositional account offer an explanation to meet Kinsey's
apparently absurd difficulty? Can he find the locus of his
pictorial attention merely by engaging in revisionary procedures?
Conversely, must he abjure these utterly in pursuit of some
pictorial prospect whose outcome will be an entity of a factitious
nature? It would be unwise to assert exclusively in either state
of affairs. However, whilst it may be obvious that out of nothing
nothing comes, it is less easy to show that despite the truth that
"after all, there is such a thing as the art", skill in the
executive part is not the whole exploration of emergent ideas. So
one of the two points I would like to make is that if the
disposi-zional account of concept formation fails to stretch this
far it has to be supposed inadequate to the present case. It is
not what a body can do, it is what a body does. Even the best
dispositions cannot be deemed reliable enough to ensure success to
the painter pursuant of his pictorial focus.
Regarding skill, it is true, incidentally, that sometimes
indeed "knowing how" can be a hindrance to a painter for the very
habits of training suggest set moves and countermoves, effects and
manipulations which can actually rob the emergent idea of its
point, which, whatever it might be, cannot be born solely of
habitude. The rules of skill and trained recall have sometimes to
be flouted, though admittedly flouting them involves knowing
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them. There is a need sometimes to be deliberately rough, rather
than refined; even to the extent of perversity, transgressing the
guidelines of compositional harmony in order to refrain from ease
of device in tackling perhaps obscure problems. In any artist's
experience a thorough working knowledge of a skill can on the
other hand, lend such attention to its own beguile that it ceases
to be other than a diplay of virtuosity. Being "effective" is in
the pejorative sense oddly destructive as I have already pointed
out, and there is, as they say, a lot of it about. Obviously
since skills assist performance, I am not suggesting that they
should not be practised and polished up.
I come to my second point regarding the function of memory in
this connection: there is actually a need to be rid of the idea
that memory alone can offer the way through such procedures as
attend the modification upon a pictorial idea. This is quite
simply because pictures do not present a world of partial recall.
That is not the point of the pictorial idea. The revisionary
procedures of the painter do not occupy his attention to that
purpose. He is no more trying to recollect what he has seen than
he is at any time learning to see.
111.5 The Conceptual status of the Need for Objective Distance.
Let me look at the way in which a painter of Landscape
considers it, at some remove, mediately; pursuant as he yet might
be supposed of pictorial possibility. How does he think about the
world as his pictorial matter? Is it possible to find a way to
overcome the painter's cramp, which is so threatening to his
agency, by attending to the nature of a mediate concern?
111.5.1 Thinking and Representation. An Analogy from Language.
The difficulty is to establish the terms of his concern,
within which he distinguishes observable features of the
landscape. This is one major aspect of the business of
Representation.
The traditional Representationist is exercised upon the
relation between words and objects. The parallel case for me to
take would be the nature of the relation between pictorial images
and objects. Yet the proposed fit seems poor; the painter is
concerred to regard the objects of his observation in magpie
fashion, being set upon pictorial purpose. Such relation as may
be said to exist between the painting and the world has obviously
more to do with pictorial intention than with any supposed fit
between image and observable object. I have, of course considered
this not only in the previous section but also in the discussions
on pictorial space in Chapter I. But it is worth pursuing in this
context, for it is my belief that what can be said to be true of
pictorial thinking is of significance for the philosophical
position on thinking and representation.
It is of interest to me that Price attacks the view that a
Representationist view of thinking can be addressed in terms of
perception theory; it is more useful, he says, to put the case
the other way about. "The capacity to form images is a prime
condition of the possibility of visual perception u29 Indeed yes.
But as I have pointed out this does not, for it cannot, extend to
the factitious image-making of such predominant concern to the
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artist. That he can envisage, can think to see things, offers no
guarantee of pictorial images. To do that requires his
deliberative agency as an artist. To indicate capacities for
perceiving is to do no more than to indicate a range of
physiological constraints. The "forming of images", for the
artist, requires his hand as well as his eye. It means drawing or
painting, not the seeing of visions or dreaming of dreams.
It is precisely on this point that we may offer the landscape
painter a way out of his supposed problem of circularity. We
know that his matter, his prospect is not an intra-mental object
of inspection; we are bound, upon the conditions of his agency to
accept that his prospect requires, for its fulfilment, making, of
a rather particular factitious sort. It is not a matter of
physiological constraints or capacities, it is a matter of working
things out in pictorial terms. It is also on this point that I am
uneasy regarding Price's position regarding Theories of
Representing and Thinking.
Traditionally the Representationist concerns himself with the




(present) Word	 (present)	 Word
(present)	 Idea
(absent) Object	 (absent)	 Object
Under the Idea Theory, Conceptualists and Imagists are taken
together; Conceptionalists make some distinction between abstract
ideas and images; words are not the only form of our ideas.
Imagis,s take all ideas to be images; words could never be the
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form of our ideas. Taking first the Nominalist position I.think
that a painter would support Price's refutation of the idea that,
when wf! think, words are what we are directly aware of. As a
putative parallel an artist's brush-marks, lines, points,
configurations in short, are the things of which he might, as a
nominalist, be supposed directly aware. This is unacceptable on
two grounds. Firstly a painter's imagery requires the material
fact of production. Secondly, a painting when it is done,
comprises a good deal more than configuration. What I am after is
some parallel of use in the artist's case. I believe that an
analogy is possible but the relation of the painter's prospect to
his intelligible object does not seem to fall into this pattern.
Neither, however, is it at all clear to me that an Idea Theory
(Conceptualist or Imagist) of representation offers a good
alternative. It may sound as if the Imagist has the best of it.
Somebody might believe that since painters are characteristically
preoccupied with pictures then it is not unreasonable to suggest
that fleeting pictorial images comprise their mental experience.
But it is very clear to me that they do not - the painter doesn't
get to be that lucky; he has decisions to make and the solutions
do not come up on mental picture-cards. However this does not
make the painter look more like a 'conceptualist'. Despite their
differences, Imagists and Conceptualists are just as well taken
together. In either case something or other, as it might be a
code, is supposedly directly experienced and stands in for that
which is, as it were, absent to the experience. For the artist
this is nonsense. The notion of his reflective activities being
such as deal with some sort of picture-coded stand-in for
extra-mental objects is absurd. So, insofar as Conceptualism
proposes that a concept, or image, symbolizes an absent object
about which he is thinking, the artist cannot accept this as a
parallel either. Further, on the orthodox account, words are
regarded as secondary symbols which apart from their relation to
ideas, have no meaning at all. The analogy is once again
hopeless, tantamount to suggesting that content is somehow
secondary as being no better than symbols, to the extra-mental
pictorial concept. Clearly this will not do as an account of the
way in which a painter reflects. Neither will it do as an account
of pictorial content. A painter's configurative brushstrokes are
not, if I may so put it, extra-mental stand-ins for ideas. Indeed
what I suspect troubles Magritte in the use of pictorial symbolism
is the danger of suggesting that the painter does not deal in
content as such, but only with symbols for content. Note that to
say that content and configuration are indivisible does not commit
us to the view that a painting is no more than the marks upon its
surface (see IV.2.). It is in this connection that I must pursue
the analogy between language and painting but suspect the
philosophy. If the problems faced by an artist do not answer to
this philosophical position then I am not prepared to accept that
the artist's case doesn't count. I put it that something is
adrift in the philosophical position and it is qualitatively
similar to the state of affairs in which the painter believes
himself faced with the threat of circularity. No account of
reflective thinking which commits me to the view that words stand
in some relation to ideas, such that hidden concepts may be
posited, is acceptable. Therefore, it cannot be set as a parallel
case in consideration of pictorial thinking.
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111.5.2 Mental Images.
A picture does not stand in for anything, present or absent.
That is not the point of painting it. A picture does not express
some intra-mental idea or object. A picture does not stand as a
collection of secondary symbols whose meaning rests in their
relationship to some collection of ideas. Certainly I welcome
Price's despatch of intra-mental objects of inspection but given
the nature of the activity of prospecting and the need for the
artist to get further so as to paint, I must propose that this
does not argue the need to be rid of the notion of intelligible
objects. The practical orientation of the artist's prospect
requires focus, as we have seen. Intelligible objects are for him
the very stuff of concepts. A painter's prospects, or mental
images, are his unfulfilled business. Thus for an artist there
are grave problems in attempting to be rid of them; he knows that
developing the intelligibility of his prospect is the major part
of his work. He further knows that it is an intelligibility whose
terms are irreducible. For the artist it is, according to Sartre,
proper to regard "imagining as a kind of doing". 31 Indeed, yes
and the nature of the prospecting activity requires us to regard
it as a form of working intimation. Now it is significant to
remark at this stage that Price has seemingly a wish to support
the possibility of mental images, for he says, "The fact is that
we really know very little about images. It would do us good to
be a bit more puzzled about them than we are." 32 Really, of
course, the fact is the puzzle must remain insoluble for Price.
He is committed perhaps against his inclination, to a notion of
concept development and usage which disallows enlightenment on
this point. Despite his aversion to subsistent ideas he is
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constrained against their absolute despatch by adherence to
tradition concerning the notion of expression. The concept is "in
the mind" in some way - the practical deed shows no more than a
fit, more or less successful. The product is in that case none
other than an "expression of an idea". Small wonder that Images
are so profoundly worrying to Price. As a self-confessed would-be
Romantic Landscape painter, he inclines to the truth but is
prevented in his academic habits.
Looking to the painter's concerns the position clarifies.
Images are his daily business - a constant preoccupation, for
their existence is essentially dependent on his agency. The
"fact" may be deeply mysterious, but it is not puzzling. The
relation of "fit" is simply not sought, for it is not an issue.
It is certain that we cannot rob an artist of his locus of
attention. Yet we know that for an artist this cannot be
satisfied in terms . of a wholly reflective activity, which
prospecting might be described as being. Regarding the nature of
the prospect the notion of the mental image cannot be done away
with, yet for the artist this is necessarily an incomplete thing;
he must make his images. Prospecting envisages this necessity.
But for Price there is, as I have shown, serious difficulty in
being rid of intra-mental objects of inspection and attempting to
keep hold of mental images - a difficulty which can be seen at
work in his example of the craftsman. Now if, on the other hand,
we recognize that a work of art, (or craft), is a form of thought
it is quite clearly absurd to look elsewhere for its conceptual
content - it is pointless to look, that is to say, beyond its
manifest content. The concept manifest in a painting is very
certainly an object of inspection - but not, and never "in the
mind" of the artist. I am admittedly looking now to the
artefact, the product of a certain sort of activity, whereas it
might be said to be to the point to stick to examining the
activity itself. But if Price is able to move from the business
of thinking about a something - as it might be a chair - to the
business of making it, then there is no problem about considering
that chair in terms of either the craftsman's thinking or making,
for they ought not to be utterly distingished. Price's problem is
in not recognizing the value of his own elision. As Wollheim
concisely puts it, "in the making of any work of art a concept is
operative". 33 This does not permit of the separation of concept
and expression. When Price speaks of the "concept in the mind of
the craftsman" I do not feel that he has entirely embraced the
consequences of conceptual manifestation, even although he sets it
out as if he had. Somehow for Price the concept of the craftsman
is condemned to its own overlasting discretion. That it is
forever in the mind sits awkwardly with an intended dismissal of
objects of inspection. There is some equivocation in Price's
position.
It is vital that my position is unequivocal with my
conviction regarding the indivisibility of concept and
expression. For me there can be no question of characterising
pictorial ideas at any stage of their development in terms of
stand-ins of any kind. Regarding the business of prospecting the
emergent idea is the entity itself, factitious as it must be, in a
formative stage of its progress. There is certainly a difference
between an idea which is being worked on and an idea which has
been worked out. In terms of a picture what we should then be
looking at would be a picture that is finished. A prospect we
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cannot look at at all.
For the landscape painter to reach the point at which his
concerns are pictorially manifest he does not, for he cannot, keep
checking his progress against some conceptual template. He needs
to engage in a transitional activity that his concerns may gain
clarity. To speak of the thought knowledge of an artist towards
an object is meaningful only in respect of the artefact he is in
the process of making, in whatever respect of its progress he may
be engaged.
111.6 Conceptual Manifestation.
111.6.1 The pursuit of Pictorial Intelligibility: working
drawings.
A pl )spect is potential, permeable and easily enough
stifled. It always, by definition, envisages but never defines;
promises fulfilment but never fulfils itself. To settle the
question of a locus of attention depends upon the painter coming
to the point at which the form of reflective action changes.
Pictorial effort is required. The problem of circularity turns
out to be a chimera. (see 111.4.2) The relief of painter's cramp
depends upon exploratory drawing. Just prospecting will get him
nowhere and we have seen that just starting in with the paint will
not of itself yield any solution in the circumstances. It is
clear that the artist needs to recognize from the start that an
attempt at a record of partial recall is not his object; he does
not seek to replicate the world. He recognizes the need to stand
in some sort of objective relation to his observations,
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recollections and, indeed, to his training. Thus if an idea is to
achieve pictorial life it requires that it visibly, of necessity,
attains pictorial intelligibility. There is a need to draw. This
therefore is a transitional activity; a process whereby the
pictorial concept, or idea, is materially mooted. This is a
process in which what the painter now makes - (drawings which set
a focus of intelligibility on his prospect) - are not in the
category of being complete works. His ideas are not yet clear;
he is cogitating.
Transitional working drawings occupy some ground between that
which is constituted in the prospect and that which is constituted
in the pictorial determinacy of the painting, the one in its
malleable being and the other in its determinable becoming. This
is the usefulness of the painter's workbook in which prevalent
concerns with certain shapes, colours, express aspects of his
prospect and help him to sort the pictorial nature of his
intention. It is worth noting once more that prevailing and
recurring motifs, colours, formal disposition - any such features
as are found to predominate in his workbook may or may not be
brought to stand as symbols for aspects of his prospect but they
do not have to do so (see 111.3.5 and IV.) It is much more useful
to think about these features sketched in his notebooks as being
those things with which, as a painter, he is most concerned. They
may not be, even on acceptable terms, symbolic at all; they may
simply occur because they themselves go on being interesting. He
needs, whatever form his idea takes, to work in a principled
manner in order to produce some cohesion of thought and action in
the artefact. Working in a principled manner involves a process
of sorting - a special kind of non-verbally directed
-173-
classification. The painter's "intelligible object" is his
eventual pictorial statement. The intelligibility of a painter's
working drawing is to be distinguished from the fully fledged
intelligibility of his painting. The stage at which his ideas
attain their fullest expression marks the completion of the work.
However many reflections and hesitations accompany the activity of
painting, this is the fullest possible manifestation of his
ideas. Where a painting is intended the drawings are necessary
but incomplete. To be sure, some drawings become complete
statements but this is not to deny that we may distinguish the
reflective business of working something out from the practical
physical business of working it through. Kinsey has commented
upon the need to establish his concerns as primarily pictorial.
The point is a general one. He is exercised by the need to
establish the intelligibility of those concerns in other than
verbal terms. To this aspect of his requirement I now turn.
111.6.2. Intelligibility: Another look at the analogy with
language.
Traditionally intelligibility is associated with verbal
stability. The intelligibility of pictorial concerns is of course
available to description. For the painter there is the strongest
case for holding that the intelligibility of pictorial concerns is
not statable in verbal terms. What is proposed is the possibility
of non-verbal meaning. Freed from the constraints of the word I
might presume to make "breathings" for not wholly "incommunicable
powers". 34 For the painter his locus of concern gains its
intelligibility in becoming pictorial. His meaning is pictorial
in kind and does not reside in the proposition. Thus it is that a
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great many drawings might be needed to bring the prospect towards
its fullest development as a pictorial idea. Incidentally this
might have something to do with the extreme reluctance with which
a painter will show the insides of his sketchbook to any but the
most trusted enquirer.
One way of looking at what is involved in this part of the
endeavour is to turn from the moment from the painter's
delicate standpoint and to look from the point of view of such a
supposed enquirer. Without detriment to the insight of Wordsworth
it is yet instructive to put the matter of the intelligibility of
works of art on a par with the intelligibility of language. For
there are features about the ways if understanding language which
without prejudice to pictorial irreducibility, do relate it to the
ways in which we can understand picture. The analogy with
language has a certain force.
Andrew Harrison has shown that, paradoxically, one way of
seeing how pictures are intelligible is to recognize the
importance of picturing in seeing how language is intelligible.
He expands the Wittensteinian case that picturing is by no means
confined to the business of looking at artworks. "Explanatory
models of all sorts, all have an underlying pictorial structure.
The underlying constraints of intelligibility on a picture are
both general and deeply suggestive of the nature of the deep
grammatical constrains of any language. Knowing how language
works is not just to know what it refers to, it is also to know
the system by which it refers". 35 The pictorial meaning of





recognizing (in an example like landscape painting or objective
drawing), "some pictorial reference in the world, it is also a
matter of recognizing how the marks on the paper are to be
read." 36
 Furthermore I would add that that is a matter of
recognizing the kind of the marks for therein rests the focus of
their reference.
That the constraints upon the intelligibility of artworks are
not markely dissimilar from those which set the conditions by
which we may grasp the meanings of language does support the case
for regarding a painter's work in conceptual terms. It is worth
noting, however, that there is very good reason for suspending
judgment regarding the need to establish or define the nature of
any concept, pictorial or otherwise. It is far more useful and
far less dangerous to examine what goes on in the use of
concepts. There is no difficulty about regarding pictorial
endeavour as a conceptual activity. It is not simply that in
describing a work of art after the event, we use concepts to
characterize it or to catch its characteristics. "Indeed, one
criterion of a description's adequacy is that in it the concepts
that have helped fashion the work re-appear. In this way, the
description of the world is parasitic upon the description under
which it was made." 37 To be sure; but it has been argued that
the concepts, the pictorial ideas are manifest in the
'characteristics' we can see. Ideas are developed. As I have
shown this by no means implies a hidden world of concepts
'expressed' in, instantiated by, painting. In a successful
picture the relation of thought and expression is seamless; there
is no distinction. Adequate thought is adequate painting.
	 It is
in this connection that the limitations on Price's account for
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language as well as for painting are very clear. We cannot, in
the circumstances of painting, hold on to the dichoLomy of idea
and expression, of thinking and making. This being so it is
clearly redundant to seek the nature of concepts 'expressed'
either in works of art, or in language. Recall Wittgenstein's
rejection of the notion of there being some conceptual attendant
upon utterance. Prufrock's problem is a sorry case in point:
"that is not it" does not mean that some wrong thing slipped out
by accident - in saying "that is not what I meant", Pruf rock is
lamenting, once again, an inadequacy in himself; a failure of
agency, (a point to which I shall return). We may take it that
Prufrock isn't making a slip of the tongue; he isn't talking in
his sleep either. Conditions being not extraordinary, talking is
a form of thought. The point is that he isn't thinking very
successfully. But even if he were we should be falling into error
in regarding his 'success' as a matter of fit.
In these last sections I have been considering the progress
of a landscape painting. In the light of Price's work on concept
development, it appears that, for one thing, insofar as the artist
is involved in producing artefacts of a factitious nature, his
ideas in development are quite wrongly characterized under a
dispositional account. More seriously, it is clear that any
notion of concept development on cognition which forces a
dichotomy between idea and expression is misguided.
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111.7. Pursuit of the Self.
111.7.1. An Existentialist account as it relates to the Three-Term
Relation.
What I now want to do is to take the enquiry at one remove,
as it were, from an account of man's capacities, to an existential
account of man's physical relationship with his environment.
This is to explore two of the three terms in the relation of the
painter, the world and the painting, and it takes me to the core
of my concern for the artist as agent. I shall begin by
considering, once more, the activity of prospecting as a
predominantly reflective endeavour and will examine the
possibility of distinguishing stages of reflectivity in terms of a
bodily response to the perceptible world.
111.7.2 The Emergent Idea.
It is helpful to the case to examine work done by Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, in connection with psycho-analytical research
regarding the possibility of distinguishing between reflective
activities. The idea is that physical interaction between a
sentient being and his physical interaction between a sentient
being and his physical environment, a stage termed pre-reflective,
puts him into a state of implicit and sensible but as yet
unspecific preparedness. It is upon this that the kind of
reflective thinking which leads to objective knowledge depends.
This is a state of cognitive activity in which thinking become
specific. It is posited that there are two aspects of the single
process during which ideas, initially vague and tentative, becomes
clearer, more particular.38
If tenable, this view has certain advantages, one of which is
that in placing emphasis upon the earliest stages of thought with
respect to abstract thinking we might thereby have a means of
relating prospecting, as an activity, to the activity of
developing pictorial intelligibility. There would be further
advantage if it were possible by this means to give a further
explanation of creative thinking flexible enough to accommodate
both verbal and non-verbal thinking. There are, however,
difficulties for me: one is the suggestion that an idea could be
grasped implicitly, pre-reflectively, and then, on refelection,
conceptualized explicitly. This suggests some sort of premonition
of a position which on my account cannot yet have been reached.
Either this makes some stage of that process redundant or it
deprives pre-reflectivity of a certain innocence. It also
suggests that, if we carry the notion across to the visual arts,
the artist might in some central aspect be subject to his matter
while prospecting. This would be inimical to my professed
concern. (see IV.2.3.3).
First, consider what would be involved for a landscape
painter in undergoing some pre-reflective level of experience.
will approach this by supposing there to be from the outset and
whatever follows from it, an integral relation between a sentient
being and his environment; the one interacting with the other in
a two-way physical relationship. On the face of it this would be
consistent with what I hold to be the case in the context of a
three-term relation (see 111.3.3).
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In terms of my example it is possible on this view to think
of perceiving not in terms of an objective relation, separable by
analysis from the mutable content of Kinsey's experience, but in
terms of a reciprocal relationship between Kinsey's intentions,
his behaviour as animated by intention and the environment in
which they occur. This would be to posit an existential
relationship between Kinsey as a sentient being, with the
motivation to act, and those properties of things he reveals by
means of his being where he is. Two terms of the relation would
be satisfied hereby, but what of the third, the prospective.
painting? One consequence would be that the locus of his
attention would be fixed more or less firmly by the bond of
interaction between himself and his environment. So his prospect
would appear to be less malleable, after all, than I had
supposed. Indeed, on such terms, insofar as his prospect could be
said to intimate intelligible focus, such meaning as he seeks
could thus be comprehended as primarily existential. He would on
this account orient his thinking in such terms He would thereby
say, with Merleau-Ponty: "I comprehend the world because there is
for me near and far; foreground and horizon, and because it thus
spreads out and takes on a meaning for me; that is to say,
finally, because I am situated in it and it comprehends me..(the
body is) our point of view of the world". 39
 This is a valuable
remark to which I shall return. For the moment I will limit my
attention to its existential implications for my position
regarding prospecting. The integral physical relation does not
alone provide a sufficient account of the early stages of the
artist's thinking to allow us to claim that his reflective
activities are governed by, or could be a consequence of only such
interaction. If "pre-reflective thinking", if the idea of there
being two distinct though related aspects involved here, is
retained it could be said that a painter's reflective stance is
affected, but not that it is effected, by a pre-reflective state.
I have doubts about the justification for retaining the
distinction as drawn, as the following problems show. If we do
try to retain the case, three difficulties arise.
111.7.2.1 A Threat of Objectivity.
The factitious orientation of the prospect is threatened by
the nature of the claims for meaning implied by this account. A
meaning which by definition is pre-objective effectively denies an
objective stance with regard to the perceived world. This as we
have seen is a stance sought even at this stage; there is
something odd about leaving the matter over, pending as it were
the endeavour of fully 'reflective' thought.
111.7.2.2. Just being in the Landscape isn't enough.
If a distinction is to be sustained between the
pre-reflective and reflective aspects of thinking we cannot go
about putting a reflective activity where only pre-reflective
activity is supposed to be taking place. Merleau-Ponty's
"comprehension" cannot be supposed to be much delayed upon his
physical experience. If he is not suggesting the occurence of
such a delay than either we must take it that pre-reflective and
reflective activities are overlapped in experience, which would
make his distinction a little suspect, or I may complain that he
is comprehending where he ought just to be
-181-
reacting or responding, to the environmental disturbance in which
he is involved. It is common to speak of the "blind
incomprehension" of one who has not reached understanding. Yet
not to have reached understanding is not to have been entirely
unaware of the possibility. But could anyone say "I comprehend"
and still be in some pre-reflective condition? I think not. Now
Merleau-Ponty is, I suspect, not suggesting any such thing
either. What he wants us to accept, however, is that
comprehending even in my requisite pictorial sense is possible by
way of the existential relation. The metamorphosis, gap or no
gap, from pre-reflective to full cognitive awareness has to be
accounted for within the context of the existential relationship.
This might better suit the pretensions of the latter-day plein
airist. He might claim that his affairs are not inadequately told
within that framework. But I would suggest that his affairs may
in that case fall seriously short of pictorial intelligibility.
It will not, however, suit a painter like Ed Kinsey. The locus of
his attention is not sufficiently given in an existential relation
between himself and his environment. Kinsey's pictorial horizons
may be elusive, but even in his least troubled excursion into
Wales, his pursuit of prospect accompanies him, perhaps actually
directs his travel. He does know that just being in the landscape
is not enough to settle the question of concern to the development
of any prospect of his. (see 111.3.1) This would suggest an
awareness of another sort than that proposed by Merleau-Ponty;
something more like a hunch that it is like pre-reflective
awareness (see 111.7.2.3).
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111.7.2.3. A Threat to the Agency of the Artist.
This brings me to the third difficulty in using
Merleau-Ponty's account, which is that whatever informs the
painter's prospect it is, on these terms, going to be
characterized within an 'organic' description. Now however
helpful such a characterizing description might be in
psycho-analysis, it is wrong at a critical point as an account of
the self where the self is an artist; it is to make a case for
. the artist as a being rather than as an agent. This runs counter
to my interests, for it robs artistic agency of one of its crucial
characterizing conditions: namely, concerns with pictorial space
as a factitious enterprise. The artist's predominating concern
with the world is in adding something to it. What, if anything,
is left of advantage to the artist as agent in this view? One
thing I would want to acknowledge as of value is that it gets rid
of the idea that being in the landscape consists in the merely
passive receipt of sensation. The claim, which I would not
disparage would be that the notion of 'going out' to discover
meaning in the seen and felt this requires the landscape painter
to regard his intentions regarding the focus of his prospect as
inclusive of a "reciprocal relationship" between himself and his
environment. To say that 'the world comprehends me' does not of
course imply a personification of the world; it does imply that
the world incorporates me - is comprehensive, rather than
comprehending, of my responsive presence. This ties in to the
point made earlier in this chapter about Wordsworth and "The
Prelude". (see 111.3.2) But the three-term relation of agent,
environment and artwork must be sustained. On Merleau-Ponty's
account the painter seeks a locus of attention in terms of a
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dependency, an existential dependency, of himself to his
environment. In that case an account of pictorial orientation is
not the explanation for Kinsey's concerns with the landscape;
whereas I want, if course, to say that it is: to make pictorial
irreducibility a necesary condition of the three-term relation.
His is a pictorial intention.
Consideration of Merleau-Ponty's account of the creative use
of a construct points up the difficulty for me in accommodating to
his argument. Consider the following case. Central to
Merleau-Ponty's account of Intention is his theory of Perception
as this example shows. The construction of a triangle, he says,
"involves the outward and explicit expression of the motor
intentions of a subject who is able to place himself at a certain
point and so to project lines to other spatial positions.. Thus do
I grasp the concrete essence of the triangle which is not a
collection of objective 'characteristics' but the formula of an
attitude, or certain modality of my hold on the world, a
structure, in short" .40 Since a pictorial locus of attention is
not be construed in terms of a hold upon the world but in terms of
his agent-concerns with making picture, a kind of doing rather
than a mode of being, it is very clear that this account, which
may be informative at least in part about the way in which we
perceive things, will only result in compromising pictorial
irreducibility. It is the familiar problem of the nature and
reference of the construct (see Chapter 1.7.4). The 'hunch' (see
111.7.1) is a pictorial anticipation which as an artist, both
takes Kinsey repeatedly to Wales and sustains his thought and work
in absence. The status of the "reciprocal relationship", as put
forward, I would agree requires us to consider the landscape
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painter as "synthesizing things through the intentions he has
towards them, the fundamental form of cognition is personal.. .in
the sense that intentionality implies an involvement in the
environment and not a detached attitude" .41 Indeed, yes. Yet of
course some sort of detachment is a requirement for art is
something we do (recollect 111.4.1). A painting is not merely a
product of an existential relationship between an artist and the
world.
111.7.3 The Self as Being and the Self as Agent.
The difficulty is to reconcile Merleau-Ponty's study of
reflective and pre-reflective thinking with an account of this
sort of agency. The example of the triangle will not serve my
case.
How does he characterize "personal involvement"? The organic
model puts a strain on the notion of such involvement being
consonant with the conditions under which we may postulate
personal artistic agency. For Merleau-Ponty the exploration is
primarily the nature of the Self. For my part there would be a
probleT about the adequacy of describing a painter in
existentialist terms. It would be inconsistent with a view of the
artist as agent to deny that the Self, the person he is has
centrally to do with the development of creative ideas. This is
the point at which I must qualify my position regarding
Merleau-Ponty. In talking of the "personal nature of motor
intentionality" we need to be reassured that the "expressions of
motor intention of a subject", 42 that is our painter, Kinsey, as
it might be, in relation to his environment, have at least as much
to do with what Kinsey wants to make as they have to
do with aspects of the relationship which lie outside the sphere
of his agency: such aspects, as for example the weather being
bad, his being afraid of heights, burning too easily in the sun,
having been born in Liverpool 8 and other such hypothetical
misfortunes. It is not to disregard the opportunities that such
aspects might present, but rather to say that such things are not
enough, even taken as an integral relationship of factors in his
personal life, to mark his "involvement in a real environment" as
personal (see also IV.2.3.3.). It is his agency in the situation
which gives us the crucial three-term relation: Kinsey-
environment-painting. In Kinsey's situation I want to say that it
is agency and not the social or physiological accidents of his
bodily presence that marks the relationship between Kinsey and the
environment as personal and, indeed, reciprocal. He can, indeed,
only discover himself-as-agent. We must acknowledge that, as I
said earlier (see 111.3.1), just being in the landscape is not
enough. We might regard him as being in a state of occupational
preparedness. It is not like an organic state, and it is mistaken
to write as if it were. A painter's preparedness is a mark not of
his dispositions and capacities; it is a mark of his agency as a
painter. He is constantly on the look-out for material to his
intention which is to paint a picture. The world serves that turn
to his account. The artist might doubt his agency in the matter,
where his intentions are said to depend on an immediately
perceived reciprocal relationship of body, his body, to the
environment in which he finds or places himself. Reciprocity is a
mark of agency. A 'symbiotic' account is just as unavoidably
inadequate to the case as is Price's account of dispositions and
capacities.
-186-
Now it is of more than passing interest at this point to
remark a progress within a progress. I have been at pains to
develop my case for the artist as agent and have had ever in mind
the thinking of John Macmurray. It is in this connection, in
looking to the nature of the Self, that I believe Macmurray come
to the fore and proves true. It is interesting to speculate upon
what might have transpired if Merleau-Ponty and Macmurray had
met. It is true that Macmurray's concern with phenomenology was
in advance of his compatriot generation and out of temper with his
time. But what it seems to me exciting to suppose is that in
looking to the case of the artist as agent it is possible
effectively to fill out the gap set by the limitations on both
Macmurray's account for art theory, sadly dismissive as he is, and
Merleau-Ponty's pursuit of the nature of the Self; Merleau-Ponty
wanting the Self as Agent, rather than the Self as Being;
Macmurray wanting but the passage of time and some further
thoughts about the nature of agency involved in producing works of
art. The progress of the irreducibly pictorial prospect of the
landscape painter is the example, which by virtue of being
discrete, can succinctly and comprehensively characterize the
nature of the Self. If we attend to the Self as a Being we have
but a partial account of the Self. It is only within the
conditions under which we may posit the Self as Agent that we may
come to an adequate apprehension. Loss of Self, as I remarked in
Chapter II, has to do with some failure of agency. In terms of my
case the artist as Being quite simply cannot get to the point of
entertaining a factitious irreducibly pictorial prospect. He has,
as an artist, to be the Self that acts. Two references are
illuminating in this connection. In looking at Rembrandt's
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self-protraits, from his youth to his old age we may perceive them
as manifest statement of agency, tantamount to his proclaiming,
over and again, "I am what I make". Being an old self makes no
difference! For the obverse, we must look to Wordsworth whose
intimations of Self-loss are clearly to be read in fourth book of
'The Prelude'. It is quite clear that in the figure of the
soldier encountered by moonlight on the fell, Wordsworth
personifies a fear. The soldier is not only his own self's
shadow. As a metaphor for Wordsworth's own eventual failure in
writing, the soldier is the mirror image, the Doppelgnger, to the
poet's future loss of self.
"...solemn and sublime
He might have seemed, but that in all he said
There was a strange half-absence, as of one
Knowing too well the importance of his theme,
But feeling it no longer."
Bk.IV The Prelude. Lines 441-445.
It is worth concluding upon a speculation which arises quite
naturally out of a concern for Landscape and a concern for the
nature of the Self; for they turn out to be curiously at one.
The point has been put to me that for the artist of the
Eighteenth Century the Mountain Top, the "Type and character of
the Great Apocolypse" and so on - charged as they are with
intimations of Awe and Supernaturalism - constitute, among other
things, an exploration of the Creative Self. The context for this
exploration and, indeed, its locus, is the notion of the Sublime.
As I have already said, the Twentieth Century artist may well be
put to it to establish a fresh basis for objective distance since
the Eighteenth Century tradition is concomitant with a religious
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or quasi-religious stance. Yet it should be noted that the
conditions constraining that tradition do not attach inseparably
into interpretations viable for current use. That which has no
more than a concomitance of usage may well be superseded, without
prejudice to the continued life of an idea,by other interpretive
relata- for "the relation is the principle thing". (Mondrian)
What now is conceivable as an object of awe; what is currently
viable as a celebratory locus of the Sublime?
I shall speculate upon the possibility of the Sublime by
looking for the pertinence of the notion to contemporary
preoccupation. It is abundantly obvious to those who are not
artists that a perennial concern with the human body, its
presentation, expression, health and substance is about us all in
great prevalence of image and intent. The dangers to the
integrity of the self, most notably the woman's self, may be
relentlessly enumerated in the thrall of feminist exchanges - ever
missing the point - but what of the artist? The artist truly
cannot shrink, as I suspect artists have for far too long tried
to, from a tradition of Art which actually logically presupposes 
the self as agent in a great and existential domain of reference.
He has an obligation to consider the point of these wholly human
preoccupations. It is for the artist a point to be put in some
factitious combination of equivalent Twentieth Century objective
salience.I put forward an updated case for the Sublime. I am not
thereby committed to a religious or quasi-religious stance.
Feelings of the deepest awe and reverence attend, it is surely
true, upon the power, the delight and impermanence of flesh. "All
flesh is as Grass" is for me precisely the point I might
celebrate, for above a great many things I like grass - but
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centrally it is a factitious point; a point of Art which is well
put in the context of the human figure (and, by extension in the
Erotic see Chapter II and 111.4.2) Yet it is aptly conceived as a
notion of Landscape. Consider once again what may be drawn from
Wordsworth's account of his meeting with the soldier. Surely this
is a poetic portrait of a moribund creative self - not merely a
character sketch of an old campaigner. It is a portrait which
compositionally requires a landscape of elusive evocation -
ghostlike, thin, of no colour or substance. The very 'self' of
the landscape is given in sympathetic abeyance. There is no
dichotomy (or pathetic fallacy either) for Wordsworth between his
poetic attention to the nature of this forlorn non-self and the
nature of this barren fell. All grass is as flesh. "The world
comprehends me because for me there is a near and far."
By such means it is possible to put a conceptual case of some
significance in the discussion of Art. To differentiate landscape
painting from figure painting is not to differentiate in terms of
a genre of subject matter; it is to distinguish the one from the
other as a genre of painterly thought. 43 I do not need to
apologise for moving with such ease from Poetry to Painting - the
parallel has already been argued for. 	 In virtue of this
intelligence it now becomes possible to link a concern for
landscape into a concern for the Nature of the Self without
submitting to any charge of metaphoric borrowing. It is the
orientation of the objective stance which makes for - or disallows
- any elision of the terms of the one with the terms of the
other. It is not, and never was, some sort of anthropomorphic
exercise. Recollect the discussion of Paul Klee in Chapter I. It
is a condition of artistic agency that concern with the
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world reveals the self that acts as ineluctably engaged upon
factitious making. This once again is the force of the three term
relation. The obligations upon the spectator set by this being so
have already been spelled out in Chapter II. Together these
arguments have considerble force. Veracity is the touchstone of
the Sublime. And that is an issue of determinacy to the
sufficiency - as the three term relation is the determination of
necessity - of the conditions under which we may posit the agency
of an artist.
Now to resume my account of a process, I shall suppose that
having cogitated as fully as may be - and having put a pencil, or
a knife, through the useless, the ill-considered, though with ever
half an eye to future use - the moment has been reached at which
there is nothing for it but to stretch up a canvas and commence
the business of shifting paint; to engage upon the "full, concrete
activity of the self".
111.8 Painting the Picture
111.8.1 A Writer's Account
What then is this "full concrete activity of the Self"? My
difficulty is to characterize, without resorting to excess, the
activity without which prospecting is empty and pictorial
intelligibility no more than part way given. In any account of
the progress of a Landscape, whether it takes the form of a
drawing, fully resolved as it can well be, or a painting, whose
terms of resolution are of a different character but not of .a
different order, the culmination of the business resists
analysis. This, for all its significance, will therefore be a
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section of no great length. Attempts to describe the activity
readily succumb to figures of speech. Consider this example: "It
is just like diving into a pond - then you start frantically to
swim. So far as I am concerned it is like swimming in a baffling
current and being rather frightened and very thrilled, gasping and
striking out for all your worth. The knowing eye watches sharp as
a needle; but the picture comes clear out of instinct, intuition
and sheer physical action,. Once the instinct and intuition gets
into the brush-tip, the picture happens, if it is to be a picture
at all." 45
It would be easy enough to dismiss this in its entirety, as
just another bit of Lawrentian hyperbole. I find it quite
persuasive, nonetheless, for the truth is, as a description of
what painting feels like, it is half-right. The nature of the
activity is such as to be emotionally and physically exhilarating
and it is true that at any point in this stage of picture-making
anything, everything, can go wrong. Equally, it can seem on a
good day, as if the picture takes over, making things go right.
That is the way it feels, at least. Lawrence's account begins to
be worrying once he leaves the simile for the 'straightforward'
account. His statements beg questions: how can the eye as part
of the body be "knowing" while the rest of the body is given over
to "instinct and intuition"? The difficulties besetting these
notions are legion. The account seems either to ignore or to
dismiss its problems, to take as given the very questions which
give particular point to an account of the activity.
My intention is to show that the business of painting, which
depends in considerable part upon contemplative, reflective






_). s '_	 S•
....	 ...... 	 ' • " ••,,Cli„
	•
. ••	 ' ' ''''	 '	 ...‘'...1. "-S‘,4'•••:.::•,s'• 	 , ."% • ‘
' ..1.• • ....`'	 t.,.....'	 ,...‘,. , ''''	 . i
'`• ,:•!:' :`" s -"5	 s. 47 'n.N'	 ..7,1*,. S`  . \ •'%.'.
`,..‘ •••••• ',.t.t. ... '......
' '
1 s: " L. ..',1',..l• s. •	 't' ei ltib:4N,. . • ' •
	
' - ••• . , ....‘\ 
5 ‘%.	 V ^ 
Mi41011.11111116
•,: .. , ,` •
:	
.. 1 s ' '••••	 ,
	
••,	 •
• .• ''',„.• •
•••••• %••n:`....1:4.:...4. ' ..' .••:.•:,•:.; ......., •••• .	 y... loo 1. .1t..t.	 V	 -7414
t: ••••''Z.. .7..;.„....‘"•"" "?';.:::....
	












at the same time true that the full concrete activity of painting
constitutes the most complete expression of pictorial ideas. The
ideas, the intelligible content of an artwork are most fully
manifest at the point at which reflective activity is least
prominent. Lawrence is convincing on this point, though once more
he takes on the unexplained as given, "Theorize all you like - but
when you start to paint shut your theoretic eyes and go for it
with instinct and intuition."46
111.8.2 Dealing with Lawrence's Account of Instinct and
Intuition.
How should Lawrence's remarks be regarded? The usefulness of
his assertions is that they have the gist of an account which is
acceptable, if only it were possible to take up the notions of
instinctive and intuitive action on which he quite
unquestioningly rests his case. Unfortunately, it is problematic
at a critical point, for if by instinct is meant something like
the cry of the hungry child then this is at odds with everything
so far said about the artist as agent. Even Kinsey's
"frustration" (see 111.2.1) has a context which takes it out of
Lawrence's frame of reference. If, on the other hand "instinct"
is being metaphorically deployed to characterize what might better
be termed plainly as "feeling", in the sense of having emotions,
then it may be no easier to deal with, and I shall not try here,
but it at least might come within my brief. I suspect that, being
Lawrence, the former would be preferred. Regarding "intuition":
this is so difficult to deal with that it is, in my view, quite
unhelpful to try. It has the doubtful reputation of being a term
people use when they want to talk is, once more, feeling - meaning
in this case, hunches, premonitions, and at a rarefied level,
something which is far more fruitful,though its connection with
Intuition is dubious; that is, heightened awareness. Not that an
analysis of "heightened awareness" would be without difficulties
for it would compromise my account of agency to characterize such
feeling in terms of dispositions, or mental states. Yet
"heightened awareness" is apt enough expression in the
circumstances - very much better than "premonition"; particular
where "intuition" cannot be, and it will at least be informative
to ask in what particular respect awareness can be so rarefied, so
as to distinguish this feeling, in the activity of painting, from
those feelings of awareness attending the artist as he settles the
nature of his mental stance in reflecting on his prospect, and in
the transitional activity of developing its intelligibility.
111.5.3 Painting as a Way of Thinking
That which marks out this part of the activity is a quite
remarkable though not necessarily peculiar bodily effort. it is
in my experience quite correct to say that once painting starts,
awareness of almost everything else stops. The physical business
commands complete attention of the body. The remarkable feature
of this activity is that hand and eye must work together; it is
as if the hand, as well as the eye, were brain tissue! The feel
of the brush is in some literal sense the command of the pictorial
content. The phenomenology is difficult to describe and I shall
abjure figures of speech as far as I can, until plain words fail,
when I shall stop trying.
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Kinsey also regards the activity of painting as "totally
absorbing", (see 111.2.1), a matter of putting on paint, pushing
paint around, taking it off; scraping, cutting, all the time
tactilely, visually aware of the stuff as a substance and as
pictorial content. Colours look good, appear to be right, then
feel wrong; then feel and look nearly right, so nearly right that
it produces great tension. Then it is done. All the way through
this rather frantic business the hand and eye work asone. I do
not really see that the eye "watches" at all. What happens is
much better described in terms of a sensible peculiarity; the
active work of the two senses, sight and touch, to the extent that
they effectively conjoin into a unified active sense. Other
activities may occasion this state of affairs perhaps. I do not
want to make outrageous claims for painting, as such.
But the real meaning of heightened awareness, in this
connection, lies in the pictorial orientation of that occurrence.
The reflectivity engaged upon in early stages of the process is
ever oriented towards this full activity of the agent. It is not
the case that reflectivity ceases when the painting starts; it is
far more true to say that the kind of thinking towards which
everything accomplished in the early malleable, incomplete stages
is moving, is, in this activity, wholly pictorial factitious and
necessarily gestural. Thinking does not stop. Painting is
thinking. This does not mean Lawrence is mistaken in exhorting
the painter to put away his theories. The theory, if it was part
of his concern, is at his painterly disposal but it needs no
consultation in the deed, true enough.
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The agency of an artist is unavoidably a bodily concern.
(Action, because it terminates in the objective world, is
inherently particular). "The dependence of the deed on the doing
of it is in the full sense an existential dependence and this is
involved in the definition of action". 47 The conditions under
which we may posit the agency of the artist require that we
acknowledge his reflective and physical involvement in factitious
deeds whose product is a pictorial form of thought.
111.8.4 Serendipity.
It has to be said that, given the extent to which the artist
gives himself over in the pursuit of his pictorial concerns, there
is something seriously adrift in the suggestion that the picture
just "happens". The painter is not to be regarded as a medium, a
voice through which something or other speaks - or worse an
automatic paint brush. It is a persuasive idea, however, and one
which begs serious attention, for it is quite often true that once
a picture starts to go well it seems to yo forward on its own; it
seems to "happen". As Kinsey says, "At this stage one becomes
aware that other unidentified aspects have crept (my emphasis)
into the work" (see 111.2.1). Are there "unknown elements"? I
want to say that it is not at all unlikely, but that this does not
commit me to saying that what happens in their occurrence is
irrespective of Kinsey's agency. Unlooked for possibilities most
frequently arise out of a situation in which thinking is
effective; productive. As the jazz clarinettist Peewee Russell
put it. "The more you try, the luckier you are". In painting
there is cohesion of reflective and practical activities which, if
it is sustained, is more likely
than not to create possibilities not initially envisaged (see
11.4.3 and 11.6). Much as effective functioning in any field may
yield solutions and problems not specifically anticipated, so the
painter about his agent-concerns will, if he is working well, turn
up all manner of ideas. They are not truly accidental, since the
artist's activities are the source, the hopeful source at that, of
their possibility; yet they seem fortuitous and it would be a
pity, as well as doubtful, to deny the pleasure of the
'accidental' by suggesting anything so firm as that they must be
anticipated or deliberate. That the artist is agent need not
preclude him from the pleasures of surprise at his own
accomplishment. It need not commit him to full or advance
knowledge of the effective range of his capabilities and deeds.
Neither, in reserving to himself that satisfaction, need he feel
obliged to deny responsibility for the happy result. That is
false modesty. Neverthless, I do know how it feels to believe
that it might never happen again.
Conclusion.
The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate the force
of the three-term relation as a characterizing condition of the
agency of an artist. This has had two related implications.
One, in his necessary concern to create entities of a
pictorial kind I have shown that the artist engages in reflective
and practical activities; we cannot force upon the activity of
painting any dichotomy of thinking and making. Idea and
expression are indivisible. I have further pointed up the case
for regarding artworks in terms of their being irreducibly
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pictorial ideas. It is my contention that the artefactual product
of artistic agency should be regarded as having pictorial
intelligibility. In painting a landscape an artist takes from the
world, of which he is a part, such matter as pertains to his
pictorial purpose. This he works, not as a mirror of reality, not
as its grid or construct, it cannot be explained in terms of the
landscape to which it might refer. His terms are the terms of
Landscape and that is a factitious matter; an addition to the
world, not its abstract. Herein is the particulatity of the
three-term relation, since this it is that which characterizes the
agent as an artist.
The second implication of accepting the conditions of the
three-term relation is that an account of the Self necessitates an
account of the Self as Agent. In pursuit of this relationship of
the painter, the world in which he finds himself and his pictorial
idea. I have explored the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as having
a bearing on my concerns and as it deals with ideas perhaps
unwittingly close to the heart of John Macmurray. It has been my
wish to show the relevance of my thesis to Macmurray's theory of
the Self as Agent. In attempting to account for the activities of
landscape painter I have been able to demonstrate the limitations
upon an account of the Self as Being. The self that an artist or
poet, or anybody else, is , depends for its being upon his doing,
his agency. To posit the Self is to posit under some
characteristic description a three-term relation of agent, world
and agent-intent. In taking the agency of the artist as the
starting place for investigation it is possible to relate his
refelective to his active doing without prejudice to the
importance of either to the outcome, that is to say, to his
eventual accomplishment.
A painter is one who paints. His agency is characterized as
the creation of pictorial ideas whose full expression depends
crucially upon an inherently particular "activity of the Self";
the progress of "
	 steady moods of thoughtfulness
Matured to Inspiration, "
In the last chapter I shall look to the matter of such
particularity as it informs the fourth condition.
CHAPTER IV THE PERSONAL ASPECT OF THE AGENCY
OF AN ARTIST
IV.I Introduction
In whatever sphere of activity, the
agency of an artist implies the
product of endeavour as a manifest-
ation of his agency as personal.
In this chapter I shall be examining the
relationship between the artwork, insofar . aa it
is a factitious object whose properties are avail-
able to observation, and such claims as might be
made by the spectator, and by the artists them-
selves, regarding the agency of the artist. I
shall contest the view that in consideration of
the properties of works of art we may leave aside
consideration of the agency of the artists 0;1-10
made them. Attention to the standpoint of the
observer will indicate the problems of sorting
out	 grounds for positing the agency of the
artist.
Firstly, I shall consider what it would be to
regard a painting, in terms of its physical prop-
erties, as evidence of human rather than inanimate
agencies, arguing that we cannot get from an acc-
ount of inanimate agencies at work between subst-
ances to an account of the human agency at work
in making use of them.
Secondly, I shall attend to possible grounds
for positing the artwork as evidence of artistic
agency, giving some hPid to the clues in whose
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consideration those grounds are decided; clues
such as the location in which an artwork is found;
the conventions of the gallery space; and, in
particular, the claims made by artists themselves.
Thirdly, a word of caution to the spectator
against the unquestioning acceptance, even at the
assurance of the artist, that evidence of human
agency is as such all that is needful in order to
posit the agency as that of an artist. An example
of a 5ourious claim will serve to show that it is
a concern with creating pictorial space, a factit-
ious entity, upon which the agency of the artist
is conditional; without which all that can be
claimed is at best human, rather than inanimate,
agencies having been at work.
From the standpoint of the artist I shall
be looking to the status of claims to personal
agency, examining the significance to an artist
of right attribution of authorship. In so doing
a number of related points arise concerning the
suppositions attending the notion that ascription
presumes personal agency: I shall put forward a
case for the individuation of artworks, arguing
for t17is in terms of the conditions under which we
may posit the agency of an artist.
There is, from the standpoint of the spec-
tator and out of proper regard to the nature of
artworks, a need to postulate an artist. We are
brought back to review the first consideration of
this chapter: that in attending to the proper-
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ties of artworks the spectator must acknowledge,
be cognisant of, the agency of the artist as manif-
est in the configurations upon the canva s . There
is no divorcing the form or substance of an artwork
from the reflective and practical concerns of the
artist.
I shall examine the possibility that claims
to artistic agency, in the form of claims to
authorship, may not in all cases in which author-
hip may be sustained be informative concerning
the properties of the works at issue as artworks.
In such cases it may only be feasible to posit the
endeavours of a human rather than inanimate agency.
It ma-y be possible to show that the human agency at
work has a spects which mark it out as evidence of
personal agency. I want to say that human agency
is personal, that human action is particular,
of necessity. My argument will be
that something distinguishes personal agency as
that of an artist. For it to be possible to posit
personal agency a worthy of consideration as a
property of artworks it is necessary to demonstrate
artistic agency as characteristically concerned
with the creation of entities of an irreducibly
pictorial kind.
IV.2. Attention to the Standpoint of
the Observer.
In calling Ed Kinsey a painter we acknowledge his
activities. A painter is one who paints; we
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mark him off by this title from others. Tacitly
we separate him from others in terms of his, as
distinct from their doing. It has from the outset
been my concern to contest the suggestion that a
painter ' s activities and concerns segregate doing
from being. It is a common tendency to mark out
artists as beings of a special sort as if it was
that which accounted for the marvellous and strange
things artists do; this sort of claim embodies
a refusal to admit to the agency of the person who
paints. To put the attention, deliberation and
hard work that contribute to the product down to
temperament or a 'gift', is to di smiss as irrele-
vant the hard work that, even given great natural
endowment of ability, attends the making of a work
of art. Kinsey's agency as a painter both takes
bearings upon and expresses his temperament and
feelings; but we remark him upon the evidence of
his activity manifest in his work. The very self
that he is depends for its being upon his agency
as an artist.
If a painter is so-called because of the char-
acter of his activities we should be concerned
to consider the evidence of his agency as regards
both the observable effects of his doing and the
doing itself. My concern so far has largely been
to explore the doing from the standpoint of the
agent. But recollecting Chapter II. in which we
noted the need for the artist to take into account
the fact of there being an observer, I want now
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to return to consider an observer's point of view;
to further the enquiry regarding the agency of an
artist by turning to examine its observable effects.
This is, of course, the preferred approach to
discussions of human agency. However its useful-
ness to me is that in taking the standpoint of the
observer it is po q sible to gain a clearer insight
into the standpoint of the agent, The observable
features of a painting should not be regarded as
the explanation of painterly agency although they
are it.= manifestation. The observable feature
of a painting should rather be regarded as being
explained by a theory of painterly agency. It
is the standpoint of the artist as agent with which
I am primarily concerned. With this in mind I
will consider what can be said of the doing by
concentrating on the artefact in order to see
what may be learned from regarding a work of art
a q evilence of the agency of the artist.
TV.2.I The Limitations of a Material Account
In regarding the observable features of a
work as evidential there is a need to clarify the
explanatory stance. It may be felt to be obvious
that marks on a canvas, however strange, are not
wholly accidental. Fo it may seem just as obvious
that ,,uch mark- are due to human rather than inanim-
ate agency; but their explanation is not too
readily given. How to regard the observable effects
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is problematic. A strictly material account is
insufficient to explain the configurations before
us. Suppose for example that by concentrating
solely upon observable effects I hope to distinguish
human from inanimate agency in terms of material
causes. I might for example ponder the effects
of the physical and chemical action of pigment, oil
and varnish. Unfortunately I soon discover there
15 a gap in the account which can only be filled
by making a guess which is that there was, rather
than that there was not a human hand and eye
'behind' it somewhere. Moreover I wish to claim
something particular about the human agency concerned.
This, I want to say, is not the doing of just
any human agent; the person who did this is a
painter. But the evidence of those inanimate agenc-
ies effectively apparent to the eye do not, in
themselves, presuppose it. The explanation of
what is thus apparent must take account of, but
then mu3t exceed the materially substantive facts
of the canvas, for in the attempt to get from an
account of inanimate agencies to an account of
human, painterly agency something el s e must be
presumed besides the inanimate agencies at work
between materials. As regards attention to the
surface, Wollheim puts the case clearly. " The
putting of paint on canvas is a necessary but
it is not a sufficient condition for our seeing
one colour on another: even when the first colour
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is that of the paint and the second that of the
1
canvas."
If I wish to say that the object before me
bears marks of human agency, of painterly agency,
I will get further by addressing myself to matters
of concern common at least to discussions of
human agency. It is necessary to look to the inten-
tions, the deliberations, the reasoning that attend=
the production of this object, the painted canvas.
I am, in regarding a painting, to some extent
encountering the thoughts and actions of the person
who put them there. The use to which that person
puts his understanding of physical laws concerning
his materials is to be discussed in terms of his
agency as a painter. But yet it could be asked,
how do we tell that the object we are looking at
is a painting, the work of a human agent and not
merely some product of inanimate agency? On what
ground= do we -eek explanation? Obviously I am
not suggesting that in the usual way anybody act-
ually stands perplexed before the gallery wall
wondering " Is this really a painting?" For one
thing, a painting is not, many would want to main-
tain, like anything that naturally occurs, Lt seems to
-me -that it is of some interest that as spectators
we do not usually make mistakes about regarding
paintings as paintings and that a theory of human,
painterly agency is required to account for this
being the case.
IV.2.2 Aspects of an Observer's Expectations.
The manner in which we sift the evidence drawn
by observation reveals an expectancy in us as the
observers which we may say presumes the agency of
an artist. It is informative to take for consider-
ation come of the aspects which colour that expect-
ancy. The obF-erve7 looks for clues.
IV.2.2.1 The Status conferred by the Gallery.
Finding an object displayed on a gallery wall
is a reasonably good guide to the manner in which
he might regard it. Finding the same object in
a farmyard would perhaps leave him short on clues,
particularly if the object had but few of the char-
acteristics popularly associated with works of art.
Suppo,,e a painting were not done on canvas;
had lost its frame; were constituted by config-
urations not unlike those commonly remarked upon
the floor of the farmyard. Would an observer
perhaps be doubtful? It might at this point be
objected that the status conferred by the gallery
wall is a questionable matter. Since it is the
case that inclusion in an art exhibition does
confer Etatus upon objects and insofar as I am
concerned with assessing evidence of human agency
in terms of animate rather than inanimate agencies,
I am bound to give some heed to the matter. It
is true that however much an observer might pro-
test at the inclusion of outrageous exhibits he
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does not actually doubt their status as exhibits,
as these hypothetical cases show:
A. Suppose a visitor to a gallery discovers some-
thing on a wall. It is a painted canvas, surrounded
by the cusomary accoutrements of exhibition
He takes it to be the work of a painter. So he
asks the curator for a catalogue, hoping to extend
his kn pwledge about the painter.
B. Then suppose he discovers something else on
a wall in a gallery. A cavity, surrounded by frag-
ments of plaster, rather mildewed, blackened ;
a clear view through to the timber frame which is
it=elf under some sort of attack. He thinks the
curator Fhould get on to the Department of Public
Health. He does not ask for a catalogue, because
he does not mistake this hole for an artwork.
C. But suppose he comes upon another hole, surr-
ounded by mouldy plaster exposed to the timbers,
evidently Fomewhat damaged, but seemingly arranged
and surrounded by the accoutrements of exhibition.
Outraged, he makes for the curator to demand a
catalogue, remarking that there ought to be a law...
Somehow or other he takes it that this hole is an
exhibit.
What is interesting is that however great an out-
rage and puzzlement the observer may feel, he is
not so puzzled that he mistakes his case. He is
outraged and this bears witness to his recognition
that it is intended as an artwork. As far as the
observer is concerned, a hole in the wall is only
outrageous if he thinks he should take it that it
has been set up as a work of art. He reacts un-
favourably, is outraged where he senses that claims
for deliberations of human agency of a certain
character are suspect. However profuse or scanty
the clues the spectator is moved by some response
to the proddings of the artist. For the artist is
claiming per s onal agency. In such cases there are
always clues (see TV.2.3). Finding the battered
painting in the farmyard may be an indication
of its present status, forgotten, lost or disreg-
arded. But recognizing that it is indeed a painting
is to recognize the nature of the agency of its
making as at least not inanimate. It is not just
the fact of the conventional setting that informs
the spectator's stance with regard to artworks
as opposed to natural or accidental event;, differ-
entiating this from the stance he might adopt
with regard to natural agencies. This fact counts
and must not be disregarded, but it is another which
i s worth remarking. What we see in B. would not
in the usual way be explained by its being discover-
ed on the walls of an art gallery. Another sort
of explanation would be the sort to
expect of the man from the Deparment. What is
seen in A. and C, on the other hand has unden-
iably some history of inanimate agencies, but the
recognition of something as an exhibit in a gallery
is scarcely furnished out of even the fullest
explanation of that kind. The status conferred upon
the object by its inclusion in an exhibition
prompts a search for explanations of another kind.
The man asks the curator for a catalogue because
he wants to know not whether the exhibit is an
artwork but why it is presented as an artwork when
50 little, other than the set-up, apparently
distinguishes it from a fall of plaster.
I have chosen the sort of example which gener-
ates the most confusion for the observer and
serves well to illuminate the distinctions as
remarked. However, the matters that interest me
regarding the 'avant-garde' are no less germane
in accounting for the observable features of the
works of the 'Old Masters'. It may be quite usual
to express confidence as to how one should regard
the familiar but we should be chary of leaving our
assumptions unexplored just because they do not
trouble us very much. In the present connection
the agency of the artist is what concerns me.
Whether the gallery visitor stands beforeSaskia
or a hole in the wall the basis upon which he re-
cognizes or fails to recognize clues is the same:
he confidently expects that the object of his att-
ention shows the marks of the deliberations of a
thinking being. However vehemently he expresses
himself about the hole in the wall he is not
denying that it is intended that he takes it to
be a work of art which i q so presented. His
doubts are addressed perhaps to the justification
for pre c, enting an object of this kind as a work of
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art when the only evidence of artistic agency that
he can see is the name of the artist, suitably
affixed to the exhibit.
IV.2.2.2 The Function of the Gallery.
This leads readily to the question of how to
regard the function of the gallery. If the situat-
ion in which the observer discovers the object
gives him one reason to regard that object as part-
icular evidence of human agency it must be of some
concern to look to the conditions attending the
situation given in the gallery spece. All the
conventions of gallery space presuppose the agency
of artists.
Take the complex functioning of the art
gallery. There may be disagreemnt as to the func-
tion of the greatest importance. There are several
to choose from and they overlap. It is true that
a connoisseur regards the gallery as a good place
to look at collections of particular cla s ses of arte-
fact . He maybe sees the gallery as predominant-
ly a store from which he might add to his own
collection. Names are very impprtant- He also,
one would suppose, enjoys being in the presence of
works of art. It is also true that an artist
regards the gallery as a market place for his own
work, so names are very important for him; but as
well a s this he regards it as a kind of power-
house. By which I mean he engages with the expressed
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concerns of other artists. He denigrates, mocks
or reveres, sharpens his own ideas, is hopefully
filled with new enthusiasm and is moved,often,
by emotions he cannot well define. A chance visit-
or may become a connoisseur or a painter, or may
simply drop' in now and then for pleasure or for
interest's sake. The collector takes his pleasure
also and doubtless gains in more than financial
interest; a painter may himself be quite a connois-
seur; a chance visitor may be inexplicably moved
by emotion. The overlaps are numerous. In all
cases the presence of the gallery visitor postulates
the agency of the artist.
The po=ition so far is this: in looking at
an object for evidence of human agency one way of
pursuing it is to consider the circumstances in
which we come across the object. The circumstance
of an object's being in an art gallery presupposes
artistic agency. But sometimes that evidence is
not given in the circumstances under which it is
being considered. To identify an object as a
painting presupposes agency; human, painterly
agency, no matter how obscure the circumstances
might be.
I am now some way towards an idea of what
does not count as evidence of the agency of the
artist. The material history of the uork does not
greatly help us on its own. The notion of con-
vention helps us in respect of its presuppositions.
-212-
Clearly that there are such presuppositions demands
that we find a way to meet the question of whence
it is the observer culls his expectations.
IV.2.3 Evidence and Empty Gestures.
I put it that there are always clues to what
the artist intend, of the observer. I want now
to expose certain ostensible intentions which turn
out to be spurious, for there is a grave danger of
confusion for the observer should it be the case
that the clues strewn by the artist, purporting-
to be indicative of his effective agency, turn
out to be empty gestures. Stress upon the agency
of the artist is a current preoccupation not to
say obsession with artists. At every turn the att-
ention is drawn to the presence of the artist;
his effective passage through space and time.
Many artists are concerned with the extent to which
human and inanimate agencies overlap. It is of
intere s t that the greater the overlap that is ex-
plored the more evident and lengthy are the protest-
ations of the agency of the explorer. Given that
in calling a person an artist we acknowledge his
activites and are able to do so only by attending
to the work he puts up for us to look at, we tend
as observers, to be confused if the overlap between
human and inanimate agencies is too great. I
think it is fair to say that the more the artist
leaves in the charge of Nature the less he may
credit to himself. I suggest it is the fear of
a diminishing role which occasions the prevailing
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tendency to explain. Now, no artist can have things
both ways in this matter; but it is often apparent
that this is exactly what is attempted. The art-
ist sometimes seems to want to leave everthing
to Nature and then to assert his part in the
production.
IV.2.3.1 Evidence as Art.
Quantities of evidential material adorn the
gallery walls and it is well to examine it insofar
a F
 we are interested in its status aF evidence. Re-
membering that the sort of evidence with which
I have neen dealing so far has taken the form of
an object on exhibition, I have regarded such obj-
ects as evidence of the agency of their makers.
Now let me turn to a different approach; the exhib-
its on the gallery wall which are set up as evidence
of works not on show. Exhibitions of study notes
are often shown as contributing to a fuller under-
standing of the finished statement, whatever its
form might be. For example, exhibitions of photo-
graphs of artists doing things. In the main, it
would be unreasonable to carp at the inclusion
of supporting material in an exhibition whose
purpo ce is to show the developmental nature of the
artist ' s work. There is often point in including
records of workF not included in the current
show, although it is questionable that an under-
standing of what stands before us rests upon such
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information. Some would argue vehemently to the
contrary. I myself find such exhibitions helpful
and informative.
There is no disputing the fact that recent
work on show seems to specialize in putting up
evidence of artistic agency. some exhibits wholly
consist of evidence. Consider a work by Lizzie
Cox in a travelling exhibition mounted by the
Arnolfini Gallery. The exhibition was dalled
'A Sense of Place'. The exhibit includes photo-
graph s , samples of sheep wool; several (sealed)
strips of slides; copious notes, mostly illegible,
a couple of preparatory sketches; all on sale in
expensive frames and supported by a video-tape
recording, not on sale, of the artist talking about
being an artist in the West Country. The very few
legible notes are amusing but not very informative;
and where is the statement, the culmination to
all this busine s s? The point might have been to
hood-wink the spectator into expecting something
which never happens: to show what it is to prepare
and then to omit that for which the preparations
were laid. But I do not believe this is so.
Somewhere, somebody would have to have said so.
No, this is by way of being a statement. No statem-
ent is present but the exhibit is got up in the
trappings of statement. Before becoming too
haughty, it would be well to identify the quarrel.
Putative Evidence - as Art-material should not be
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confused with the kind of material which is often
usefully put up with the purpose of extending the
amenity of the gallery and of widening the observer's
visual vocabulary, as it were. Whatever the
short-comings of Cox's exhibition it would count
as evidence of study. My quarrel is that what it
lacks is any attempt to draw the multifarious
comments and jottings together into some re s olut-
ion . A s spectators we are justified in doubting
whether this exhibit is intended to be regarded
in terms of evidence as Art or evidence of Art.
IV.2.32 Dubious Claims.
In order to expose the difference between these
two intentions let us consider an imaginary obser-
ver exposed to two other works. Our observer is
much like any other who puzzles over the visual
arts. I_shall take an example other than a painting
to do so since it will better illustrate the point
and because also my remarks are not confined to
the concetns of painters. We will start out of
doors. Let us suppose an observer is out walking,
coming through the fields. He sees a man taking
a walk in one field and in the next he comes upon
a curious trench which, because of its configur-
ations he does not reckon can be to do with drain-
age. Its shape draws the attention however and
he spends some time looking at it and pondering
its origins and idly considers what it would be
to dig up the Home Counties, to re-arrange the
Pennines. Both objects of his observation are,
as it happens of some artistic significance; he
ha- not realize it yet ,Vt both are art works.
One is 'X's Wilk through a Field'; the other is
'Undulating Trench'. In the case of the first
our chance observer could have no possible notion
of the character of X's ramble. There is'nothing
about X l s walk to mark it out from the pleasant
afternoon stroll of any casual observer. The trench,
on the other hand is remarkable in that it is
clearly a work of some sort. Its creator, it is
true, must have walked through the field but unlike
X he made significant alterations in passing. And
he is not present. The problem for the observer
in recognizing the 'true' character of the solit-
ary rambler's activity is that as a ramble it is
much like his own. How can he get to see that
unlike his little stroll this is indeed a work
of art? Just to help the case along let us suppose
our unknowing observer should chance to visit
h13 local art gallery some little while later.
With some surprise he comes upon the exhibition of
some very F;martly got up photographs, one set of
which bears the title 'undulating Trench' and the
other, 'X's Walk through a Field'. The first he
regards with great interest and enthusiasm.
"Why, certainly!"he declares, "I knew it wasn't
drains." The other photographs are very puzzling.
He vaguely remembers having seen someone who could
have been X and he knows the place in the photogr-
aph well. But how is he to regard these photogra-
phs? Which is the work, the walk as photographed
or the photographs themselves? Let us give him
-217-
a little more to go on. There is a catalogue for
him to read and a very long piece in it about
'X's Walk'; which leads him to believe that the
photographs are by way of evidence. Though quite
nice photographs, they are not the work (see IV.5.1.5).
The walk is supposedly the work. Does this help?
Not a lpt Th?. record of the event, tdat is the
joyiotograph, we are intended to suppose, gives us the
clue we need to know that such events are . to be
regarded as works of art. Our observer might be for-
given for asking should he not also be provided
with a record of the photographer who was presum-
ably in the field at the same time? And so on....
If we are to tell something about the agency of
X by attending to such evidence we are constrained
by the fact that X needs to put forward something
besides the event of walking through a field to
distinguish it, not as human agency, that is not
in doubt, but as the product of artistic agency.
That which distinguishes the event, namely the photograph,
does not conFtitute the work of art. The photog-
raph is put forward not on its own merits in such
a case, but as evidence. I submit it does not
stand as evidence of the agency of X as an artist.
It is only evidence of a claim regarding an event
which is itself indistinguishable as a work of
art. Not even its inclusion in an exhibition can
fill the logical gap. It can only deepen the
sense of mystification suffered by an ever-larger
band of gallery visitors. Mystification thrives
on logical confusion. If, as in this example the
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so-called work of art is constituted in its eviden-
ce, in that photographs are necessary to .distinguish
it thus, where the evidence is not held to cons-
titute the work of art, in this case X's walk
through a field, then we are most surely left with
a gap. And if we should query the justification
for setting up a situation in which, in effect, there
is nothing more on the gallery wall than a record
of nothing, we may feel there are grounds for sus-
pecting the artist of perpetrating a deception;
pretenf,ing to an agency, artistic agency, which
he cannot in good faith claim. Alternatively, we
may more kindly suppose that a dangerous confuion
attends the thinking of the artist, who: perhaps in
truth supposes that he can boast personal artistic
agency in this work. He may suppose that he can have
it both ways. It is high time to show that he can-
not, however ingenuous his intentions, continue in
this fashion. The truth of the matter is where
there is no visible or tangible product other than
photographic evidence of X's having been in several
parts of the same field neither he nor anybody
else can distinguish X's deeds as an artist from
the deeds of our chance observer, or of some local
shepherd who may in pursuit of his business inad-
vertently at any time stray into focus.
IV.2.3.3 Assessing the Status of the Evidence
We are now in a position to distinguish the
evidential status of the photographs. They are
far from similar though at first they may have
seemed to be so. 'Undulating Trench' has been
photographed because it would be impossible to
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organize transit for the work. There is a good
case for saying that 'X's Walk through a Field' is
not a work of art. If that is right, then putting
out sharp photographs as if they were evidence,
turns out to be an empty and perhaps pretentious
gesture. My point is that the ethos of the gallery
space may lend status to both sets of photographs
but it should not blind us to the folly of supposing
the adequacy of that status as such, for constituting
something as a work of art.
To return to the matter of the artist's put-
ting out clues; whether the observer is the vic-
time of error or deception it is very unusual for
artists to omit to give weight to the matter of
their personal agency. Where there is no justif-
ication for claiming authorship, there is no case
for positing personal agency. We must suppose
that in exhibiting, any artist is making such claims.
Should his claims turn out to be empty we may say
that he has been mistaken or is practising a
deception. It is not my task to advise anybody
how they might disentangle true claims of agency
from the mistaken or false. However in noting the
possibility of error or deception we have some in-
dication of the importance to an artist of the
matter of the personal nature of his agency.
Should he forfeit this he would have no justific-
ation for regarding himself as an artist.
In positing some object as a work of art we
posit the agency of its maker. No artist can ignore
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what this entails: such agency diminishes in
proportion as undifferentiated agencies take over.
Lest he should fall back upon the convenient
supersition of the artist as a special being
endowed with extraordinary Powers or subject to
Inspirations, let him bear in mind that in such
contingencies no claim to personal agency could be
sw,tained. Personal agency cannot be accounted as
a natural endowment (see III. 7.2.). Either
he must renounce his role as agent or he must
clarify his position and renounce superstition.
He cannot have it both ways.
So far I have been concerned to adopt an
ob-erver's eye view of the artist as agent.
Being on the recipient's side has been useful insofar
it has shown the value of examining certain indic-
ations.
a. It has become clearer for one thing that
however informative the history of the physical
make-up of a work may be, it cannot provide an
adequate account of the object as a manife--tation
of human agency. It follows that something must
be added to that 5tory. The explanation needs
to be broadened.
b. In filling out the account it is possible to
look to the function of the gallery. Conventions
attach to the description of its role but the
functions of the Gallery presuppose the agency of
artists.
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c. Before an object can be regarded as a manifes-
tation of artistic agency it is needful to attend
to the question of the means by which this comes
to be recognized.
d. We have noted this: if the artist has any
concern to make known the fact of his personal
agency he is wont to leave clues, or pointers.
Not all clues point true. Examples show that they
may be mistakenly or falsely laid. From the fact
that clues are laid it may be taken that the art-
ist is concerned to indicate his personal agency.
The very fact of his putting his work on exhibition
in a gallery is supposed to indicate the nature of
his agency as artistic. But it has been shown that
the statu e
 conferred by the gallery can be a spur-
ious affair in that respect(see also IV.3.4).
IV.3 Attention to the Standpoint of the Artist
It is now clear that if I wish to fill out
the explanation of the work of art to account for
he agency of the artist concerned I must look to
the claims for personal agency made by the artist,
if only insofar as they have to do with his belief
in , and public recognition of his agency as an
artist. The very act of observation is in this
connection, consequential upon the promotion of
the agency of the artist as personal. It is reason-
able to suggest that this being so, the activities
of artists reach out to and affect the activities
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of others. The artist's agency involves the re-
sponse of the observer. This was the substance
of the second chapter. I regard the agency of a
painter as having a necessary relationship to the
painting he makes, recognizing that the observable
features of the painting provide the only access we
have to that relation. The artist wants to say
that a painting or any artwork is as particular as
an entity as the person who makes it. So looking
to the configurations on the canvas would, in that
case, presuppose that relation.
IV.3.1 Some Suppositions attendant on a Claim to
Personal Agency.
As individual attribution is of account to
the artist I want now to look to the suppositions
which attach to his assertion of personal agency.
What I am after is that which counts as a mark of
his personal agency.
The painter may suppose the following:
Uniqueness of statement is a mark of his personal
agency as a painter.
Novelty of statement marks his personal agency
as a painter.
That he is materially effective is a mark of his
personal agency.
IV.3.2 Concerning Uniqueness.
I have looked at the progress of ideas and
practice integrally involved in the making of an
artwork (see 1.3.4) I now want to look at what is
involved in a series of works being instances of
one idea or group of ideas and yet being individually
distinctive works (see 11.4.2). Artworks in series
offer a good example. As Elizabeth Frink commented
on a series of her own sculptures, "Each is a work
in its own right and each leads on to the next".3
Artists do not suppose themselves to be alone in
their concerns. One landscape painter would ex-
pect another to understand something of his inter-
ests. Yet he would hope and trust that no other
landscape painter had made or could make exactly
the statement of those interests that he himself is
making. A number of matters arise which are of
interest about the individuation of artworks, which
I shall now discuss. In order to establish that
it is possible to individuate the products of a
painter's agency I need to show the following to
be true about Kinsey: that Kinsey's concerns are
not identical with the concerns of any other and
that it is the very contingency of the case which
is important.
In order to show how this is true I might
begin by distinguishing between works done by
Kinsey himself; the different ideas he develops
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in his several works. I will then move on to dis-
cover what would be needed in order to distinguish
his from the works of any other in terms of personal
agency.
IV.3.2.1 Distinguishing between the Works of
One Painter.
Firstly, to di-tingui c:h between the works of
one painter suppose that Ed Kinsey makes a painting.
The pictorial statement, which his painting is,
shows some aspect of his concerns. Kinsey adopts
methods and chooses materials which he thinks
will best serve him in making that particular state-
ment. It might be supposed that the difference
between one work and another, where both are the
work of the one painter, rests upon its being
true that only such means as he has elected to
employ adequately differentiate his concerns.
Any other form of expressicn would make for a dif-
ferent picture. However though this is quite
correct, it will not do. True, should Kinsey sel-
ect a different palette or schematic system then
he will produce a different painting; but suppose
he decides to prepare six canvases, exactly similar
in size. He may also decide to use exactly the same
colours and the same system of composition in each.
Yet it would, we know, be possible for him to
complete six distinctively different paintings.
The variations open to him are many at a given time,
and over a period will be increased despite the
fact that he has employed the same techniques
and materials in the production of each one.
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It is not denied that the relation of means and
eventual end are integral. Indeed, it is not
senFible to distinguish between the statement and
its material or formal content at all, for a paint-
ing simply cannot be subtracted out from its matter
or its form. But the example illustrates what we
already must know: that this state of affairs
does not work both ways. A choice of materials
and a variety of systems is not the guarantee of
pictorial concerns being various. A painter pur-
suant of hi c. matter has a broad field of possib-
ilites from which to choose. It is a field he
may plunder and from which he may retreat. His
several conceptual concerns may involve him in
diverse means, but they need not.
Another way is worth trying. It is possible
to posit a certain unity to Kinsey's concerns, in
which his statement and his chosen means are in
an integral relationship such that all save KinFey
him-elf, as agent, may be regarded as variable.
Kinsey, as an artist, pursues many ideas. However
many ideas he pursues, however diverse or similar
the means he employs, however many statements he
completes, they are unified in that they are
KinFey's . However minimal a unity this may seem,
it should not for that be despised. Indeed,
such as it is, it poses some interesting questions.
Given that Kinsey may be regarded as a constant
factor in an otherwise flexible and variable
relationship of factors, these other elements
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may be viewed as indefinitely malleable. The agency
of Kinsey requires and governs the unity of the rel-
ationship. But Kinsey may by recourse to diverse
means express numerous conceptual concerns in
numerous statements. Where there is more than
one statement, by whatever means it is accomplish-
ed, some difference in concerns must be acknowledg-
ed. Yet they do have in common that they effective-
ly express Kinsey's agency. There is some cont-
inuity of ideas in that they are Kinsey's ideas.
I than now explore this as the means by which we
may di s tinguish between works in terms of personal
agency; that is to say, mark out any or all
of those work s
 by one painter from any or all
by another (see 11.4.2).
IV.3.2.2 Individuating Artworks.
This is a bold claim but one which I mean to
substantiate. Numerous approaches have been made
to the problem of individuating artworks. They tend
to proceed along the lines of dealing with the prob-
lems attending the spectator in his attempts to
characterize the evaluation and assessment of art-
works. Should he, for example be able to remark
his enjoyment of artworks as a special kind of
experience? Can he characterize, in some distinct-
ive way, the language of art critics? The first
approach involves enquiries about the nature of
response and seem to me, however valuable an
exercise that might be, unlikely to yield any sure
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answers on behalf of the spectator and they take
us in any case no nearer to the individuation of
artworks. Finding ;:ome special experience which
is arsociated only with an enjoyment of artworks
would not tell anyone very much about artworks as such,
for there can be no comprehensive account of
experience in this area. Anyway, some object-,
might give us enjoyment so close to the 'requisite'
kind to be indistinguishable and yet not be art-
works. Consider the sudden sighting of a new
moon. A further worry about this approach would
be, as Strawson has pointed out, that even if
indeed there was a special experience accompany-
ing this kind of enjoyment would its presence be
what made it this kind of enjoyment? The objection
to thiF would beinline with objections to the
notion of artworks as instrumental. The very idea
of looking for an identifying experience is not
only daunting, but misleading.. The apparently
"limitless elasticity" of art criticism defies
analysis. At best it is "departmental and limit-
5
ed", at worst it is a threat to the unwary, an
industry of verbiage whose effect is to reduce the
artwork to the status of an emetic. Of course my
sceptical rejection of 'language' analysis-attem-
pts relates to my. rejection of 'special experience'
analy F i--httempts, for I regard both in terms of
concerns with spectator response. The question
of assessing enjoyment or evaluation provide no
clear access to the status of artworks regarding
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their individuation and can yield only an inadeq-
uate account of spectator response. The other way
of looking at the question is usually to attempt
some general statement about properties of objects,
such that artworks may be distinguished as objects
of a certain kind. "The uniqueness demanded of
a work of art is that conGequent on its essentially
being evaluated for itself and not for its instrum-
‘
enatal potentialities". In what sense can a work
of art be unique, evaluated for itself? To suggest
that this can be answered by referring back to the
spectator's standpoint as Strawson suggest s , does
not seem entirely satisfactory if, by doing so,
we get no further than to assert the "criterion
of identity of a work of art is the totality ,
 of
features which are relevant to its aesthetic
7
appraisal". It comes back to criteria which have
doubt1A.ss -hown to be themselves highly problematic.
Nevertheless, the kind of an artwork is not given
in the terms of its appraisal; its appraisal is
rather a reponse to the artwork as an object of
a certain kind.
My contention is that artworks have in common
with each other, but not with other works or things,
a concern with pictorial space. They also have
in common that any artwork whatsoever manifests
the pLctorial concerns of an individual agent.
Even in cases of multiple editions the point remains
good. However many copies exist the properties
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of the object do not cease to be a manifestation
of the pictorial concerns of the artist who designed
the artwork for edition. We cannot dissociate
the person, the painter, Kinsey is, from the pict-
tures Kinsey paints. This is the force of the
idea of the agency of an artist; the relationship
of a kind of deliberative doing to a kind of active
being. The artist self as agent is, that is to say
exists, only in his reflective and practical activ-
ities. In the case of an artist that agency is
not to be separated out from the things he has
done, or is doing. In terms of the conditions
upon which we may posit the agent as an artist
it is thus not merely possible but imperative that
if the agent i s rightly to be regarded as personal -
then that upon which, as agent, he depends for
his being - may no less be individuated.	 Action (selt10315)
is inherently particular Thus the uncertainties
and d:ubts besetting the attempts to individuate
artworks in, merelyi terms of spectator response
can be abandoned; concern for the properties of
artwork s is the key to their individuation. But
rather than look in vain to the appearances and
categories of artworks, consider instead that
in the visual arts, any work of whatever sort, is
a manifestation of the pictorial concerns of an
individual. As an artefact it is, as I have al-
ready claimed, (Chapter 1, Introduction), a
fictitious entity.
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Its being so owes as much to the reflective act-
ivities of an individual agent as to the stuffs
and surfaces by means of which his prospect becomes
a public matter.
IV.3.3 'Novelty' Despatched.
I turn now to the supposition that novelty of state-
ment is a distinguishing mark of the personal agency
of the painter. This may speedily be despatched.
If a work may be distinguished among	 the works
of one painter and may also be singled out by
authorship, as has in both cases been my claim, it
may in either category be remarked as unique.
This is to render the question of novelty spurious.
As a distinguishing mark of the personal agency
of the painter, 'novelty' is a redundant suppos-
ition.
IV.3.4 The Material Object.
Thirdly, consider the suppo-ition concerning
the material character of the artefact as it supp-
orts the claim to personal agency. This suppoc,-
ition is substantially endorsed by points raised in
other chapters in the following way: I have noted that
a painter's concerns are oriented towards some
material statement. In Chapter I. the agency of
an artist was stated as conditional upon a concern
with a factitious pictorial entity. In Chapter III
I endeavoured to show the central importance of
positing cohesion between thinking and doing;
the interdependency of thought and action in the
reflective processes of painting and drawing;
their manifestation in the artefact. In Chapter II.
concerning the public aspect of artistic agency
I endeavoured to show the significance of that co-
hesion as the occasion of response of any whose
standpoint is that of a spectator. In any discus-
sion concerning the extent to which the concerns
of an artist may effect the responses of anybody
.else what must be posited is the existence of a
work of art; a necessary artefact. Where we
are attending to suppositions as they axK:ern a
painter's claim to personal agency we should
bear these considerations in mind. The claim
of the painter may be substantiated by virtue of
the fact that his personal agency as a painter is
given in the character of his concerns, as being
the concerns of some particular painter, in this
case Ed Kinsey. Such concerns do not guarantee
artefactual expression but as I have shown they
necessarily envisage it.
Here the moment has been reached at which the
matter of personal agency, from the standpoint of
the subject, meets with the matter of the personal
agency of the artist as it is observable from the
standpoint of the spectator. From the spectator's
point of view there must be something to attend
to: some artefact. Where this is so, there being
obvious problems about attending to Minimalist
exhibits, then, sure enough, the material effect-
iveness of the painter is one mark of the agency
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of that painter. rrom the painter's point of view
it is very difficult for him to sustain a credible
role as an artist in cases where the material
character of his work is in question. It is worth
recollebting the point that where the character
of the artefact is seriously questionable as a
Wor.Kof art on terms already discussed in the
chapter (see IV.2.3.3) the observer should be
ready to set to work to question the terms of his
response. It is all to easy to be mistaken about
the object of attention. This in no way suggests
a standard of response; but there should be some
caution on the part of the observer in receipt
of what rightly or wrongly passes as evidence.
In IV.2.3.3 it was suggested that the relation of
agent to artefact might not as such be enough
to show the character of that relation as pecul-
iarly the agency of an artist. I now offer some
appraLsal of that problem by way of a very obviDus
statement: that Kinsey's concerns are painterly
is shown by the material and compositional evid-
ence of the artefact. The surface as content,
as configuration, is the evidence for the observer.
Kinsey's claim to agency is acceptable on the
basis of there being an integral relation between
his concerns, his chosen means of expression and
his eventual statement in the form of a painting.
We may not distinguish his agency as painterly
in kind.
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I now turn to a closer examination of the personal
agency of the artist as a matter of regard for
the spectator.
IV.4. The Postulated Artist.
This is a matter which seems to require the
spectator to remark that which might not be all
that accessible to the eye. Since the artwork,
whatever it might be, speaks for itself and does
not depend on any additional apologetic by its
. maker the spectator might well wonder how to go
about the business of discerning the personal agency
of the artist. Some might say it was unnecessary
and mistaken to attempt it when what matters is
not the painter but the painting and the config-
urations upon its surface. Some indeed would have
us believe that consideration of the agency of the
artist does not enter into a consideration of the
properties of the painting. This would be one
way of cutting down on the spectator's difficulties,
but my claim is that the personal agency of the
painter is intrinsic to the properties of the
painting. "The painter is included from the
8
start". The spectator's difficulties I shall argue
are capable of resolution within this framework.
It is necessary to look, for the solution, to the
concerns of the artist for whom the question of
attribution, or authorship, is crucial. This is
not just a matter of pride; from the standpoint
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of the painter his painting is a complex statement
of concerns of his at that or some other time.
It presents to the observer, in irreducibly pic-
torial terms, his thinking as a painter. Since the
reflective and practical activities he has under-
taken are manifest in the configurations upon the
canvas it is a little strange to suppose that
this complex activity, his very agency, might,
by adopting a certain stance, be divorced from the
spectator's field of attention. What is needed
is that without straining intelligibility we can
accommodate the needs of agent and spectator in
such a way as will do a disservice to neither.
IV.4.1 The Agency of the Artist as a Consideration
with regard to the Properties of Artworks.
We must ask what the connection is between
artist and artwork. David Carrier poses a possible
distinction, "If we say the artwork is what the
artist mdkes we focus on the link of the work to
that person. If we say the artwork is what
9
the artist makes we focus on the product". His
purpose in putting the point is to discover whether
and bow far we may regard the properties of a work
of art as dependent upon the identity of the art-
ist. Whether or not postulated artists are super-
fluous is a -question we can meet only within
the terms of artistic . agency by asking ourselves
what it adds to a dE6cription of a work to post-
ulate an artist or , by omission, how much is lost.
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Now if Carrier objects to the view that knowing what
a nice man Monet was, or how he balanced the books,
is any help to us in looking at "Water Lilies"
then so most certainly do I. But this is surely
not the kind of thing in any case that goes with
postulating some particular artist. Someone of
Nelson Goodman's persuasion would have us separate
off the artist and his concerns, to make the quest-
ion of who did what redundant in an account of the
properties of artworks (see V.I.4). Conversely
someone of Richard Wollheim's persuasion would
assert the primary importance of postulating
an artist.
A strong expression of the first view
would have us accept, with Goodman Cand Bartheithat
10
"..it is the language which speaks, not the author".
For Wollheim on the other hand, "what we see in
a picture and the artist's intentions are linked
in that, by and .large, an intention to represent
X must express itself through the making of a
11
picture in which we can see X". And we cannot
divorce the intention in such case from the intend-
er. We do not need to fall into the spectator's
trap of imposing a unifying Gestalt onto any
aesthetic experience in order to maintain that if
an implied artist is essential to the spectator then
that sonnet, that painting or novel is necessarily
by that artist. It seems to me mistaken to suppose
that an artwork's properties can as Goodman claims,
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"be studied quite apart from the acts or beliefs
or motives of any agent that may have brought about
the....relationships involved" without the qualific-
ation that certain of the acts, beliefs,and motives
of the artist have necessarily quite particularly
informed the material, compositional progress of
the work. This is not at all the same thing as
saying that the conceptual concerns of the painter
can be subsumed under some culture-oriented system
of symbols. These factors cannot conceptually be
disregarded since the very marks upon the canvas
are their direct manifestation as the conceptual
concerns of the painter. In saying a work is "what
the artist makes" we are not it seems to me pre-
cluded, in focussing "on the product", from postul-
ating an artist. On the contrary; the artist is
i rrpaied thereby.
IV.4.2 A Qualification upon the notion of a
Shared Communicative Grasp.
What is not being suggested is that in look-
ing at a painting we should expect it to be trans-
parent to the painter's life-history. We are not
after extraneous details of the painter's personal
affairs. Even in a self-portrait (see IV.4.3),
there is no need to regard the painting as evidence
of anything other than is given in the content
of the painting. What is being suggested is that
what can be seen in the marks on the canvas are
certain pictorial concerns of one particular
painter and that the complex properties of the
work show and cannot exclude the personal agency
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of that painter. If this is understood there is
no need to scan the canvas looking for clues
of some extra content; nothing beyond the work
need be postulated nor sought in order to discover
the agent. All we need to know about his intent-
ions is present to the attention in the work
before us. To deny that consideration of the agency
of the painter enters into consideration of the
properties of a painting is to limit the spectator's
attention to a partial field of reference. Those
emphases in an artwork which we take as having the
function of depiction, symbolism, representation,
denotation, all to be sure are accessible to a
spectator on the basis of a shared communicative
grasp. Insofar as we are concerned to know how
paintings represent, depict and so on, events
and states of affairs as they commonly affect us,
that grasp gives the spectator in some part a
framework of response. As has been said "This
shared basis for communication allows the spec-
tator access to the properties of the painting".12
This is true, as far as it goes. But any discus-
sion of pictures in the context of a system of
communication must take as its point of departure
a situation in which somebody is saying something
to somebody else in the context of an artwork.
Presumably it is only by understanding the whole
situation that we are able to tell whether a pic-
ture-represents or not and if so what it represents
and how. But understanding even half of the situation
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cannot exclude the agent's personal standpoint,
for that, surely, is contituted in the surface of the
very picture before us. The point is put by
Colin Lyas," It is something someone did...In
the work, given the requisLte knowledge and exper-.
ience, we can find chronicled the choices made,..
13
the attitudes expressed". A spectator comes to
some extent informed to the artwork, but he is
not comprehensively informed. He is by way of
coming as a primed recipient to ideas; such is
not a passive response, but it is a response.
Seeing " what is meant" when it comes to under-
standing paintings is an acknowledgement not only
of some shared system of communication but also
of the contribution to that system,perhaps even an
effective disruption to it, in the conceptual conc-
erns of the agent which are presented to the atten-
tion in the content of the canvas. As noted
earlier in Chapter II. the authority of an artwork
is the extent to which that work engages the attent-
ion. In certain cases the spectator may not at
first recognize the conceptual territory at all,
and can only come to do so through greater familiar-
ity or by sustained effort. Even with this shared
basis for COME lication being rather wobbly he




Returning to an earlier observation, (see 217.3
IV.4.2) there are paintings which it seems to me
expressly set out to say something of the painter's
person. Van Gogh's self-portraits offer a good
example. However these paintings need to be seen
primarily as a sort of testimony to the indivisibil-
ity, for Van Gogh, of his person and his concerns
as a painter. The content of these works does not
yield to analysis of the latter to the exclusion
of the former. Even in such paintings as these
what the painter puts on the canvas is all that
is required. There is no question of looking
beyond or behind the content of the canvas.
What is asked is acknowledgement of the person,
the agency of Van Gogh, the painter.
Now while there is no need to scan the canvas of
even a self-portrait for clues which lie beyond
the content of the work the spectator is not,
cannot be precluded from engaging in extensive
reflective attention to the work for, as Stefan
Morawski puts it, "Anything in the work of art which
beyond 'telling a story' makes a commentary
on the human condition, conceptualizes the author's
view point and stimulates the audience towards
abstract thinking. The range and strength of
cognitive response depends on the richness and
intricacy of the work's structure and texture, on
11
the author's insight and power to involve us".
However intricate and extensive the cultural mesh
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within which the spectator and artist communicate,
ele extent to which a work of art compels the spec-
tator's attention is not confined by it. For
Morawski the self-portraits of Van Gogh, and also
of Rembrandt, offer,"..certain evidence that cult-
ural equivalents can never be claimed to subsume
the creation they mediate...Among these artists,
the oeuvre and the personality articulate as one
fascinating whole which is not explicable only by
the moeurs of the moment". An artwork's range
rests upon the recognitions and Sharing of concept-
ual concerns. This is in part a cognitive endea-
vour. It also in large part engages the emotions
of the viewer. Nowhere personally do I find this
more powerfully so than in addressing the self-
potraits of Rembrandt. In no other art form is the
exposure of the self to another so given. The
self-portrait is in two senses reve/atort- The
artist as accent is defined, exposed, in the terms
of this forth. .Foh'in any activity of painting
I am my agent-self, my person. In painting him-
self Rmbrandt iyes , to any who cares to cast a
glance,his person, both in its appearance and
its very agency . It is undoubtedly an act of
generosity and as such it should be received.
Furthermore it is the very expression of the
personal nature of such agency. I would therefore
say that the propertles of painting include not
only reference to the world at large as mediated
by Culture. They manifestly refer the spectator
to the individual agent who put the paint on the
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canvas. It is his agency, his individuality,
worriting at constraints, amongstwhich are those
of cultural context, that results. in the object
presented and received in exhibition. As a Land-
scape painter it is no less true that Ed Kinsey
is not in any sense by way of trying to meet the
cultural expectations of his public. Consideration
of the agency of Ed Kinsey enters into consideration
of the properties of his painting. If Kinsey is
making a statement in painterly terms, that he is
making it matters to him and I hold that its matter-
ing is of more than psychological interest since
it has issue in practical terms whose expression
marks the agency evident in the painting as his
and nobody else's. The agency of the painter does
emphatically "enter into it". Subtract it and you
may as well get rid of the painting - get rid of
painters. All that will remain is a posse of
spectators with only their expectations to lament.
I am, as must by now be unquestionably clear,
far from seeking to exclude the study of the spec-
tator from considerations of artworks, but it is
important not only for the sake of the artist
but just as much for the sake of the viewer to
recognize the study of the spectator as ever
pointing in the direction of the concerns of the
artist; for this is a communicative consequence of
exhibition. Centrally, we must regard works of
art as more or less cohesive complex instantiations
of thought and action and as such they presentyin
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some immediacy the thoughts and actions of some
person. The limitations of time and space have
their constraining influence upon the work in prog-
r*ss and outcome. They are part of 
	 i might borrow
a term	 from which we cannot subtract the artist
as agent as a constant in an otherwise variable
field of pictorial concerns. In this section it
has been argued that works by one painter may be
distinguished from each other in respect of their
comprising, as statements, a widely variable dis-
position and use of elements; yet they have in
common that each is a statement of the one painter.
It is further claimed that works by one painter,
however distinct they are from one another as works,
are fundamentally to be distinguished from any
work or works by any other painter. Whatever it
might be that those works, in collections of works
by more than one painter, can be said to have in
common, such as thematic content, style, medium
and so on they are distinct in being the works of
different agents, (see IV.5.I.I). It has also
been noted that the artist regards his own agency
as worth notice. He leaves clues.
•
We have noted the inadequacy of supposing that
considerations of agency need not enter into con-
sideration of the properties of artworks. We
furthermore saw that clearly it is not enough to
posit that agency has in a general way been involved
in the production of an artwork. This would not
in itself be informative. That agency of some sort
-243-
has been involved in artworks is self-evident.
If no more were being claimed for artworks than
that some action or other has taken place it would
be entirely understandable if the matter was held
to be uninteresting. If we hold that what it is
that has been done is a manifestation of reflective
and practical activity on the part of some indivi c:u-
al some person, we shall want to make much more of
it for we now have a pointer to the character
of the agency concerned since that which is or
has been done just cannot be set apart from the
activities involved in the doing; those activities
of thinking and making are just what constitute agency
in this connection. This is the substance of
Chapter I. I also want to point out that in saying
we must distinguish the sort of agency involved
not just as human rather than inanimate but as
human therfore personal, I am making a point of gen-
-eral significance.
IV.5 Attribution as an Informative
Notion.
It might be objected that if all we are saying
is that people are different, this is in itself
trivial; but to suggest that an artefact is capable
of expressing in pictorial terms the concerns of
an individual agent is of significance. In looking
at paintings and other works of art we are addres-
sing ourselves to statements of a pictorial sort.
These statements may be regarded in many connec-
tions, central to which are the concerns of their
author. Artworks are actual manifestations of
personal agency; that is to say the marks on the
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canvas do not stand for or symbolize some conceptual
position of the painter; they just are his concept-
ual position (see 111.4.2.20 Attribution implies a
rather closer relationship between the artist and
the artefact than is allowed to be the case if we
segregate consideration of the properties of art-
works from consideration of the agency of the art-
ist.
In talking about the personal nature of human
agency I am not making a special case for artists.
What is true about painters as regards agency is
not irrelevant to other spheres of human action.
All the same, the examples I have taken for exam-
ination are useful in that they point up the
relationship of thinking to doing with greater
clarity than might some others. It is true in this
case there is an artefact. Now we should under-
stand that there being an artefactual manifestation
is not in iteself remarkable, but the fact that the
way of characterizing the artefact produced by an
artist does not require the artefact to be regarded
as instrumental in some other field of concern
allows us to regard the agent re hi.s concerns, his
production and product, within something of a
discrete relationship; the example is thus curious-
ly free from extraneous diversion. The general
point I want to make is that the personal character
of our thoughts and actions is of account in con-
sideration of the results or effects of our thoughts
and actions and that this is the force of the idea
of human agency. The agency of the artist is a
good case for us to take for the particular case
provides a model for what is generally true.
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One way of approaching the matter is once
more to pay attention to what artists themselves
are concerned about. Since my enquiry is being
conducted from the standpoint of the agent it is
consistent that the importance to an artist of the
fact of his, rather than anybody else's agency
should provide us with a key to the personal nature
of his thinking and doing. I shall refer to this
concern an artist has as a concern with a right
attribution of authorship.
1V.5.1 Some Testing Examples.
I shall be looking at three cases in which
claims of attribution make sense. My case will be
that n pt all of the examples yield information with
a bearing upon the properties of the artefacts con-
cerned, but that there is something to be said for
regarding the relation between artworks and artis-
tic agency in terms of this being the case.
These are the examples for c3mparison:
a balloon seller's balloons
a painter's works
a knitter's socks.
They have in common that in each case someone could
say of the artefacts, "They are mine." The last
two examples differ from the first in respect of
the probability that the persons concerned could
say of these artefacts, "They are mine, in that
they are my doing." The second and third cases
are of a kind insofar as their being as they are
involves the reflective and practical concerns of
their 'owners'. I shall put it that they are to
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be distinguished insofar as it may be said to be
true that there is nothing about the properties
of even hand-knitted socks which would persuade
anyone to credit a claim for attribution with much
significance. It seems to me that the same may
not be said about a painter's claim. This does
indicate some noticeable particularity of charact-
er about artistic agency. Certainly it is to make
some sort of case for paintings being particular-
ly good examples, insofar as they are clear in-
dicators of the workings of personal agency.
The significance of the first example is two-fold.
It gives us in the present context a case in which
the claim of attribution is uninformative as to
the properties of the balloons as such. Further,
it eventually helps us to make some useful obser-
vations about artefacts as artworks which, (whilst
not committing us to an attempt to set out suffici-
ent conditions under which an artefact may so
qualify,) are significant in revealing necessary
conditi:ns under which an artefact so qualifies.
Let us look more closely at the examples.
My claim is that a painter's collection of his
own paintings is not like a balloon seller's collec-
tion of balloons. A painter's paintings are less
like the vendor's ball000ns than they are like
David's socks that he himself has made. David's
socks are less eloquent than the painter's paintings
where both are considered as manifestation of
personal agency.
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However, such attribution is in varying
extent informative of knitters and painters and
not, in the ordinary way, of much help in charactr-
izing balloon sellers. Let me elaborate on two
of the examples. This will show us the distinct-
iveness of the cases in question.
IV.5.1.1 A Case of Mistaken Attribution.
The First Case. A and B are collections of
artworks. They are distinguished as collections
in that although each work in these collections
is an individual work those works which comprise
group A do so in virtue of their having each and
every one been made by 'A'. Similarly those works
comprising group B are the work of 'B'. Thus,
however similar the collections A and B may be to
each other in subject-matter, medium, quantity,
they are fundamentally distinct as collections.
This was the point made more fully in1V.3.2.2.
Let me try it out in another context.
The second case. C and D are bunches of
balloons. They are distinguished as bunches in
that although each balloon in bunch C is quite
unlike the others in its bunch, every one of
the balloons is firmly attached by strings to the
hand of one balloon-seller 'C'. Similarly those
balloons comprising bunch D are attached by strings
to the hand of 'D'. We might say that since 'C' and
'D' are separate individuals this allows me to mark out
C and D as fundamentally distinctive bunches of
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balloons, even though as bunches they contain the
same collection of colours, shapes and so on.
Since I am concerned with attribution let me now
consider what might happen in the event of somebody's
treating someone's paintings as they might perhaps
someone's balloons. I now need to postulate
particular painters and balloon sellers in order to
make the point. So I will give names to the examples
rather than mere letters.
In the first case, consider the plight of two
landscape painters Max and Mercedes. Each has
done the same number of paintings with the same
subject matter; executed in the same medium and
painted all in the last three years. They are
preparing for a joint exhibition. The gallery
by some chance gets into a muddle and switches
things so that in the catalogue Mercedes is attrib-
uted with paintings done by Max and Max is catalog-
ued as the author of paintings done by Mercedes.
There is embarrassment and tension but is there
any question of leaving things as they stand?
Absolutely not, as we shall see.
In the second case, two balloon sellers,
Tosh and McGarry, have each the same number of
balloons; each has the same selection of shapes,
sizes and colours of balloon and both are out in
the High Street on Saturday afternoon. By some
chance the wind snatches the balloons from McGarry's
hand; snatches the balloons from Tosh and after
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a bit of a scuffle each recovers a clutch of
balloons, just as many, just as before. Except that,
as it happens, they have in fact exchanged balloons.
But although neither vendor has the stock he started
out with neither Tosh nor McGarry make any trouble.
Is there any question of not leaving things as they
stand? Of course not, why should there be any
trouble? So long as the balloons are not burst
and are just as many and as beautiful as before
then Tosh and McGarry may be content. (They have
not, happily, exchanged price lists.)
What have Max and Mercedes to be upset about?
On the face of it the situation is very good.
The gallery has lost nothing, neither has anything
been damaged; all the works are as before and
each may be seen entire and appraised, as Goodman
would say, in its own terms. Is it not just like
the case of the balloons? What does attribution
matter, where that we have is a collection of
paintings and not of balloons? Can we not put
paintings and balloons on a par and say that so
lcng as nothing is destroyed or lost, so long as
each can charge what he or she wants to, there is
no justification for making trouble? We should
not expect Tosh or McGarry to make trouble under
the circumstances of their case. What we have to
admit is that Max and Mercedes do not see themselves
as being at all like balloon sellers and this has
nothing to do with their feelings about the social
comparison of artists and balloon vendors. They
would claim that collections of paintings have as
such tn be regarded in terms r, f their liqtir_tive
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attribution whereas the two bunches of balloons
need not be regarded in that way. There is no
advantage to Tosh in recovering his original clutch
of balloons so long as he recovers himself a
comparable clutch. The point is he can recover
a comparable enough clutch of balloons. But
Mercedes claims that there does not exist in this
world a remotely comparable clutch of paintings
to those now wrongly attributed to Max.
IV.5.1.2 The Importance of the Contingent Case.
Can this position be sustained? Now it is
only contingently true that given the diversity
of the complex i matrices' associated with each and
every work of art, no two works, even by the same
painter, will be the same. There is a logical
possibility of repetition or exact coincidence
which it is crucially important to dismiss
'he conceptual point at issue just is. that a
painting or other art work is a manifestation nf
personal agency; this would be threatened by
asserting a logical position on replication. I
argue that this is to mistake the nature of the case
and it is this which allows me to regard
the threat as empty. Another difficulty seems to be
this: if we cannot attribute individual identity
to an entity,
 such as a computer i we cannot usefully
attribute artefacts produced by that entity with
characteristics which mark it out as having been
produced by that entity and no other. But suppose
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we can reasonably posit the existence of machines
with individual identity; it it reasonable to
suppose that the attributes which allow us to
posit this stop short of the material effects of
individual thinking and making? In other works, if
machines are s individuals: which I admit is possible,
why should we deny that 'individuals' may produce
works which are thereby unique? If this is a reason-
able position to maintain then would the possibilityof
'individual' work produced by some artificial
intelligence threaten my position? Not unless it helps
in giving an account of the product so produced, to
add attributability into a description of such a
product. Further, the logical possibility of-an . .
infinite variety of artefacts being produced by any, or
infinitely many individual artificial intelligences
is conceivable but does not constitute any threat
to my position; it is only to say that certain
sorts of machine would have to behave very much like
human beings for it to be usual for there to be
a fuss about mistaken attribution and would have
to be very like a human being indeed to mind quite
so badly as Mercedes. The point is really that
human action is ittherently particular and that this
accounts for the positive value of the contingent
nature of the case to the argument for the individ-
uation of artworks. What I am now saying is that
for certain objects an adequate account of the
objects [as such requires as part of their descrip-
tion some reference to their attributability to
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individuals. The separate bunches of balloons,
C and D, cannot be marked out as fundamentally
distinct even though their owners are as individ-
uals, fundamentally to be distinguished. There
is nothing about the vendor's bunches of balloons
as such that allows me to regard them as manifest-
ations of the personal identity of the vendor.
It allows me to call Tosh and McGarry balloon sellers
with certain rights of possession and procedure
but that is all. Even rights of possession may
under certain circumstances be regarded with
some flexibility. If I continue with the suppos-
ition that paintings are manifestations of person-
al identity how does this accord with some more
usual approaches to persons and objects?
1V.5.1.3 Examination of the Idea that the Notion
of Authorship is informative in Consider-
ation of the Properties of Artworks.
I will now attend to the last example comp-
aring it to the others.
a. Tosh-the-balloon-seller's stock of
balloons.
b. Mercedes-the-painter's collection
of her own works.
C. David's collection of socks that
he has knitted.
In each case possession is being claimed
but in b. and c. possession implies attributability
in the sense that each could say, "They are mine
in that I made them". We may reasonably suppose
-253-
that Tosh will not say that, though he may have
inflated them. We can see that a. is obviously
not the same as b. and c. But how far can c. be
said to offer as good an illustration of an individ-
ual identification of the maker in question as might
b. ? David's attitude towards his socks may appear
very similar to Mercedes' attitude towards her
work. Should someone switch their own hand-knitted
socks with his we would be sadly advised in suppos-
ing David might not object. What might the basis of
his objection be? The socks might well be less
well-made, they may not be of a colour he approves.
They may not fit anybody for whom he knits. They
may be a pair short. Let us call these observable
diffelences for David. However, although any one
of these conditions would provide him with grounds
for complaint we cannot with impunity say, were
none of them to obtain, that David would feel there
were no grounds left for objections. The socks
may be equally well made; be of acceptable colour,
even the same colour; they may do quite nicely
for anybody for whom he ordinarily makes socks.
Furthermore, there may be no more, nor no fewer
pairs in the exchange. Yet he feels irritated
and offended by the idea that his having not
made these socks is of no account. He would
put it perhaps that the person who claims to
have made the socks that David in fact made is,
for one thing, telling lies and that, for another,
this person must want people to believe that he
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is capable of knitting socks of the quality of David's
socks which would at least mean there is something
to this matter of attribution after all. Though as
we have seen there actually might be no noticeable
difference. So, that he objects on the basis
of a claim being untrue is one objection he can
sustain. Unfortunately it would be very easy to
get bogged down by a discussion of all sorts of
noticeable differences without ever getting to the
differences which, being noticeable, were also 
germane to our concerns. The thing that matters
is in this case the relationship of authorship
to the material properties of the artefact. That
David's socks are socks that nobody else made is
what matters to David and more might be at stake
than the truth of the other fellow's claim.
Unhappily, I cannot accept, even though he might
want me to, that nobody else could have made the
sockE that David made. For making socks involves
certain constraints which cannot be disregarded -
if the artefact in the making is going to be a soCk,
that is. Certain conditions have to be fulfilled
in making a sock: it should fit some foot when
it is finished. So, if it is knitted, there must be
a rEcularity about the numbers of stitches invol-,r-
ed in shaping the object. Certain kinds of yarn
are available and these constrain the knitter as to
size of needles, tension of thread, and so on.
Thus it is not for David to say that nobody could
make socks just like his. And I think he is not
saying that. I suggested that more might be at
stake than the truth of the claim. What he is saying
can perhaps better be appreciated by adding into the
case an emotive factor. Suppose the socks he
made were a present for Ruth. His having done
something for her cannot be fulfilled by her re-
ceiving socks which, after all, were not of his
making where his making was part of the giving as
he intended it. Now 'his making' can be the point
of the attribution even when he means to keep them
for himself. It is still perhaps an emotive matter.
Although it is none the worse for that, it is true
to say that as a property of socks, it is
not a very visible property. It has in fact, less
to do with the socks as such than it has to do
with his intention to make some for Ruth.
We are back to the question of socks being
less good as examples of objects whose properties
need to be considered in the light of their maker's
agency. With Mercedes and the mis-attribution
of her work, that she has done the work is on a
par with David's having knitted the socks but as
artefacts her paintings are capable, in ways that
David's socks are not, of manifesting the personal
agency of their maker. Making socks is an instru-
mental activity. Socks are normally for something
in a way that painting pictures is not. It is
a mundane but important fact that socks are for
• feet. This puts a limit on the extent to which
socks can vary from pair to pair, from sock to
sock. Socks cannot be individuated
with respect to the personal agency of the knittei
for their function necessarily constrains their
maker and thus the nature and appearance of the socks.
The same cannot be said of artists and artworks.
That David made these socks matters for him, but
it is more important for him and a right regard
for his feelings than it is for a right regard of
the socks, except in the case of their being a
present where the making and who made them is an
important part of the giving. A right regard for
paintings involves recognition of the irreducibly
pictorial character of the work as manifestation
of the personal agency of its maker as the agency
of an artist.
1V.5.1.4 The Case for Sock-Works.
Now what if, just to be awkward David says,
"But my socks are going into an exhibition of
modern sculpture." ? Then we should seem to have
to say of the work, David's socks, that they are
further on a par with Mercedes'paintings and that
for some fool to switch David's Sock-work with
somebody else's sock-work would provoke an outburst
whose grounds were quite as capable of justifi-
cation as were those substantiating Mercedes'
complaLnt in her case against the gallery. Well,
yes and no. If this sock-work is constituted by
a perfectly useful pair of hand-knitted socks
and not by some representation of socks, or depic-
tion of, symbol, of socks, then the conditions
for its being a 'Sock-work', are two-fold.
I. The socks must fulfil the conditions of making
. already outlined and it is a consequence of those
conditions that some person other than David could
have produced the socks for his Sock-work. Thus to
that extent there is some aspect of which it is
not possible to say that it marks out, individuates
the artist. Therefore unless David has done more
than hang up his socks on the gallery wall while
we may grieve with him along the lines already
described, for the fact that 'his making' is not
a public matter of concern, however painfully he
may feel it, we must admit that here at least he
is up against what looks like a problem. The work
could be anybody's. (Goodman might appear to be
his best hope. Isee IV.I)
2. However, while the conditions on which the sock-
work works as a piece of sculpture rest upon the
socks being socks, with all the conditions ful-
filled appropriately, more is involved than that
David's socks mostly fetch up on someone's feet.
These socks are on a gallery wall. For all I know
they may have enjoyed a useful life on somebody's feet
already, or perhaps if they do not sell as scul-
pture, they will yet serve Ruth as socks. But
this makes no difference to the fact that they
may happen to constitute an exhibit in a show of
modern sculpture. So long as David's socks are so
exhibited, it should be possible to set the work
alongside Mercedes' paintings and discuss them
as artworks amongst whose properties the personal
agency of Mercedes and David as artists, cannot
hut be of account. Yet David is up against the
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problem of having in good faith, let us say, made
a piece of sculpture whose success as a work
in part rests upon his doing something which by
virtue of its workaday function could well have
been done by somebody else. He may yet rescue
himself from difficulty by claiming, that exhib-
iting his socks is tantamount to some pictorial
statement or other. If he merely hangs up his
socks and just calls them artworks then, whatever
we want to say about objets trouves as art, which
I presently do not, he cannot get over the diffic-
ulty, if it matters to him as a sculptor, that there
is every chance that anybody's socks would do as
well, and that for anybody else to have put them
up would, equally, serve. He would therefore have
much less good grounds than Mercedes for complaining
if his works had been switched for somebody else's
Sock-pork.
Let us think about this objection a little
further. Interestingly, although we can show that
in some situations David's socks are to be disting-
uished from Tosh's balloons,such that it is unrem-
arkable that Tosh should not get fussed over a
switch of his stock with . mcGarry's, and no more
surprising that David should take on so should
his socks be swopped with, say, mine, we find that
the situation is somewhat altered by suggesting
that both balloons as well as socks might take
on the character of artworks. The problem encounter-
ed over David's Sock-work is relevant to consider-
ation of Tosh's putative Balloon-work. I have put
the case that sock-work could be attributed to
anybody and not necessarily specifically to David,
and Balloon-work could similarly be attributed
to anybody and not just to Tosh. Now this makes
a point as to whether there is a way to distinguish
between David's socks and Tosh's balloons regarding
attribution. As artworks it is now true of both that
there is little about their properties to indicate-
who it was that actually manufactured the parts
ch make up the works, whether they are Sock-
works or Balloon-works.
David, Tosh, McGarry, Max and Mercedes will
exhibit what they please as artworks. But are their
works as described, exactly comparable when it comes
to positing the personal agency of the people
concerned? There is nothing to prevent David from
hanging up his socks or Tosh, in hope of greatly
enhanced returns, from hanging up his balloons
as artworks. It would be difficult to show that
balloons or socks could not be artworks.
If this is right, then what is the significance
of right attribution in cases in which attribution
does not refer to the majority of the properties
of the work? We seem to be making out that for
one category of artworks, paintings, a right account
of the properties of the work includes attribution
to the personal agent, the painter; for another
category of artworks such as Sock-work and Balloon-
.
work, a right account of the properties of the work
leaves . outin large part reference to the personal
agency of the artist. If I want to say that both
sorts count as works of art then this could be
a threat to my professed view, which is that in
any account of the properties of an artwork the
pictorial character of the agency of the artist
must not be disregarded. I could simply refuse to
accept the second category for consideration as an
artwork, except that in so many such cases I find
myself supporting the artist against his critics.
There are charlatans; there is deception, yet this
being so does not on its own allow us to get rid of
that second category. Conversely, it is regrettab-
ly the case that believing that the artist is ex-
hibiting in good faith yields insufficient grounds
for retaining it. We should have to look for some
fundamental conditions of acceptability as regards
the properties of both categories if we are to
defend a sympathetic attitude towards balloons or
socks, as described, as artworks alongside paintings.
IV.5.1.5 Accepting some Unpalatable Implications.
The position is this: concerning paintings,
paintings are distinctive; individual. Works of
one painter are distinguished from other works of
the same painter in that we may characterize each
as a manifest /matrixl involving the prospect and
conceptual concerns of that painter in some partic-
ular statement. What ultimately counts is that.
firstly each and every painting is an irreducibly
pictorial statement. Secondly these statements
or paintings, are distinctive aspects of the conceptual
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life and development of one painter. The paintings
of one person are fundamentally to be distinguished
from paintings by any other person. The observable
features upon the canvas cannot fully be accounted
for without that the personal nature of the paint-
erly agency involved be taken as fundamental to
the properties of the work. Regarding Sock-work;
insofar as Sock-work is comprised of socks and
only socks the work might have been done by any-
body. For an artefact to be a sock certain cond-
itions must be fulfilled. The constraints of sock-
making do not permit the knitter too-extensive
self-expression. It follows that given compli-
ance with conditions of manufacture, anyone can
knit socks. Knitting socks is thus not like painting
pictures even given that certain conditions attend
the artist in respect of painting, as for example
against print-making or sculpture. It is possible
to attend to the properties of a sock without either
taking into account the personal agency of the
knitter, or the agency of the knitter as pictorial
in kind/though agency is assumed. It is not possible
to attend to the properties of a painting without
taking the personal pictorial agency of the painter
into account.
Whatever might be said about the distinguishing
characteristics of artworks, it looks as if neither
David nor Tosh should take exception to their art-
works being wrongly attributed. If McGarry happens
to be credited with Tosh's Balloon-work then
-262-
however much Tosh objects he really cannot say that
there is no way in which McGarry could -met have
produced balloon-Work ': Similarly, if I, for example
am given the credit for David's Sock-work, he cannot
say, even if he knows something of my knitting,
that I could not possibly have produced just such
a work. But Mercedes knows that there does not
exist in this world a painting that having been
painted by herself could have been done by Max or
anybody else. Aside from the question whether
David and Tosh are producing artworks, or are
not, it does seem that any case they might want to
male for those works as theirs and nobody else's
is threatened insofar as the properties of the
works concerned may be considered aside from the
personal agency of David or Tosh. A problem for
me is that if I want to include Balloon-works and
Sock-works as works of art it may be difficult
for me to retain my sympathies and sustain my case
that in consideration of any artwork whatsoever
the personal agency of the artist, pictorial of its
nature, enters into consideration of the propert-
ies of the work. If I am consistent then a pair of
socks cannot on its own become an artwork merely
because it is called Sock-work, any more than I
believe a walk through a field can become a work
of art, unless something is done by the walker
which removes it from the usual run, as it were,
of walks. A big expensive phDtograph does nothing
to make good the gap in that account (see IV.2.3.2).
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Finally, it turns out that however much I
wish David's Sock-work or 'X's Walk through a Field'
were artworks I cannot really offer a good justif-
ication for saying that they are. That which sep-
arates them in my view, from being artworks is
not to be waived. Fundamental to anything's
being rightly called a work of art is that the
work is a factitious manifestation of the integ-
ral nature of the relationship of one person's
pictorial prospect and working conceptual con-
cerns. Such are the properties of these pictorial
statements. A person cannot just walk through
a field and make a claim thatthis is an artwork
unless he can by so doing show that something
distinguishes what he did from a thing anybody
might do such that 'what he did i Constitutes a
factitious entity of a pictorial kind and thus may
rightly be called an artwork, where 'what anybody
else does' is not rightly to be called an artwork.
It might rightly be called taking a walk, knitting
socks and so on for that would be agency of another
character, no less particular to its kind. More-
over such a work, if it is to qualify as an art-
work, must be both a factitious pictorial entity
and be such that nobody else could,contingentlyf
have produced it. To give the usual account of
actions being unrepeatable will not do here.
Insofar as walks through fields can be made by
anyone and are not, as walks, rightly character-
ized if and only if they are 'X's walks', then
walks are not artworks in the requisite sense.
Attributability thus takes on great signif-
icance in this acc r:..unt. While we would not need
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to put a name to every artwork before agreeing that
it qualifies as an artwork, we do need to take
every so-described work as showing by its proper-
ties the reflective and practical pictorial concerns
of some one individual. Where no such conditions
exist then the most heated claims to authorship
in the requisite sense are as empty gestures.
IV.6 Conclusion.
Attribution is a key notion in settling the
question whether and in what sense an artwork is
an instantiation of agency. Such that not only
do we, in looking at an artwork, posit the effect-
ive agency of a human being, rather than merely in-
animate : agency; but, furthermore in any claim
that might be made regarding the agency as that
of an artist and so as personal, the notion of
attribution as of professed concern to artists
themselves, provides the means to test out the
significance of the cla±n to authorship.
Where the first chapter set out the conditions
under which it is possible to posit the agent as an
artist this
	
chapter is primarily addressed
to the characterization of the artist as a per-
' sonal agent. I have put it that the artist is
not, in respect of agency in general,a special
case, notwithstanding the character of his agency
as that of an artist rather than, say, a balloon
seller.
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Two concerns have been expressed and explored
in these last sections. Firstly, it is my contention
that we should regard consideration of the proper-
ties of artworks as centrally involving consider-
ation of the agency of the artist. Secondly,
partly to substantiate that contention, and partly
as substantiated by it, I put it that we may
nicely regard artworks as particular cases of agency.
That is to say, we should look to the properties-
of artworks both as factitious entities and as
manifestations of the agency of the artist who
produced it / as personal. Furthermore we may re-
gard these observations regarding the agency of
artists as having application in any context in
which the particular nature of human action is at
issue. Finally, this indicates grounds for the
individuation of artworks rather more convincing
than those put forward in terms of spectator ex-
perience, and offers an alternative to the view
that the uniqueness of an artwork rests upon the
totality of features relevant to its aesthetic
appraisal.
If, in examining the examples and attempting
to characterize the importance of right attrib-
ution, I have stumbled upon some means of discus-
sing what does or does not count as a work of art
then this is wholly fortuitous. It was not my
main concern. What counts is the status of a
claim to agency in the context of the visual arts.
V. CONCLUSION
My concern in this exploratory text has been
to show that the characterization of a person as
an artist must be in terms of his agency as an
artist; it must be in terms of a certain_ kind of
doing. The structure of my research has been to
establish the conditions under which we may posit
the agency of an artist. The four conditions
I have established form the substance of my thesis.
Within the framework set by their constraints
I have addressed myself, not only to the question
of what an artist may think and do but also to the
concerns of the reponsive spectator with respect
to what artists think and do. I have shown that in
fulfilling the conditions under which we may posit
the agency of an artist certain. implications have
to be recognized, on both sides. I shall now,
in conclusion, assess the implications of meeting
the four conditions of artistic agency as they
affect both the artist and the spectator, as
party to his ccncerns, and will remark such points
of general significance as are raised by consider-
ation of the case as a whole.
First I will restate the four conditions.
I. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of
an artist implies that his concerns are pictorial.
An artist creates Pictorial space.
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II. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of
an artist implies a communicative stance.
In whatever sphere of activity, the agency
of an artist implies an artefact, a product,
characterized by a manifest cohesion of reflective
and practical endeavour. This product is a pictor-
ial form of thought.
IV. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency
of an artist implies the product of his endeavour
as a manifestation of his agency as personal.
From consideration of these conditions it is
clear that the agency of an artist cannot adequate-
ly be discussed in terms of what is going on sole-
ly from the point of view of the artist. Neither
is it accepta1-le+0 regard attention to artworks
as quite to be set in terms of the standpoint of
the spectator. Each is implicated within the terms
under which we may posit the agency of the artist.
It is to the asessment of these related implications
that I shall now turn.
From the standpoint of the artist the following
may be said reg_rding his agent concerns: as an
artist he is necessarily engaged in the develop-
ment of pictorial ideas. For an artist, failure
in the production of pic-t--)rial entities is a
failure of agency. This is tantamount, within the
terms of his agency as an artist, to a failure of
being; a loss of self.
An artist's regard towards the matter upon
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which he bends his attention must be primarily
pictorial in character. Thus, so far as his atten-
tion to observable objects may involve transcrip-
tion we should not take the activity in which he
engages as having primarily to do with learning to
see. This does not commit me to the position
favoured by Gombrich, however; for insofar as
constructs are ways of seeing the world the artist
is not centrally concerned with constructs.
The artist's making is not matching; neither is
it something which comes before matching, if by
that is implied the consequence that, after all art-
works function:primarlly as accounts - of-the -wörld,
What is sought, by recourse to all manner of things,
is a pictorial prospect whose fulfilment must be
a particularity, that is a factitious entity of
a material sort. Thus the doing is to be character-
ized in terms of a peculiar orientation: an inher-
ently particular manifestation of a pictorial kind.
That the agency of an artist necessarily imp-
lies some artwork ineluctably engages the artist
in a communicative relationship, for the observer
is whether the artist likes it or not, party to
his thinking, by virtue of that thinking being
observabld,, thus public.
In positing an agent as artist we recognize
his personal characteristics and preoccupations
as having some bearing upon his work. This does
not commit me to the view that his agency is subject
to dispositions to the extent that dispositional
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factors determine his activites. Rather it is that
his pictorial intentions set the direction of
constraints of his preoccupations, painterly,
sculptural and so on. The pictures Kinsey paints
need to be considered as manifestations of his
agency as personal.
Since the observer necessarily features in the
agent concerns of the artist it is fitting that
I now turn to consider the implications of my thesis
from the standpoint of the observer as agent.
Thus I choose to term his role, for the active
nature of his response is a two-way consequence
of exhibition, in the following way. The first
concern of the observer, in the communicative
context of exhibtion is that he should attempt
to enter into the artist!s pictorial context.
This puts him as observer in a position of some
vulnerability, since he may particularly when confr-
onted by the unfamiliar, feel himself to be at the
mercy of the artist, whose evident claims to agency
may sometimes be questionable. An observer needs
a critical eye. If the claims of the artist may
be questioned, however, so may the expectations
of the observer. This is the substance of the
second consequence. The reflective and practical
cohesion of pictorial concepts is in simultaneity
accessible to the attendant eye, but understanding
what is observable is not always to be accomplished
at a glance. The prectator's attention is first
-270-
taken but not necessarily held by a first imp-
ression. Some further work may be needed on the
part of the observer in order that he put himself
in possession of what is going on. He comes as
a primed recipient to pictorial ideas, yet may be
required to set aside his expectations; for the
artwork, being particular, comes of its nature as
an addition to the field of intelligible objects.
The agent concerns of the artist suppose the poss-
ibility of response in the agent concerns of the
spectator in the context of pictorial communication.
It is a shared communicative stance.
Certain points of general significance arise
from consideration of the case as a whole. With
regard to artworks as manifestations of reflective
and practical activities, the conditions upon
fulfilment of which we may posit artistic agency
bear out with particular force the truth of Macmurray's
assertion that "action is inherently particular".
The mark of the agent as artist is concern with the
creation of factitious objects of a pictorial sort,
as such necessarily particular. From this it
can be argued that artworks may be individuated
in that they manifest the agency of the artist as
personal. Since I am not concerned to make of the
agency of the artist a special case of agency the
possibility cannot be ruled out that there may be
other spheres of human agency in which consider-
ation of the properties of artefacts might usefully
include consideration of the agency of their makers.
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However, it has not been my intention to
put forward a general theory of agency. Indeed
I rather feel it ought not, if I am consistent,
to be attempted. But the possibility for discus-
sing the individuation of human agents in terms
of their agent-concerns being manifested might
be a matter of general concern, although it comes
beyond the scope of my enquiries.
Finally I will show the relationship of the
four conditions of artistic agency. As conditions
they are not independent for each one has a bearing
upon the other three. Yet each is in a particular
way informative of the kind of agency with whose
terms I have been concerned. I will show the terms
of each condition insofar as they distinguish the
conditions from each other, and in that they are
nevertheless not independent. I will then show
by analysis that as conditions they cannot reduce to
each other, from which it must be concluded that
each is vitally informative regarding the nature
of the agency of the artist.
In Chapter I. I set out to show how the following
condition sets constraints of a critical nature.
I regard fulfillment of this condition as fundam-
ental to the notion of the agent as artist:
I. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency
of an artist implies his concerns as pictorial.
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An artist creates pictorial space. That is
to say, an artist is one involved in making of
a factitious kind. That which he produces is an
artefactual entity. The terms of this condition
. implicate the agent in the following concerns:
that there is an artefact implies a communicative
stance as an inherent aspect of the agency of an
artist. This invokes the second condition.
Such making as is involved in the production of
artworks is a manifestation of reflective and
practical action. An artwork is a form of thought.
This invokes the third condition. The inherent
particularity of action is demonstrated in the
pictorial context of artworks. This invokes the
fourth condition;without such activity as that
characterized in the first condition there is
no agency such that it can be claimed as the agency
of an artist.
Concern with pictorial space distinguishes
the agent as artist. This is the particular force
of the first condition.
In Chapter II. I showed that the artist is
committed to an ineluctable constraint on human
agency:
II. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency
of an artist implies a communicative stance.
This supposes the engagement of spectator
concerns in concerns the artist has, in a context
which is primarily pictorial. This invokes the
first condition as setting the context of attention.
For a spectator's concerns to become engaged in
the pictorial ideas of an artist depends upon those
ideas having a manifest coherence. This invokes
the third condition in respect of- the notion of
intelligibility which presupposes a context of
ideas which are capable of being shared. Failure
to communicate is a failure of agency. In that
for the artist, effective agency is a condition
of his being, we may say that a failure of agency
is tantamount to a loss of self. The personal
nature of an artist's activites cannot be discount-
ed in fulfilment of the second condition. This
invokes the terms of the fourth condition.
Concern with a communicative stance reveals
Lhe artist as c:Nnstrained by the terms of human
agency. This is the force of the second condition.
In Chapter III. the attention turns to the
status of the artefact as a manifestation of art-
istic agency:
III. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency
of an artist implies an artefact, a product which
is a pictorial form of thought, characterized by
a manifest cohesion of reflective and practical
endeavour.
That which an artist makes is intelligible.
Intelligibility does not in all cases presuppose
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verbal statability. This implies a communicative
stance which operates within constraints of
irreducibly pictorial meaning. This invokes and
informs the second condition. The factitious
nature of pictorial entities supposes the
progress of reflective and practical activity
as oriented towards the full concrete activity of
the agent as artist. An artwork is a factitious
object in that it is a materially wrought idea;
it is an artwork in that as an idea it is pictor-
ial in kind. This invokes the first condition.
An artwork is an individual form of one person's
thought. However much conceptual territory a
work shares with other works, it is itself
particular within terms invoked of the fourth
condition. Concern with artworks engages the
spectator and the artist as agents in a context
of communicative intelligibility whose object is
a pictorial idea. The nature of the making
activity governs the intelligibility of
agent concerns. This is of consequence as a func-
tion of the second and first condition in that it
is informative about the entity which is an artwork.
That an artwork is a form of thought is the
force of the third condition.
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In Chapter IV. the question arises how it would
be possible to divorce concern for the agent, the
artist, from concern for the properties of artworks.
Action is manifestly inherently particular:
IV. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of
an artist implies the product of his endeavour as
a manifestation of his agency as personal.
Artworks are manifestations of action as
"inherently particular". The implications for 'this
notion of particularity are that artworks are manif-
estations of agency whose character is given in
the entity which is made being pictorially partic-
ular. This invokes the first condition of artistic
agency. Concern for the agency of an artist enters
into consideration of the ploperties of artworks.
Attribution presupposes such agency as personal.
This invokes the communicative relation of the
second condition. An artwork as an intelligible
statment shows in its context the prospect, in its
fullest determinacy, of an individual whose agent-
concerns are primarily pictorial. This invokes the
third condition. Concern with the agency of the
artist as personal is a concern of significance
respecting human agency in general. That which
distinguishes an agent as an artist is a personal
concern with the making of entities of a pictor-
ial nature.
Artwor:cs provide us with clear cases of
action being inherently particular.
Taking a broad view of these conditions it
is possible to show that being individually as
well as mutually informative they can be regar-
ded as revealing that there are two aspects to the
account. The first deals with what it is to be
a human agent; the second with what it is for
a human agent to be an artist. In no way am I
suggesting that an artist may exempt himself from
any of the conditions as defined. Neither am I
about to show that it is only artists who may
make claims to their agency as being of a partic-
ular character. My business is to show the particu-
lar character of artistic agency; that is all.
To conclude, this, then is an analysis of the
conditions under which we posit the agency of an
artist.
Regarding conditions II.& IV: Both conditions
are denerally informative about human
agency.
Regarding conditions I.& III.: The conditions
mark the character of agency in some
particularity as that of an artist.
That these conditions are neither independiant nor
yet reducible to each other may be shown as follows:
I.& III.are the characterizing conditions of the
agent as artist. Each of these conditions is
informative.
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I. characterizes the agent as artist in terms of
certain kinds of activity.
III. characterizes the product of such activity
as a form of thought. A pictorial form of thought,
as an artefact, is an observable object.
Thus III. is not reducible to I,. although consider-
ation of the artwork cannot exclude consideration
of the agency of the artist.
I. is not reducible to III., although the whole
activity is ever directed towards the product:
an artwork.
• That I. & III. settle the character of the agency
in a certain way does not make II. & IV. redundant
as conditions, for neither can be evaded. This
being so precludes the possibility of trying to
make a special case of the agency of the artist.
IV. stipulates the inherent particularity of
human agency. (Thus I. & III. come under the gen-
eral case.
II. concerns the necessity of the communicative
stance implicit in the notion of human agency.
In no way does the character of agency being that
of the artist exempt such agency from the general
constraint.
Thus II. is not reducible to IV. A-communicative
stance is an implication of agency of persons,
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but is not reducible to the notion of agency as
inherently particular.
IV. is not reducible to II. That which marks agent-
concerns as personal is not sufficiently to be
accounted as oriented towards a communicative stance.
though a communicative stance is an ineluctable
aspect of agency.
It is my contention that unless each of these
four conditions is met the agency of the artist
is critically unfulfilled. If I. & III. are left
out of account the agency could be other than that
of an artist. Although I have not expanded upon
alternative possibilities it is clear that in
terms of IV. human agency is necessarily particul-
ar in character. Thus in the event of an agent
not being an artist some analagous characterizing
conditions 'I. & III.' would have to be fulfilled.
Neither I. nor III. csn , in this connection, be
left out of account without fundamental loss to
the notion of the agent as artist.
In positing the artist as agent I admit to the
atiding constraints of conditions II. & IV., which
imply the effective dealings of persons in commun-
icative relation and the agent concerns of human
beings as necessarily particular in character.
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My purpose in these chapters has been to in-
vestigate working concerns of a certain sort:
to characterize the activities of artists. By
looking to examples drawn from a variety of sources
and addressing myself to questions which, while to
an extent specialized, have a certain continuity,
I have attempted to establish points of general
importance about the activities of people concerned
with making artworks of any kind. Clearly I have
had to limit the sort and number of examples and
since many problems beset the description of their
making, I make no claims to have resolved the diff-
iculties arising out of the endeavour. All I can
hope is that in looking at questions that arise
once an artist sets out on the business of some
sort of making I have been able to structure some
possibility of reply. At the least I can say this:
I began by stating my position as an interested
party. The two fields of interest, art and phil-
o_ophy, in which I am involved turn out to be
mutually informative. The matters relevant to
the particular case have been shown to be of gen-
eral philosophical significance. For it is, as
I have earlier remarked,of fundamental importance
to the artist that out of concern for the way in
which he works he further his concern for the way
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